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This study explores and analyzes the grassroots movement against goldmining in 
the villages of Bergama, Turkey. The struggle of Bergama villagers started out as a local 
ecological resistance movement in the early 1990s and gradually transformed into an 
environmental justice movement with national implications when activists adopted a 
rights-based discourse by incorporating into their claims the notions of justice, 
democratic participation, and citizenship rights.  
Since goldmining investment in Bergama was a manifestation of significant shifts 
in the global corporate mining industry starting in the 1980s, and of changes in the world 
political economy, an account of these shifts is presented as the global political-economic 
background for the grassroots resistance movement in Bergama. This global perspective 
is complemented by an account of the domestic socio-economic and political context in 
which the Bergama villagers’ resistance movement unfolded.  
The study employs two reference frames for the conceptual and theoretical 
analysis of the Bergama villagers’ movement. The Environmental Justice Movement 
(EJM) Literature is reviewed for conceptual clues pertaining to the transformation 
process of the movement under investigation. As the theoretical reference frame, the New 
Social Movements (NSM) approach to contemporary social movements is employed in 
an attempt to assess the applicability of this theoretical approach to the resistance 
movement of Bergama villagers, as well as the EJM in the United States.  
NSM theories are inadequate in explaining these movements. Based on the 
weaknesses of the NSM and the similarities identified between the Bergama villagers’ 
movement and the EJM, I assert that a new approach to theorizing social movements, 
which takes as its point of departure these similarities, is necessary. I argue that such an 
approach will guide not only social movement scholars in understanding ecological 
grassroots movements in the global North and South but also movement activists in their 
struggle for social change. In contrast, an exclusive focus on the distinctions between the 
ecological grassroots movements in the global South, on the one hand, and in the North, 
on the other, based merely on their economic and cultural differences, will be counter-
productive in challenging the systemic root causes of ecological problems plaguing the 











GOLD IN GLOBAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
…..They are astonished that gold, which has so few practical uses, is 
now everywhere valued so highly by human beings that people 
themselves are thought to be worth much less than gold, though the 
value of gold derives entirely from the uses to which people put it. 
 
    Thomas More – Utopia (1516) 
 
 
At the crossroads of two continents, Europe and Asia, lies Anatolia1, the 
birthplace of numerous ancient civilizations and the home of prominent thinkers such as 
Homer, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Herodotus, Heraclides, and Strabo. From 
ancient times, each generation in these lands grew up hearing the legends of the vast 
riches of Anatolian culture. Such is the renowned myth of King Midas of Phrygia, an 
ancient civilization that lived in what is today the western part of Turkey (Figure 1).  
Legend has it that Dionysus, one of Zeus’s sons, was on an expedition from 
Thrace to Phrygia when his companion and tutor, Silenus, went astray in a state of 
intoxication and fell asleep in the rose gardens of King Midas. The gardeners caught him 
and led him before the King. Recognizing Silenus, Midas treated him as an honorable 
guest, entertained him for ten days, and then led him back to Dionysus.  When Dionysus 
offered Midas a wish to be fulfilled in gratitude for his tutor’s safe return, Midas asked 
that everything he touched be turned into gold. The request was granted, but the King’s 
joy was short-lived. Faced with the dark side of his power, when even his food and drink 
                                                 
1 Geographical region that makes up the Asian part of modern Turkey. It is a 
peninsula, bordered by the Black Sea on the North, the Aegean Sea on the West, and the 
Mediterranean on the South. The term Anatolia stems from the Greek, meaning the 
‘rising of the sun’ or ‘east’. The region is also referred to as Asia Minor by its Latin 
name.   
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turned to gold, Midas begged Dionysus to rescind his gift. “To be released from your 
wish,” said Dionysus, “you need to wash yourself in the source of the Pactolus River near 
Mount Tmolus.” Midas at once did as he was told, and was thus freed from the curse of 
the golden touch. Since that day, the Pactolus River is believed to carry an abundance of 
gold in its sand.   
The end of power for Midas heralded the beginning of wealth for another 
Anatolian King. Croesus was the last King of Lydia, an ancient civilization of Western 
Anatolia. Mount Tmolus (modern Bozdağ) was located in Lydian territories, and Sardis 
(modern Sart), the capital city of Lydia, lay on the banks of the Pactolus River (modern 
Sart Çayı). In his Geographica, Strabo2 (1917) traced the geographical link between the 
myth of Midas and the wealth of Croesus in the following account: “The Pactolus River 
flows from Mt. Tmolus; in early times a large quantity of gold dust was brought down in 
it, whence, it is said, arose the fame of the riches of Croesus and his descendants” 
(p.173).  
But Croesus owed his fame only partly to the vast quantity of gold he had at his 
disposal. The Lydian King gained historical renown for introducing the world’s first 
coinage of pure gold3 in sixth century BCE (Bernstein 2000, Dinç 2004, Green 1973, 
Marx 1978, Pamuk 2000, Tcha 2003).   
          
                                                 
2 Greek historian and geographer (b. 64 BCE - d. 24 CE).  
3 It was Gyges, another Lydian king, who is credited with the invention of the 
world’s first coined money in seventh century BCE, a century before Croesus. Whereas 
Gyges’ coinage was made of electrum, a naturally occurring alloy of gold and silver, 
Croesus was able to refine electrum into pure gold and pure silver, and issue the first coin 
of pure gold.  
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Figure 1: Anatolia in antiquity 
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Gold held humans in its thrall with a magical allure for thousands of years before 
the time of Croesus. The first appeal of gold was its ever-radiant yellow color4. Due to its 
glow ancient people regarded gold as a divine substance coming from the sun (Bernstein 
2000, Marx 1978). Later, as people looked beyond the mystical gleam of gold they 
observed the worldly powers of this precious metal. Unlike silver, gold did not tarnish or 
corrode; it was not dissolved by many acids; and its unrivaled malleability and ductility 
allowed goldsmiths to craft fine articles of jewelry, and ornaments of wood, pottery and 
textile. The combination of these characteristics made gold a source of absolute power 
and an object of adulation for humankind, as expressed by Pindar5 (1915) in fifth century 
BCE: “Gold is a child of Zeus; neither moth nor rust devoureth it; but the mind of man is 
devoured by this supreme possession” (p.611).   
Croesus’ innovation added to the timeless lure of gold, ultimately placing this 
metal at the heart of the international trade and monetary system as the universally 
accepted medium of exchange and standard of value6. The same novelty concurrently 
opened Pandora’s box, shaping human experience for generations to come. Humanity’s 
eternal craving and search for this yellow metal subjugated whole nations, killed entire 
populations, and wiped out civilizations and religions (Marx 1978:2). “Get gold,” King 
                                                 
4 This physical characteristic of gold also accounts for its chemical symbol Au, 
derived from Aurum in Latin, meaning “shining dawn”. 
5 Greek poet (b. 522 BCE – d. 443 BCE). 
6 The supremacy of gold in the world commercial and money markets was 
challenged by another precious metal for a long time (Bernstein 2000, Green 1973). A 
bimetallic currency system of gold and silver prevailed in most countries until “the 
increasing supplies of gold, first from Brazil in the eighteenth century, then from Russia, 
California, Australia and South Africa in the nineteenth century…led to the 
demonetisation of silver and enabled gold to become the sole standard of value” (Green 
1973:17).   
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Ferdinand of Spain commanded his conquistadors in 1511, as he sent them westward 
across the ocean in search of gold, “humanely if possible, but at all hazards, get gold!” 
(quoted in Bernstein 2000:15, Green 1973:11, Marx 1978:17-18). The Incas, the Mayas, 
the Aztecs, and the Caribs succumbed as a result; high and low cultures were 
extinguished (Marx 1978:18). 
The 1848 discovery of gold in California ushered in the Age of Gold in the New 
World. Another milestone came in the late nineteenth century when mining companies 
replaced individual prospectors in the search for gold. Individual goldseekers had 
collected the visible alluvial gold that lay exposed as nuggets in and along streams; 
further gold recovery called for concerted effort, better equipment and more efficient 
mining techniques7. By the mid 1850s, gold was no longer mined by “the individual 
miner with his pan, but a group of men joining together and pooling their capital to build 
more elaborate crushing equipment and to dig deeper” (Green 1973: 37) 
The real breakthrough for investors in gold mining occurred in 1887, when two 
Scottish physician brothers, Robert and William Forrest, and a chemist, John MacArthur, 
patented their technique of extracting gold from the ore8 with cyanide9. The so-called 
MacArthur-Forrest process, also known as cyanidation or cyanide leaching, requires that 
gold ore be crushed to a fine powder, then circulated through tanks containing a solution 
                                                 
7 Mercury-based mining, a method for separating minute particles of gold from 
surrounding materials by amalgamation with mercury, became the norm for gold 
extraction in this era. 
8 Body of rock, containing one or more minerals in such concentrations that it is 
economically feasible to extract them.   
9 Cyanide and its ability to dissolve gold had been discovered in 1783 by Carl 
Wilhelm Scheele, a Swedish, self-taught chemist (who died at the age of 44 due to long-
term exposure to highly toxic substances, among them hydrogen cyanide). However, the 
compound was not used in gold mining until the late 19th century.   
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of sodium cyanide that dissolved gold. Solid wastes containing cyanide are separated 
from the gold-bearing solution and deposited in a waste pond. Gold is then precipitated 
from the remaining solution using zinc dust (Green 1973:42, Weston 1983:133). The 
cyanidation technique maximized the rate of gold recovery from the ore, made the 
investment in gold mining more profitable than ever, and thus, gave rise to the 
development of the modern corporate mining industry. The cyanide leaching method 
remains the dominant technique in gold extraction throughout the world.  
Two significant innovations in gold recovery came in the 1970s, when the carbon-
in-pulp process and the heap leaching cyanidation method were applied for the first time. 
The carbon-in-pulp process, described as “the most revolutionary gold recovery 
development since the cyanide process” (Hall and Laxen quoted in Weston 1983:133), 
involved the recovery of gold “directly from cyanide pulp [skipping the process of 
separating solid waste from the gold-bearing solution] by adsorption on to a suitable 
granular activated carbon, which, when loaded, is then eluted to provide a solution” 
(Weston 1983:134). In the final step, gold is recovered from this solution by electrolysis. 
The carbon-in-pulp process further reduced capital and operating costs, increased the rate 
of gold recovery even more, and thus, was swiftly adopted by the corporate mining 
industry in gold mining operations worldwide.  
The other new technique, the heap leaching method, entailed the spraying of a 
cyanide solution over an open-air, flattened heap of extracted gold ore. As the solution 
seeps into the heap, it dissolves gold. The gold-bearing solution is then collected from the 
leach pad at the base of the heap, and gold extracted from this solution (Weston 
1983:136). The heap leaching process made it economically feasible to extract gold from 
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ores with concentrations as low as 0.4 ppm10, which were previously considered 
unprofitable mineral reserves (Dinç 2004, Fields 2001, Weston 1983). As conventional 
gold collection tools such as sheepskin, hollow reeds, pans, and wooden rockers were 
thus relegated to oblivion as ancient artifacts, contemporary gold recovery techniques 
turned the mine sites of the twentieth century into chemical processing facilities. 
The more profitable techniques combined in the 1980s with favorable political 
and economic developments at the global level to produce the golden age of the corporate 
mining industry. The decade was marked by rapid rises in gold prices; decreases in 
production costs, leading to increased investments and profit margins of the corporate 
mining giants; and a geographical shift in exploration and production activities, 
encompassing new areas with rich, unexploited or under-exploited gold reserves. 
The underlying reason for the sharp increase in gold prices from $ 44-per ounce in 
1971 to a record high of $ 850-per ounce in 1980 was the 1971 collapse of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary system. Adopted in 1944, the Bretton Woods system was a 
gold-exchange standard that combined a flexible floating exchange rate system with the 
nominally stable gold standard (Bordo 2003:32). The standard set the US dollar as the 
nominal anchor and required the United States to affix currency to gold at $35 per ounce. 
Other countries in the system were to peg their currencies to the US dollar. But in late 
1960s, the dollar was increasingly pressured by a large deficit in the US balance of 
payments, generated by the highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to finance 
the Vietnam War. The crisis culminated in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
                                                 
10 The concentration of metals or minerals in the ore, a.k.a. ore grade, is measured 
in ppm, i.e. parts per million. A gold concentration of 0.4 ppm is equivalent to 0.4 gram 
(0.015 ounce) of gold per ton of ore (0.4g/ton).  
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1971 when the United States relinquished gold convertibility, cutting the dollar-gold link 
and allowing the US dollar to float (Tcha 2003). No longer required to control private 
gold holdings to maintain the fixed dollar-gold standard, the US government in 1975 
lifted the ban on purchasing gold. An immediate upsurge in the demand for gold 
dramatically increased gold prices. For the corporate mining giants, high gold prices 
meant high returns on their investments.  
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the changes it triggered in US 
monetary policies reverberated across the globe in the 1980s. Following suit, many 
countries “adopted some form of floating exchange rate system and liberalized.…their 
foreign exchange and capital markets” (Allen et.al. 2003:81). Further reforms instituted 
within the framework of neo-liberal restructuring increasingly integrated these countries 
into the global economy and opened up their markets to global capital. Included in their 
financial and economic liberalization measures was the liberalization of the gold trade, 
creating a global market for this precious metal.  
The corporate giants of the global mining industry benefited from these 
developments, not only by exploiting increased investment opportunities and 
geographically diversifying their operations, but also by increasing their profit margins 
due to low capital and production costs of mining in the countries they invested in. In an 
attempt to attract foreign direct investment these countries provided incentives for global 
mining companies, which reduced the cost of mining in these newly emerging neo-liberal 
economies.  
For much of the twentieth century, South Africa was by far the largest gold 
producer, supplying up to 70 per cent of the world’s total gold output, followed by the 
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USSR, Canada, the United States, and Australia, respectively. This stable pattern started 
to change in the 1980s (Figure A-2 in the Appendix). As South Africa’s share declined, 
partly due to high costs of production, Brazil, Colombia, Papua New Guinea, China, and 
the Philippines emerged as promising producers. Geographical diversification in gold 
production continued into the 1990s, with the addition of other developing countries to 
the global gold market as significant suppliers: Indonesia, Peru, Chile, Guyana, Ghana, 
Mali, and Uzbekistan. During the 1990s, the finance sources of global mining projects 
shifted from shareholders and state enterprises to multilateral development agencies and 
regional banks, such as the private sector agencies of the World Bank Group-the 
International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency-, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Gedicks 2001, Szablowski 2007).  
Global gold production rose precipitously due to new mining techniques, rising 
gold prices, increased investment opportunities, global funding, and decreased production 
costs. The total supply of gold increased from 1,200 tons in 1980 to 2,500 tons in 2006 
(USGS, Minerals Yearbook).  
But the upward trend in gold production “is now levelling off, due not least to a 
considerable slowdown in exploration spending in the late 1990s” (World Gold Council 
2006). Underlying this slowdown are disputes starting in the early 1990s that pitted 
global mining corporations and, often, host governments against the residents of mining 
communities concerned with the environmental and public health risks of mining 
operations. Along with the expansion of mining investments in terms of geography and 
scope came negative impacts of mining operations. As local communities increasingly 
voiced their reaction mining conflicts became a highly contested issue on the agenda of 
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global politics. The wide spectrum of stakeholders in these conflicts included mining 
corporations, commercial lenders, governments of the host and home countries, 
international financial institutions, insurers, industry associations, consultants, grassroots 
groups, NGOs, and affected communities (Szablowski 2007:3).    
In spite of the technological developments in gold production, a technology for 
eliminating the risks associated with cyanide use and with the mobilization of heavy 
metals in the processing of huge quantities of ore11 is yet to be found. As stated in an 
article in The Economist, “[w]hen it comes to despoiling the planet and polluting the 
environment, the mining industry is a world beater” (07/14/2001, 360(8230):75).  
Acid mine drainage is by far the most serious environmental hazard associated 
with gold mining because it exposes populations to heavy metals and other toxic 
materials (Fields 2001, Pearce 2000, Vick 1983).  The waste material left after the 
desired mineral is extracted from ore is referred to as ‘tailings’ and consists of ground-up 
rock containing uneconomic metals, minerals, organics, and process water. The tailings 
are either discharged as slurry to a waste pond; stored on the ground in open pits or 
underground in mined-out voids; or disposed of in the ocean. Acid mine drainage refers 
to the chemical reaction of the tailings with water and air by which heavy metals in the 
ore are mobilized. Most mine tailings contain sulphide minerals, such as pyrites, which 
oxidize in air, producing sulphuric acid. Sulphuric acid dissolves dormant, highly toxic 
heavy metals in the tailings, such as arsenic, lead, cadmium, antimony, mercury, zinc, 
copper, aluminum, manganese, and chromium. These heavy metals drain off-site,  
contaminating groundwater and/or entire watersheds (Fields 2001, Pearce 2000). The 
                                                 
11 30 tons of earth is dug up to extract 1 ounce of gold.   
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dangers associated with acid mine drainage are greatest in regions at risk from flood and 
earthquakes (Pearce 2000:47).    
The biota, habitats, and communities around the mine sites worldwide are 
afflicted with cyanide and heavy metal spills into rivers and seepage into groundwater; 
cyanide poisoning due to inhalation; landscape pollution; and transportation accidents. In 
1984, heavy rains in Papua New Guinea generated a landslide that spilled toxic waste 
from a gold and copper mine into the Fly River system. Damage to a heap leach pad in 
the Summitville, Colorado goldmine in 1992 caused cyanide to spill into the Alamosa 
River. In Kyrgyzstan, a truck carrying two tons of sodium cyanide to the Kumtor 
goldmine crashed in 1995 and contaminated the Barskoon River. The 1995 failure of a 
tailings dam at Guyana’s Omai goldmine contaminated the Omai River with cyanide, and 
a similar failure in Baia Mare, Romania, spilled cyanide into the Danube River in 2000. 
In the same year, a freight helicopter transporting cyanide to the Tolukuma gold- and 
silvermine in Papua New Guinea dropped a one-ton box of sodium cyanide in the jungle 
(Mineral Policy Center 2004). A 2003 cyanide spill at a Nicaraguan goldmine 
contaminated the Bambana River, and seven children who drank from the river died. 
Over 100 people were hospitalized in 2003 after being poisoned by cyanide spilled from 
an overturned truck in Taiwan. In 2004, the State Council of China reported that three 
people were killed and another 15 hospitalized because of a hydrogen cyanide gas leak at 
a goldmine in Beijing's suburban district of Huairou (Habal and Roldan 2006, World 
Rainforest Movement 2003).  
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The most recent incident occurred in the Kışladağ Goldmine in Eşme, an Aegean 
town in the Province of Uşak in Turkey. In June 2006, gold extraction in Eşme was 
carried out on the basis of trial production, using the heap leaching cyanidation method. 
Over 1,000 residents experienced a set of symptoms associated with cyanide poisoning: 
severe headache, nausea, diarrhea, difficulties in breathing, and numbness in the 
extremities. A group of concerned physicians from the Aegean University in İzmir went 
to the region and collected blood samples to test for cyanide levels. They were unable to 
conduct tests because the vials were confiscated by the sub-provincial governor’s office. 
But nine of the ill Eşme residents had gone to İzmir for treatment; tests performed on 
their blood samples revealed high levels of cyanide (Elele Hareketi Basın Duyurusu, July 
19, 2006). Despite assertions by physicians, city administrators officially described 
residents’ illnesses as intestinal infection caused by bacteria in the drinking water. Two  
weeks later, the mine switched from trial to full production capacity with the 
authorization of the government. The Ministers of Environment and Forests, and of 
Energy and Natural Resources delivered speeches at the opening ceremony for the mine, 
declaring that Turkey’s gold potential would be exploited to the last nugget because of 
this mineral’s significant contribution to the Turkish economy.  
Gold returned to its land of birth as the venerated medium of economy twenty-six 
centuries after the first gold coin of Croesus. The first gold mine in the history of the 
Republic of Turkey was established in the early 1990s in an Aegean village in the 
agricultural town of Bergama, lying about fifty miles northwest of Sardis, the capital city 
of Croesus’s Lydia. In its accelerated quest for gold, the global mining industry chose 
Bergama in 1989 as one of 560 exploration sites in Turkey. Like everyone else in Turkey, 
 xvii
the villagers of Bergama valued gold as an article of adornment, a store of wealth and 
thus, a means of financial security. But, also like everyone else, they were neither 
familiar with gold mining nor with the many risks it involved. As they learned about the 
process of gold extraction, the potential destruction it might wreak, and the experiences 
of other communities around the world afflicted by mining, the Bergama villagers 
resisted gold mining on their prime agricultural lands. Their resistance started out as a 
local ecological movement, and transformed, over the course of nearly two decades, into 
an environmental justice movement with national implications when the villagers adopted 
a rights-based discourse by incorporating into their claims the notions of justice, 
democratic participation, and citizenship rights. Despite the many cases the villagers won 
in the domestic and international courts establishing the absence of public interest in 
operating the risky mining facility, and reaffirming the constitutionally sanctioned right 
of citizens to live in a healthy environment, goldmining continues in Bergama today. So 
does the resistance of Bergama villagers.  
Analyzing the history of humanity’s relationship to gold, Bernstein (2000) 
suggests that “gold reflects the universal quest for eternal life – the ultimate certainty and 
escape from risk” (p.5). If we take Bernstein’s observation at face value, the irony is 
arresting: In its aggressive pursuit of gold, the corporate mining industry imposes serious 
risks on the lives and life-sustaining resources of the communities around mine sites 
worldwide. Another remark on the history of gold may shed light on the puzzle. As Marx 
(1978) states, “….for millennia gold has had an aura of magic which defies the rational” 
(p.4). The irrationality of humankind’s obsession with gold particularly stands out when 
the magnitude of the environmental and social risks of gold mining is weighed against the 
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dispensability of most end uses of gold. To illustrate, in 1999, of all the extracted gold 
that is not stored by central banks as reserve holdings, 83 per cent was used for jewelry; 
the combined gold use in dentistry, electronics, telecommunications, aeronautics and 
aerospace industries amounted to a mere 7 percent (Tcha 2003:2). The share of gold held 
as reserve asset by central banks and supranational organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, accounted for roughly 20 
percent. Perhaps the clearest statement of the irrationality of human deeds a propos of 
gold is that by Yale University economist Robert Triffin: “Nobody could ever have 
conceived of a more absurd waste of human resources than to dig gold in distant corners 
of the earth for the sole purpose of transporting it and re-burying it immediately 
afterwards in other deep holes, especially excavated to receive it and heavily guarded to 
protect it” (Triffin 1961:89).   
In the face of its defiance of rationality, the time-hallowed appeal of gold did not 
wane; neither did the unyielding quest for this yellow metal. No unit of measure exists to 
gauge the social and environmental suffering inflicted upon the communities worldwide, 
which still seem to be haunted by the infamous legacy of King Ferdinand. But there are 
ways to measure the different attributes of gold. Karat, for one, quantifies the purity of 
gold in terms of the percentage of parts in 24 that are gold. Thus, 24 karats of gold 
denotes one hundred percent gold. And 8 karats is the lowest possible standard. 
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AUTONOMOUS GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS:  
 THE CONVERGENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF GLOBAL NORTH AND SOUTH 
AT DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
In the societies of the global North and South alike collective action and popular 
protest shifted both in nature and form starting from the 1970s, as manifested in the 
emergence of a variety of autonomous12 movements and community struggles for social 
change. Powerfully challenging the logics and practices of capitalism, militarism, formal 
democracy, eco-colonialism, dominion of technology, and wholesale commodification of 
human experience, these grassroots movements called for the empowerment of the 
people, direct democracy, human development, and decolonization of everyday life 
(Katsiaficas 2006, Wignaraja 1993, Yuen 2004). As diverse as their cultures and 
traditions are, the activists of these movements share an understanding that their 
grievances are tied to the existing system, which creates and sustains the illusion of 
popular participation in decision-making processes as governments and corporations 
cooperate to impose their neoliberal agenda on, and in this process impoverish, 
marginalize and alienate, millions of people worldwide. Movement activists counter the 
false universality of this system of control, epitomized by the Thatcher/Reagan ideology 
of TINA (There Is No Alternative), with their slogan of “Another World Is Possible” 
(Yuen 2004: xxiv, xxix).  
                                                 
12 In Katsiaficas’ conceptualization of the term, autonomy applies to collective 
relationships rather than individual subjectivity. Thus conceived, autonomous movements 
refer to those social movements that are independent from political parties and other 
formal, hierarchically organized institutes of the establishment. Instead of the false 
autonomy that the capitalist world system offers individuals in choices among various 
consumer products, politicians, and individual careers, these movements seek real 
autonomy in which collectivities can plan their future as part of humanity’s creative 
powers (Katsiaficas 2006: 266).  
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As Kothari (1993) enunciates, there is nothing new in the conflict between the 
forces of status quo and those of social change; however, what is new about autonomous 
grassroots politics is that for it the telos of political struggle is not the conquest of state 
power but the creation of direct democracy. Thus, autonomous grassroots movements 
struggle against systemic injustices that are bound to occur no matter which party or 
coalition of parties is in power, experimenting with new modes of politics by “building 
political communities and representing themselves as local citizens of a networked global 
polity”, and “keeping intellectual ferment alive so that state-based politics do not become 
an orthodoxy” (Kothari 1993: 73-74, Yuen 2004:viii-ix). In this conception of politics, as 
stated by Kothari (1993):  
…it is not enough to provide participation in the system, even if this could 
be made less formal and more substantial. The aim is also to create a just 
society. Participation is necessary but not sufficient for this to happen. For 
that what is needed is self-government, a decentralized order through 
which the masses are empowered, not decentralization in the sense of 
some territorial scheme of devolution of functions and resources to lower 
levels but decentralization in which the people are the center (P.74).  
 
 
Accumulation and Legitimation Crises in the Global North and South:  
A Historical Synopsis   
  
The tendency towards peridodically recurring crises is an inherent characteristic 
of capitalism that stems from the contradiction between the goal of capitalist 
accumulation and the means by which this goal is pursued (Arrighi 1978, Minibaş 2005). 
Historically, each crisis period saw the destruction of existing economic, social and 
political equilibria, creating new balances to reinforce the capitalist system (Minibaş 
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2005: 20).  Again, historically, the solution adopted by capital and the state to respond to 
a crisis gave rise to problems during subsequent crises (O’Connor 1984).  
 Intervening in the system the state takes into account the needs and the discontent 
of the dominated classes to maintain the system in the long run. But, as Poulantzas (1978) 
states:  
…within this framework, it adopts essential measures in favor of 
expanded reproduction of capital, elaborating them in a political manner 
such that, through certain concessions to the dominated classes [like free 
and universal public education, social security, unemployment benefits]…, 
they may guarantee the reproduction of the class hegemony and 
domination exercised by the bourgeoisie as a whole over the popular 
masses (P.185). 
 
Once the dominated classes are appeased with the concessions granted, however, the state 
strips these socio-economic gains of their initial content and character in a covert fashion 
(Piven and Cloward 1971, 1982, Poulantzas 1978).   
 In an attempt to rescue capital from its crisis in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression the liberal democratic state in the U.S. increasingly intervened in the 
economy in the 1930s. Along with promoting the private economy the state in this era 
also assumed an unprecedented role in protecting the working class against the socio-
economic costs of the processes of economic growth and capital accumulation. This 
compromise, which the post World War II social welfare states of the global North were 
built on, “enabled the state to maintain its claim to be democratic, neutral, and protective 
of the public good, while legitimizing its participation in the private economy” (Krauss 
1989: 230).  However, the welfare state compromise contradicted with the logic of 
capitalism. In its claim to legitimacy the state assumed a distributive and social role, 
raising democratic expectations. But in meeting these expectations the state was 
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constrained by the economic imperatives of the capitalist system. Put differently, the 
welfare state made an impossible promise for “democracy, equality, liberty, and personal 
fulfillment for all, within the context of capitalism” (Gintis 1980: 225).  To secure its 
legitimacy despite this contradiction and ensure continued mass loyalty the state offered 
its citizens a system of formal democracy, as opposed to substantive democracy 
(Habermas [1973] 1975).  
The distinction between formal and substantive (or direct) democracy that 
Habermas refers to is based on two different understandings of democracy, as 
conceptualized in the classical theory of democracy, on the one hand, and the theory of 
democratic elitism, on the other. Classical theory of democracy “is based on the 
supposition that man’s dignity, and indeed his growth and development as a functioning 
and responsive individual in a free society, is dependent upon an opportunity to 
participate actively in decisions that significantly affect him” (Bachrach 1967: 98, 
emphasis added). In contrast, democratic elitism theorists interprete the interests of the 
people narrowly in terms of the electoral privileges granted to them by political elites, 
and reduce democracy to a mere political method. In this conception then, “the standard 
for judging democracy is not the degree of centralization or devolution in the decision-
making process but rather the degree to which the system conforms to the basic principles 
of the democratic method: political equality (universal suffrage), freedom of discussion, 
majority rule, free periodic elections, and the like” (Bachrach 1967: 94). Thus, the 
argument goes, as long as these principles are adhered to, the system holds political elites 
accountable to non-elites, and thereby serves the interests of the latter.    
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Corresponding to the democratic elitist line of reasoning the welfare states of the 
advanced industrial countries adopted formal democracy as a means of reconciling 
capitalism and democracy. This was necessary from the point of view of the social 
welfare state because substantive or direct democracy would reveal the contradiction 
between the state’s role in capitalist accumulation and its claim to legitimacy. Using 
formal democratic institutions and procedures as the vehicle for its legitimation process - 
the process that Habermas ([1973] 1975) refers to as the formally democratic 
procurement of legitimation - the welfare state was able to guarantee mass loyalty, but 
keep the public from active participation in decision-making13. In the resulting 
“structurally depoliticized public realm” citizens centered their lives around career, 
leisure, and consumption, and expected rewards conforming to the system such as 
money, leisure time, and security (Habermas [1973] 1975: 37).   
 However, the shift in the boundary between the political system and the cultural 
system at the expense of the latter due to the expansion to the cultural realm of the state’s 
administrative planning and control gave rise to a deficit in the legitimation process. The 
systems of meaning, which individuals and groups drew on for identity formation and 
socialization, were damaged and their continuity disrupted with the state’s exploitation of 
cultural elements for administrative or market purposes in the late capitalist era. The 
legitimation deficit turned into legitimation crisis with increasing resistance to the 
                                                 
13 Robinson (1996) extends this conceptualization to the working of global 
politics under neoliberal dictates, arguing that for the policymakers of the 21st century 
global society, democratization is not a means of “meeting the authentic aspirations of 
repressed and marginalized majorities for political participation and for greater 
socioeconomic justice” but a tool for the maintenance of social control through 
incorporating masses into the global social order and thus, legitimizing that order 
(Robinson 1996: 71-72).  
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objectification and strategic employment of the cultural system for the needs of the 
administrative system (Habermas [1973] 1975).    
 As Wolfe (1977) noted: 
The inability of government to achieve its professed ends despite its 
seeming power, the separation of decision makers from the public, the 
eclipse of rationality and its replacement by a world of illusions and 
falsehoods, the bankruptcy of traditional political thought, the replacement 
of genuine politics by an alienated opposite, the schizophrenic nature of 
citizenship, the breakdown of mediating mechanisms, and the 
utopianization of ruling classes – all these processes operating together 
have contributed to a serious paralysis of the late capitalist state (P.323).  
 
 The development experience of the global South has been, and is, closely tied to 
the political economy of the global North, not only through historical relations of 
colonialism but also in terms of the ongoing political, economic, and ecological 
impositions of the capitalist world economy on the former.   
 Following their liberation from colonial rule and emergence as politically 
independent nation states in the post-World War II era, countries of the global South 
adopted a development model based on central planning and control of the economy by 
the state and/or the private capital, with the main goals of industrialization, modernization 
and urbanization. The model was to be carried out in a top-down fashion. The benefits 
would either trickle-down automatically or be handed down by the central state 
apparatus. Economic growth and development were expected to solve all the ills of the 
society, whether of material or social nature. In the course of this development process, 
internal capital accumulation was to “be assisted by free and massive inflows of foreign 
capital and technology” from the industrialized global North, either the free market 
economies of the West or the centrally planned economies of the East (Wignaraja 1993: 
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8). Underlying this path of development was the idea that the global South would 
“overcome ‘underdevelopment’ in ‘interdependence’ with the rest of the world economy” 
(Amin 1993: 77).  
However, this development model failed on several grounds. At the national level, 
essentially replicating private capitalism or state capitalism, the economic policies 
adopted within the framework of the development model ignored the socio-economic 
specificities of the countries of the South. To illustrate, existing approaches to economic 
development in the global North looked at the private and the public sector as 
dichotomies, ignoring the informal people’s sector, which constituted 30-40 percent of 
the economies of the global South (Wignaraja 1993:14). Politically, the hierarchical and 
highly centralized bureaucratic-technocratic processes excluded people from participation 
in decision-making at every level of government. Resistance to this exclusion did not 
bring about social change because opposition to the system was violently repressed by 
militarized state structures (Wignaraja 1993). Along with its role as the facilitator of 
domestic capital accumulation to maintain internal class domination the state became 
“the instrument of the ‘adjustment’ of the local society to the demands of worldwide 
accumulation” (Amin 1993: 81). Thus, at the international level, the massive transfer of 
resources from the global South to the global North widened the gap between the two 
poles, and illustrated that a technology-capital centered development model was 






Apart from the model’s narrow orientation and its lack of relevance to 
Southern countries, the realities of the quantity and quality of foreign aid, 
of transfers of technology, and of the weak internal mobilization efforts 
ensured that the prevailing assumptions regarding the possibilities for 
rapid growth were of little operational value…[N]either the quantity of aid 
nor its quality nor the kinds of technology transferred were sufficient or 
appropriate to transform these societies, let alone to lift them out of the 
poverty trap into modernization and industrialization…They have created 
impoverished rural areas in the South and increased the dependence of 
Southern countries within an inequitable global order (P. 8).   
 
 The failure of the economic development model in the global South, and the 
concomitant acute problems such as economic polarization, youth alienation and 
environmental degradation “weakened the legitimacy of the nation state, its claims to 
sovereignty and its ability to be a protector and mediator” (Wignaraja 1993: 19).   
 
Neoliberalism and the Grassroots Backlash  
 The 1970s were marked by the stagnation crisis of the capitalist world economy. 
To solve the problem of falling rates of profit the global capital started an offensive 
against the South and the working classes in the North, targeting the gains made during 
the period of global economic expansion between 1945 and 1970 (Wallerstein 2004). 
This offensive, which came to be called neoliberalism, manifested itself in the political 
realm with the distinct turn to the right of national and international politics. The 
resulting conservative policies “constituted a pushback on all three sources of rising cost 
for [global capital]: wages, the internalization of costs to reduce ecological damage, and 
state taxation to finance the welfare state” (Wallerstein 2004: 123).   
 Through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and institutions 
such as the World Economic Forum, the Trilateral Commission and the G7, the core 
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countries of the world economy along with the business elite devised the specifics of the 
neoliberal economic policy. The resulting Washington Consensus: 
proclaimed that the world was in the era of “globalization”. Globalization 
was said to be the triumph of the free market, the radical reduction of the 
economic role of the state, and above all, the elimination of all barriers to 
transborder movements of goods and capital. The Washington Consensus 
ordained that the prime role of governments, especially those in the South, 
was…. to accept the unrestricted opening of their frontiers….[A]ny 
government that did not conform would be punished, first of all by the 
world market and second of all by interstate institutions (Wallerstein 2004: 
123).  
 
 The states of the South had to borrow from outside lenders to cope with the 
negative effects on their economies of the stagnation of the world economy and the debt 
crisis. Thus, the impositions of the IMF and the World Bank, the two powerful enforcers 
of the Washington Consensus, were incorporated into the national economic policies of 
the global South. In return for their loans to the South the IMF and the World Bank 
stipulated that the economies of the former be restructured in line with neoliberal policy 
prescriptions, that is, social services be reduced, trade be liberalized, and priority be 
given to the repayment of external debt over any other policy measure. The global 
neoliberal agenda was further bolstered with the establishment in 1995 of the World 
Trade Organization, which functions as a forum for trade liberalization, coordination of 
multilateral trade negotiations, and settlement of trade disputes.  
 These top-down policy impositions were counteracted by powerful social 
movements from below. People worldwide stood up and acted against the imperatives of 
the capitalist world-economy that increasingly benefited the few at the expense of the 
many, whose socio-economic needs were disregarded by the system, and who were 
excluded from decision-making processes at local, national and global levels of 
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government. Examples of these movements include the democratization struggles in the 
Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Latin American countries; ecological grassroots 
movements against commercial and industrial projects destructive of the lives and 
livelihoods of communities, such as the Chipko movement and the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan in India, and the Environmental Justice Movement in the United States; 
ecological resistance movements mobilized by indigenous people and other inhabitants of 
rural communities against the risks and damages of corporate mining operations in West 
Papua in Indonesia, Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea, Niger Delta in Nigeria, 
Intag in Ecuador, Bergama, Eşme, Havran, and others in Turkey, Cajamarca in Peru, 
Imataca in Venezuela, and Rosia Montana in Romania; and the ‘movement of 
movements’, also known as ‘alterglobalization’, ‘counterglobalization’, ‘global justice 
movement’ or ‘antisystemic movement’ (Yuen 2004: viii), which brings together diverse 
groups from the global North and South against the economic and socio-cultural ravages 
of the Washington Consensus such as increasing unemployment, alienation, destruction 
of food autonomy, and ecological damage (Wallerstein 2004).   
 
Ecological Grassroots Movements: At the Crossroads of System and Lifeworld 
 
Ecological destruction and environmental inequities are closely linked to the 
political economy of capitalist production processes and relations (Faber 1998, Foster 
1998, O’Connor 1998). To sustain the process of capital accumulation and profit increase 
the global economy relies on ecologically and socially destructive forms of production. In 
this process, governments practically serve as agents of global capital. By pitting 
economic growth against environmental protection, and taking decisions that privilege 
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the former over the latter, political elites accommodate the needs of economic elites. It is 
at this rift between economics and politics on the one hand, and the social and natural 
environment on the other, that ecological grassroots struggles find their meaning. In 
Habermas’ ([1981] 1989) words, “the new conflicts arise along the seams between 
system and lifeworld” (p.395). Thus, ecological grassroots movements in the global 
North and South struggle both to protect their means of life against “further destruction 
resulting from capital’s inherent recklessness and excesses” and to democratize the state 
through structural change (O’Connor 1998:12).   
Starting from the late 1970s and early 1980s, residents in communities across the 
U.S. have frequently mobilized in grassroots social movement organizations to oppose a 
local environmental threat. Love Canal in upstate New York was the first of hundreds of 
communities organized to fight against toxic contamination in their neighborhood. When 
residents discovered in 1978 that their community was contaminated with hazardous 
waste disposed of by a chemical company they organized a local protest and fought a 
successful battle against the company, forcing it to be accountable for its actions (Di 
Chiro 1998). Their path of resistance and protest was followed by many communities 
throughout the country facing similar problems. Other communities organized to oppose 
a proposed facility construction in their neighborhoods due to high environmental risks 
involved. The literature shows that some of these community groups transformed into 
justice, equity, and rights-based movement organizations when they realized over the 
course of their struggle the compounded nature of inequalities they face on political, 
economic, social, and environmental grounds (Bullard 1994, 1996, Bullard and Wright 
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1992, Taylor 1993). However, the conditions under which such transformation occurs is 
not examined by social movement scholars.    
This research project is an attempt to address this gap in the literature through an 
exploratory case study examining a grassroots movement in the villages of Bergama, 
Turkey that transformed from an environmental to a rights-based movement. The 
villagers’ long-lasting struggle against gold mining started out as a local ecological 
resistance movement in the early 1990s, and gradually transformed into an environmental 
justice movement with national implications when activists adopted a rights-based 
discourse by incorporating into their claims the notions of justice, democratic 
participation, and citizenship rights. This transformation occurred against the background 
of significant economic and political changes in Turkey. On the economic level, Turkey 
saw a radical shift in policy from an inward-oriented development strategy and planned 
economy based on import substitution, heavy protectionism, and export pessimism in the 
1960s and 1970s, to neoliberal economy based on export expansion and progressive 
liberalization of the trade regime and the capital account, starting in the early 1980s. On 
the political level, Turkey’s long, ambitious journey to become a full member of the 
European Union (EU) gained momentum with the entry into force of the Customs Union 
Agreement in 1996, and with the endorsement of the candidate status of Turkey by the 
EU Helsinki Council in 1999. The political significance of these developments was 
manifest in the sweeping reforms undertaken by the Turkish Parliament in 2001 and 2002 
to meet the democracy and human rights criteria for EU membership.     
This study contributes to the field of environmental justice studies by addressing 
the gap in the literature that leaves environmental injustices outside the U.S. less 
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examined. The research also provides an in-depth account of the transformation process 
of the Bergama movement, and an understanding of the formation and transformation of 
this community’s collective identity. As such, it adds to other studies in the literature, 
which point to movement transformation but fail to address the specific questions of 
‘why’ and ‘how’. An essential analytical departure of the current study from previous 
research on the Bergama case is that the former not only examines the movement 
transformation from the perspective of internal movement dynamics but also ties it to the 
political-economic context by looking at the interrelations between the transformation of 
the movement and the changes in the political-economic setting at the national, as well as 
the global level. Finally, the study presents an opportunity for further research to compare 
the Bergama movement with other cases around the world, which in turn, is likely to 
contribute to an adequate understanding of the shift in the meaning of justice within the 




ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT: 
A “NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT”? 
 
 
The emergence and upsurge of new forms of collective action in the industrially 
advanced Western societies in the late 1960s and early 1970s challenged the classical 
theories of social movements on both sides of the Atlantic and led to the emergence of a 
new strand of theories in the social movement literature. Among these, the European-
origined New Social Movements (NSM) theories viewed the social movements of the 
post-1960 era as manifestations of and responses to the structural conditions of advanced 
industrial societies. According to the NSM theorists, the contemporary social movements 
were brought about by new conflicts. Underlying these conflicts was the contradiction 
between the systemic acknowledgment and reinforcement of the autonomy of individual 
action, on the one hand, and the encroachment of state power into the private sphere, on 
the other (Della Porta et.al. 2006, Habermas [1981] 1989, Melucci 1989, Offe 1985). For 
NSM theorists, a defining characteristic of the new conflicts was their socio-cultural 
nature, which significantly differed from the old, class-based conflicts over economic 
distribution (Della Porta et.al. 2006, Habermas 1970, [1973] 1975, [1981] 1989, Melucci 
1980, 1989, 1996, Offe 1985, Touraine [1978] 1981).  
 Contrary to the arguments of the NSM theorists, however, class-based conflicts 
continued into the post-industrial era in developed and developing countries alike. In the 
case of environmental movements, these conflicts effected the emergence of ecological 
resistance movements against the assault of extractive and polluting industries on the life-
sustaining resources of socio-economically marginalized communities worldwide and 
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against the disproportionate distribution of the costs and benefits of capital accumulation. 
The Environmental Justice Movement in the USA constitutes an example of these 
movements.  
This chapter provides a review of the NSM approach to contemporary social 
movements and of the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) in an attempt to assess 
the usefulness of the NSM theories in explaining the latter. 
 
The Emergence of New Social Movements (NSM) Theories 
  
 For the greater part of the 20th century, European and North American social 
movement scholars have focused on structural strain and ideology to explain collective 
action. Within the American tradition of analysis, strain theorists argued that rapid social 
change introduced pervasive strains into society and social movements emerged as 
mechanisms to cope with the emotional stress of those strains. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, sociologists emphasized the socio-economic class base of the movements and 
centered their analyses upon ideologies that movement actors drew on to articulate their 
sense of injustice, which provided the basis for mobilization (Johnston et.al. 1994). 
 The emergence in the 1960s of movements, mobilized around different grievances 
and demands, and expressed by different constituencies than in previous cases of 
collective action, prompted social movement scholars to devise new theories to explain 
contemporary movements.  
In the US, resource mobilization (RM) theories developed in the 1970s as a 
response to strain theories. RM theorists argued that structural strain alone did not 
sufficiently explain movement emergence because strain always existed in society. As 
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their point of departure to analyze contemporary movements RM theorists focused on the 
resources and opportunity structures available for the mobilization and organization of 
movements, and on the rational orientation of movement actors.  
New social movements (NSM) theories emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
in continental Europe as another attempt to explain the post-1960 movements. NSM 
theorists offered a corrective to RM theories and the dominant European theories of 
collective action. According to NSM theorists, RM scholars restricted their analyses to 
the micro-level, and failed to link the emergence and nature of contemporary social 
movements to the pervasive structural changes of the late modern era. On the other hand, 
the dominant European theories of collective action were built on the economic 
reductionism of classical Marxism, and thus, proved inadequate for grasping 
contemporary social movements (Buechler 2000). Marxist social movement scholars had 
argued that the fundamental economic logic of capitalist production shaped all politically 
motivated collective action, and that the class standing of movement activists defined 
their collective identity. Reasoning that socio-economic stratification categories no longer 
applied to contemporary social movement actors NSM theorists looked to ascriptive 
identity codes, like ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and age, as the determinants of collective 
identity, and to socio-cultural factors as the source of movement emergence.  
 
NSM Theorists 
 Although NSM theories share common themes that distinguish them as a 
consistent theoretical framework from other theoretical approaches to social movements 
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they vary in the emphases they assign to political, structural, social and cultural aspects of 
contemporary social movements. 
In an attempt to lay out the variances within the NSM theoretical framework, this 
section introduces the basic ideas of four major NSM theorists: Jürgen Habermas of 
Germany, Alain Touraine of France, Alberto Melucci of Italy, and Manuel Castells of 
Spain. 
Jürgen Habermas 
 Habermas constructs a two-level concept of society that integrates lifeworld and 
system. Lifeworld incorporates the processes of reaching understanding in social 
interaction. The lifeworld of the members of a community comprises of undisputed 
background convictions, which are culturally transmitted, linguistically organized, and 
continuously renewed in interaction. These background convictions serve as interpretive 
patterns of communication, which communicative actors draw on for common definitions 
of situations.  
 System, on the other hand, incorporates the processes of material reproduction of 
the lifeworld, through which a society secures its physical existence in relation to nature 
and ensures its functional integration.  
 In late capitalist societies, the twin processes of rationalization of the lifeworld 
and the increasing complexity of the system brought about the uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld. Rationalization of the lifeworld occurs when the institutionally produced 
knowledge penetrates to the level of everyday communication and replaces the 
interaction-guiding functions of the unchallenged traditional knowledge that is immune 
from any criticism (Habermas [1981] 1984: 340). With the rationalization of the 
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lifeworld, the communicatively-structured and socially-integrated spheres of action, i.e. 
the private and public spheres, are differentiated from the formally-organized and 
systemically-integrated domains of action, i.e. the economy and the state (Habermas 
[1981] 1989: 318). In this process, societal integration is overtaken by the language-
independent steering media of money and power, which set their own imperatives against 
the marginalized lifeworld. Thus, the mediatization of the lifeworld turned into the 
colonization of the lifeworld.  
 Habermas states that the new social movements are directed against “the profit-
dependent instrumentalization of work in one’s vocation, the market-dependent 
mobilization of labor power, against the extension of pressures of competition and 
performance all the way down into elementary school. [They also take] aim at the 
monetarization of services, relationships, and time, at the consumerist redefinition of 
private spheres of life and personal life-styles” (Habermas [1981] 1989: 395). In short, 
the new social movements are mobilized against the colonization of the lifeworld. 
Alain Touraine 
 According to Touraine, industrial society is gradually replaced by a programmed 
society. The characteristic feature of programmed society is “that the central investments 
are now made at the level of production management and not at that of work 
organization, as is the case in industrial society” (Touraine [1978]1981: 6). Consequently, 
class domination in programmed society consists less in organizing work than in 
managing the production and the data-processing apparatus. Touraine designates the 
dominant class of programmed society as the technocracy. Since the domination by 
technocracy transcends the realm of work and extends to the organization of social life 
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the resistance to this domination is not limited to a particular sphere and a particular 
class. Thus, the struggle is no longer between capital and labor in the factory but between 
the different kinds of apparatus and their users, i.e. consumers or the public, at large. The 
latter is defined by their resistance to domination rather than by their specific attributes, 
like economic class. As opposed to the economy- and labor-centered social struggles in 
industrial society collective resistance in programmed society is carried out in the socio-
cultural realm for the control of historicity. 
Historicity is a central concept in Touraine’s theory of social movements. It refers 
to the capacity of social actors to construct a system of knowledge and the cultural, 
cognitive, economic, and ethical models that allow them to produce society. A social 
movement, according to Touraine, is “the organized collective behavior of a class actor 
struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete 
community” (Touraine [1978]1981: 77). The contemporary social movements over the 
control of historicity involve a struggle between the public and the technocrats over who 
will program the programmed society. 
Alberto Melucci 
Melucci conceives of postindustrial societies as complex systems driven by 
advanced information technologies. Thus, production in these societies revolves not only 
around economic resources but also around social relationships, symbols, identities and 
individual needs (Melucci 1996: 99). Similarly, the market is transformed from a setting 
where material goods are circulated to a virtual sphere in which symbols are exchanged. 
Due to the ever-rising complexity of the system, the management of postindustrial 
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societies requires increasing intervention in the relational processes and symbolic systems 
on the social/cultural domain.  
The distant and impersonal apparatuses of control in postindustrial society follow 
an instrumental rationality and subject individuals to its dictates, which permeate daily 
life and existential choices by intervening in and manipulating identity formation 
processes, communicative resources, relations with nature, and the biological and 
affective deep structure of individual behavior. Resisting this domination, the new social 
movements focus on personal, spiritual and expressive aspects of life.  
Melucci identifies five characteristics shared by all new social movements 
(Melucci 1996: 102-103). One common characteristic is the low negotiability of the 
goals. Due to their socio-cultural nature only a small portion of the demands of new 
social movements can be mediated and institutionalized through political representation 
and decision-making. Secondly, unlike previous forms of collective action, the new social 
movements are not interested in seizing political power and gaining control over the state 
apparatus. Rather, they demand immediate control over the conditions of existence, and 
freedom from the domination by the system. Thirdly, new social movements challenge 
the separation between the public and the private. This challenge manifests itself in the 
attempt of the movement actors to politicize everyday life, aiming at its democratization. 
Fourthly, new social movements express solidarity as an objective in their search for a 
communal identity. They often center on identity codes such as gender, age, ethnicity, 
and locality to achieve solidarity. Finally, new social movements reject representation 
and appeal to spontaneity, anti-authoritarianism, anti-hierarchism, and direct action 
tactics as their modes of action. 
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Manuel Castells 
Castells argues that the techno-economic transformation of society, brought about 
by the information technology revolution and the neo-liberal restructuring of capitalism, 
induced a new form of society, which he calls the network society. The network society is 
characterized by the globalization of economic activities; the networking form of 
organization; the flexibility and instability of work; a pervasive, interconnected, and 
diversified media system; and the transformation of the material foundations of life. In 
Castells’ (2004: 2) words: “This new form of social organization, in its pervasive 
globality, is diffusing throughout the world,...shaking institutions, transforming cultures, 
creating wealth and inducing poverty, spurring greed, innovation, and hope, while 
simultaneously imposing hardship and instilling despair”.  
Castells conceptualizes the network society as being shaped by the opposite 
trends of globalization and identity. Since 1970s collective actors worldwide have been 
powerfully challenging the one-dimensional logic and the globalizing dynamics of the 
network society, and claiming control over their lives and environment. These collective 
expressions include proactive movements such as feminism and environmentalism, 
aiming at transforming human relationships; and reactive movements, resisting the 
assault of techno-economic forces on fundamental categories of social existence, like 
religion, nation, ethnicity, family, and locality.  
A common characteristic of these new social movements is their adoption of a 
decentralized form of organization based on networking, which mirrors and counteracts 
the mode of domination of the network society. These networks of collective action not 
only share information and organize activity but also produce and distribute cultural 
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codes. Due to their diffuse and subtle character it is difficult to assess the potential of 
these networks for creating social change. However, Castells (2004) argues, it is this 
same characteristic of collective action networks that promises to create a new society:  
Because our historical vision has become so used to orderly battalions, 
colorful banners, and scripted proclamations of social change, we are at a 
loss when confronted with the subtle pervasiveness of incremental 
changes of symbols processed through multiform networks, away from the 
halls of power. It is in these back alleys of society, whether in alternative 
electronic networks or in grassrooted networks of communal resistance, 
that I have sensed the embryos of a new society, labored in the fields of 
history by the power of identity (P.428).  
 
Premises of NSM Theories 
NSM scholars focused on the conditions and processes of transformation in 
postindustrial societies that gave rise to new social movements. On the macro-level, they 
studied the structural roots of new conflicts associated with modernity, capitalism, 
bureaucracy, and welfare state, and the new ideologies raised on those conflicts (Dalton 
and Kuechler 1990, Eder 1985, Habermas [1981]1989, Kriesi et.al. 1995, Offe 1985). 
According to NSM scholars, new social movements no longer accepted the premises of a 
society based on industrialization and economic growth, and reacted to the infusion of the 
welfare state into private spheres of life and to its creation of new needs, which could no 
longer be satisfied. On the micro-level, NSM theorists specified changing values, 
aspirations, grievances and collective identity as determinants of movement mobilization 
(Cohen 1985, Inglehart 1977, Melucci 1989, Pizzorno 1978, Touraine [1978] 1981).  
As the point of departure for their analyses NSM theorists looked into the 
structural, political-economic context in which contemporary social movements unfolded 
(Buechler 2000, Kriesi et.al. 1995). In an attempt to theorize the link between the social, 
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cultural and political transformation of postindustrial societies, on the one hand, and the 
emergence of new social movements, on the other, NSM scholars contrasted the old and 
new political paradigms. The old political paradigm of the liberal welfare state relied on a 
growth-security framework (Offe 1985). The underlying assumption of this framework 
was that dominant values of progress, growth, prosperity, social mobility, and 
instrumental rationality would foster the dynamic force of the politico-economic system, 
which was based on unabated industrial production and productivity increase through 
advanced technology. Furthermore, as the family-, work-, and consumption-centered 
private sphere would absorb the energies and aspirations of individuals or groups of 
individuals, the latter would show little or no interest in participating in the spehere of 
public policy as long as the state apparatus ensured the security needed for the 
uninterrupted flow of this dynamic process. Thus, the welfare state provided its citizens 
economic security through the social security system, military security through the 
national defense apparatus, and legal security through the judicial and correctional 
system.  
The unproblematic functioning of this political paradigm during the two decades 
following World War II was not so much due to the absence of social and political 
conflict in this era but rather to the widely agreed-on and undisputed modes of conflict 
resolution (Offe 1985). Conflicts revolved around socio-economic concerns such as the 
distribution of the benefits of economic growth and the protection of social status. As the 
dominant establishments representing collective actors, specialized interest organizations 
and political parties resorted to collective bargaining and party competition as the 
exclusive mechanisms of conflict resolution (Habermas [1981]1989, Offe 1985).  
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To accommodate collective actors within the growth-security framework, the 
welfare state also provided individuals with resources to develop their potential for 
autonomy and self-realization. However, to ensure the internal integration of the 
increasingly complex system, the state simultaneously needed to expand its control 
beyond the public sphere, subjecting individuals to the systemic dictates of the economy 
and the state apparatus, and thus invading the private sphere (Della Porta et.al. 2006, 
Habermas [1981] 1989, Melucci 1989, Offe 1985). On the one hand, individuals were 
asked “to participate in the shaping of their own identity, in the constitution of their 
capacity for action; on the other hand, their identity [was] denied and their capacity for 
action circumscribed through the ramified intervention of the apparatuses of control and 
regulation, which [defined] the conditions, forms, and goals of individual and collective 
action” (Melucci 1996:109). This contradiction led to what Habermas ([1981] 1989) 
termed the “colonization of the lifeworld”, and gave rise to new conflicts, which:  
…deviate in various ways from the welfare state pattern of 
institutionalized conflict over distribution. They no longer flare up in 
domains of material reproduction; they are no longer channeled through 
parties and associations….Rather, these new conflicts arise in domains of 
cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization; they are carried 
out in sub-institutional – or at least extraparliamentary – forms of 
protest…The issue is not primarily one of compensations that the welfare 
state can provide, but of defending and restoring endangered ways of life. 
In short, the new conflicts are not ignited by distribution problems but by 
questions having to do with the grammar of forms of life. (P.392). 
 
Another contradictory characteristic of advanced industrial societies was their 
structural incapacity to deal with the global threats and risks they created (Eder 1985, 
Habermas [1981]1989, Offe 1985). Omnipotent as they were in controlling, exploiting, 
and dominating their social and physical environments, the state and the economy in 
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advanced industrial societies were unable to cope with the self-destructive effects of the 
use of their power. 
The new conflicts that stemmed from the contradictions of advanced industrial 
societies transcended the old, class-based conflicts over distribution and brought about a 
shift in the focus of social movements from socio-economic goals to socio-cultural ones 
(Habermas [1981] 1989, Melucci 1996, Offe 1985, Touraine 1981). Born out of these 
new conflicts, the new political paradigm adopted by contemporary social movements 
sought to politicize everyday life, the institutions of work and family, the relations with 
nature, and the standards of rationality and progress, beyond the dominant channels of 
representative-bureaucratic political institutions, and thus, emancipate civil society from 
state regulation and control (Offe 1985:820). Defying the welfare state’s binary 
classification of ‘public sphere’ and ‘private sphere’, this politicization established for 
itself an intermediate, non-institutional niche between the private and public spheres. In 
this space of social action, new social movements resisted the intervention of the state 
and the market in daily life, claiming the right for individuals to decide on their own 
private and affective lives against the all-pervasive manipulation by the system (Della 
Porta et al. 2006:19). Emphasizing decentralization, freedom from control and regulation, 
and articulating their need for belonging, esteem, autonomy, and self-realization, the new 
social movement actors centered their demands around issues such as sexual identity, 
cultural-ethnic-linguistic identity, physical environment and quality of life (Habermas 
[1981]1989, Inglehart 1977, Melucci 1996, Offe 1985).  
According to NSM theorists, the ideological characteristics of the new social 
movements also set them apart from the old forms of collective action. To illustrate, the 
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workers’ movement of the past used ideology, in line with the Marxist conception of the 
term, as a unifying source of mobilization (Johnston et.al. 1994). In terms of the 
ideologies they espoused, earlier social movements in general were classifiable as 
conservative, liberal, right, left, capitalist or socialist. In contrast, the new social 
movements did not lend themselves to simplistic ideological categorizations. Rather, they 
exhibited numerous ideas and values in their search for institutional reform to expand 
civil versus political dimensions of society and to democratize everyday life (Johnston 
et.al. 1994, Offe 1985).  
The driving force of the new social movements was collective identity, and what 
Inglehart (1977) referred to as postmaterialist values. In contrast to materialist values that 
involved economic well-being and physical securiy, post-materialist values gave priority 
to the quality of life. Rejecting the instrumental rationality, social control and co-optation 
systems of advanced industrial societies, postmaterialist values emphasized personal and 
political freedom, political and economic democracy, environmental protection, openness 
to new ideas, and a caring society (Buechler 2000, Kriesi et.al. 1995). According to 
Kriesi et.al. (1995), postmaterialist values were similar to the values traditionally 
defended by the left in Western Europe and included social-democratic, libertarian, and 
emancipatory components. Similarly, Della Porta and Rucht identified the new social 
movements as “left-libertarian movements” (Kriesi et.al. 1995:xx). This 
conceptualization drew on Kitschelt’s (1990) analogy between the new left parties and 





Although Left-libertarian parties and new social movements operate in 
different institutional domains, they both seek to disrupt established 
relations between state and civil society from the perspective of similar 
visions and objectives. They are “Left” because they share with traditional 
socialism a mistrust of the marketplace, of private investment, and of 
achievement ethic, and a commitment to egalitarian redistribution. They 
are “libertarian” because they reject the authority of the private or public 
bureaucracies to regulate individual and collective conduct. They instead  
favor participatory democracy and the autonomy of groups and individuals 
to define their economic, political and cultural institutions unencumbered 
by market or bureaucratic dictates (P.179-180).   
 
A defining characteristic of the new social movements that stood in contrast to the 
social movements of the past was their unconforming organizational structure and modes 
of action. Rejecting proxy and control, movement actors relied on legal but 
unconventional direct action tactics of disruption and resistance to mobilize public 
attention (Offe 1985:830). In terms of organization, the new social movements adopted a 
decentralized, participatory, non-hierarchical, informal model with a poorly defined 
distinction between the roles of rank and file members and formal leaders.  
Habermas ([1981]1989) and Offe (1985) identified the social base of the new 
social movements as the middle class. Accordingly, the new social movements were 
carried out by the new middle class; elements of the old middle class; and a peripheral 
segment of the population (Habermas [1981]1989:392, Offe 1985:832-34). The first 
group mostly comprised of those employed in the human services sector, and enjoyed 
high educational status and relative economic security. The second group was made up of 
self-employed individuals, such as farmers, shop owners, and craftsmen. The last group 
consisted of those located either outside the labor market or peripheral to it, such as 
middle class housewives, students, retired people, and unemployed or marginally 
employed youths.   
 27
Despite the fact that the social base of the new social movements could be marked 
by class, in their self-identification the movement actors relied neither on socio-economic 
codes nor on political orientation but on categories pertaining to the particular goals they 
pursued, such as gender, ethnicity, lifestyle, locality, or in the case of environmental and 
pacifist movements, the entire human race (Habermas [1981]1989, Melucci 1996, Offe 
1985, Touraine 1981). Offe (1985:833) explained this seeming paradox by noting that the 
new politics of the new social movements was “a politics of a class but not on behalf of a 
class”. To be concrete, movement actors, identifiable by particular socio-economic status, 
formed an ad-hoc social alliance and acted as a collectivity, bound by their critique of 
growth and their supra-class demands of either universal (e.g. in the case of the 
environmental movement) or particularistic nature (e.g. in the case of students’ 
movement).  
 
Environment and Justice Redefined:  
The Emergence of the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) 
Shifts in the nature and scope of social movements also occurred in the United 
States. One of these shifts was observed in the environmental movement. The mainstream 
trend in the contemporary U.S. environmental movement, represented by the 
professional, hierarchical, and bureaucratic organizations, was challenged in the late 
1970s and early 1980s with the emergence of a culturally diverse grassroots movement 
for environmental justice that redefined “the scope of the environmental movement to 
include social conditions that people experience in everyday life” (Hofrichter 2002:1). 
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Environmental justice framework came into being as an expression of resistance 
by low income and minority communities to their unequal exposure to industrial toxins, 
dirty air and drinking water, the disproportionate siting of polluting industries, municipal 
landfills, incinerators, and hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities in 
their neighborhoods, and to the adverse effects of these discriminatory land-use decisions 
on their well-being and quality of life (Bryant and Mohai 1992, Bullard 1983, 1993, 
1994, 2002, 2005, Cole and Foster 2001, Ferris and Hahn-Baker 1995, Hamilton 2002, 
Lavelle and Coyle 1992, Miller 2002, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial 
Justice 1987). Making a connection between the use of their neighborhoods as the 
“dumping grounds” (Bullard 1983, 1990a, 1992, 1993, 2000, Bullard and Wright 1992) 
for locally unwanted land uses on the one hand, and their socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics on the other, these groups couched their struggle for 
environmental equity in a civil rights and social justice context, paying particular 
attention to “questions of distributive justice, community empowerment, democratic 
accountability” (Taylor 1993:57). They challenged industrial policies that pit economic 
growth against the environment, housing policies that forced minority and low-income 
families to choose between the Scylla of health risks and the Charybdis of homelessness, 
and demanded a shared role in the decision-making processes that affected their 
communities (Bullard 2000).  
According to the proponents of the EJM, “environmental degradation, economics, 
power, politics, and racism are intricately interwoven and cannot be separated” (Bryant 
and Mohai 1992:6). This core claim of the movement was supported by studies reporting 
that risk burdens - the by-products of polluting industries and their production processes - 
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were localized in low income and minority communities while benefits were 
disproportionately distributed to whites and people at the upper end of the education and 
income scales (Bullard 1983, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, Cole and Foster 2001, 
Guinessi et.al. 1979, Hamilton 2002). EJM activists and scholars argued that these 
disparities were not coincidental. Rather, they reflected larger social inequalities, which 
had been “created, tolerated, and institutionalized by local, state, and federal action” 
(Bullard 1994: xv) over the years.  The EJM asserted that the differences in 
environmental quality between people of color and white communities were 
manifestations of an institutionalized form of racism. This distinctive form of racism was 
termed as environmental racism by Rev. Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., a longtime civil rights 
activist and a key leader in the EJM from the early 1980s through the early 1990s (Brulle 
2000, Cole and Foster 2001, Di Chiro 1998, Lee 1992, Mohai and Bryant 1992a), to refer 
to “racial discrimination in environmental policymaking, the enforcement of regulations 
and laws, the deliberate14 targeting of communities of color for toxic waste disposal and 
siting of polluting industries, the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of 
poisons and pollutants in communities of color, and the history of excluding people of 
color from the mainstream environmental groups, decision-making boards, commissions, 
and regulatory bodies” (Chavis 1993:3).  Environmental racism provided benefits for 
whites while shifting costs to people of color by influencing “local land use, enforcement 
of environmental regulations, industrial facility siting, and where people of color live, 
                                                 
14 Bullard extends Chavis’ conceptualization to include ‘unintended’ 
discrimination in the definition of environmental racism. According to Bullard (2000:98), 
environmental racism refers to “any policy, practice, or directive that differentially 
affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or 
communities based on race or color”. 
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work, and play” (Bullard 2000: 98). Like racism in the housing industry, educational 
institutions, job market, and judicial system, environmental racism was incorporated in 
public policy decisions and private industry practices, and reinforced by government, 
legal, economic, political, and military institutions (Bullard 1993, 2000, 2005).15    
As justified and well-articulated as these conceptions and problem definitions 
were, however, low-income and minority communities didn’t have an avenue to address 
their claims within the ideological and organizational framework of the existing 
professional environmental movement organizations. It was essentially due to this reason 
that they eventually organized to build a movement of their own. An analysis of the 
differences between the EJM and the professional wing of the contemporary U.S. 
environmental movement is therefore necessary to present a complete picture of the EJM.     
 
The Locus of the EJM in the Contemporary U.S. Environmental Movement  
 
The late-1960s’ youth-centered, reactionary environmental movement in the U.S. 
gave way to a mainstream reformist movement in the 1970s when the old conservation 
groups and the newly established organizations professionalized, taking on primary 
concern with issues of conservation and pollution regulation, relying on compromise and 
                                                 
15 ‘Environmental racism’ was gradually adopted as a key concept by EJM 
scholars. Although the term was coined in 1987 it was not incorporated into EJM 
discourse right away. For example, the first edition of Bullard’s seminal work Dumping 
in Dixie (1990), the first book published on environmental justice, does not include the 
concept ‘environmental racism’, while the second and third editions (1994 and 2000, 
respectively) employ the term extensively throughout the book. Another example for the 
evolution of concept formation in the EJM literature is the shift from the term “Black 
Environmentalism” (in ‘Dumping in Dixie’, 1990) to “People of Color 
Environmentalism” (in ‘Dumping in Dixie’, 1994 and 2000), as the movement 
increasingly embraced and was embraced by Native American, Latino, and Asian Pacific 
communities.  
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concession strategies, and engaging in tactics of legislative lobbying, electoral 
campaigns, awareness raising, and occasional litigation (Cable et.al. 2002, 2005, Faber 
and O’Connor 2002). The hierarchically structured organizations of the professional 
environmental movement, most of them headquartered in Washington D.C., 
predominantly consisted of white, male, upper- and middle-class, paid employees. Their 
constituencies reflected a similar demographic pattern of white, highly educated, upper- 
and middle class members. This elitist membership profile and organizational structure of 
the professional environmental organizations, along with their neglect, if not ignorance, 
of the social justice and public health implications of environmental problems, 
contributed to an ever-growing rift between the low-income and minority communities 
and the mainstream environmental movement.   
The move away from this mainstream trend in contemporary environmentalism 
came in the late 1970s with the emergence of an innovative grassroots formation in the 
environmental movement when the locals of Love Canal in upstate New York discovered 
that their community was contaminated with hazardous waste disposed of by a chemical 
company (Cable et.al. 2005, Cole and Foster 2001, Di Chiro 1998). Community residents 
organized a local protest and fought a successful battle against the company, forcing the 
latter to take responsibility for its actions (Di Chiro 1998). Their path of resistance and 
protest was followed by other communities throughout the country facing similar 
problems and threats of toxic contamination caused by what Erikson (1994) called “a 
new species of trouble”, with reference to postwar industrial technologies, production 
processes, and their by-products of high environmental- and health risks. The 
community-based organizations comprising the grassroots wing of the environmental 
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movement had a membership profile that was markedly different from that of the 
professional environmental organizations. Members of grassroots groups were middle-or 
working-class whites, with many women holding leadership positions (Bullard 1993, 
2000, Cable et.al. 2005, Cole and Foster 2001, Faber and O’Connor 2002, Freudenberg 
and Steinsapir 1992, Kraus 2002, Taylor 1993).  
The EJM is considered to be part of this grassroots wing of the contemporary 
environmental movement and an outgrowth of the civil rights movement (Cable et. al. 
2002, Cole and Foster 2001, Di Chiro 1998, Martinez-Alier 2003). According to Cole 
and Foster (2001), the EJM added to the economic analysis of environmental problems 
the civil rights movement’s racial and structural critique of the political economy. Faber 
and McCarthy (2003:45-46) argued that, in addition, the EJM drew on a diversity of 
political paths, including the occupational health and safety movement, the indigenous 
land rights movement, and the solidarity movement for promoting human rights. The 
constituency of the EJM comprised of low-income and minority groups who were 
aggrieved by the disproportionate distribution of various environmental risks in their 
communities and the discriminatory waste facility siting decisions targeting their 
neighborhoods. The immediate goal of movement advocates was the equitable 
distribution of environmental hazards and privileges through all segments of society. In 
the long run, they envisioned a world where the burdens of pollutants and hazardous 
waste would be reduced and eventually eliminated (Taylor 1993:54). The EJM activists 
directed their protests against corporations and decision-making bodies at local, state, and 
federal level that they held responsible for the discriminatory facility siting and 
enforcement decisions. They also criticized “the corporate state structure that supports the 
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externalization of the environmental costs of production, disproportionately allocates 
environmental risks to people of color and the poor, and creates racial and class 
inequalities in communities” (Cable et.al. 2005:60). It is essential to note the significance 
of environmental justice scholars for the development of the EJM (Cole and Foster 2001, 
Field 1998, Taylor 1993). Academics played a crucial role in supporting the local 
struggles for environmental justice through their studies demonstrating the 
disproportionate impact of environmental risks on people of color and low-income 
communities; in shaping or reaffirming movement leaders’ consciousness about the 
structural nature of environmental oppression (Cole and Foster 2001:25), and thus 
helping to redefine and reconceptualize environmental problems. 
As Bullard (1992:89, 2000:12) stated, since their residents were affiliated with 
civic clubs, neighborhood associations, community improvement groups, and anti-
poverty and anti-discrimination organizations, African American communities had 
already in place a protest infrastructure that facilitated the emergence of an environmental 
justice movement. Also, due to the long history of racism in the U.S., low-income people 
of color had never been fully convinced that the government was on their side. The EJM 
activists were therefore, in Taylor’s (1993:54) words, “more experientially equipped to 
perceive the injustice in the distribution of environmental hazards”. For working class 
white communities, however, it was a major disappointment to realize that the 
government did not protect them adequately (Cable et.al. 2002, Čapek 1992, Di Chiro 
1998). In her book depicting the story of the community-based environmental struggle in 
Love Canal, Gibbs (1998:3) best exemplified this experience when she wrote, “if you 
were to ask any of the protesters if they could have pictured themselves carrying a sign 
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before the issue surfaced, they would have answered, ‘Absolutely not.’ Law-abiding, tax-
paying citizens were forced to move from the anonymity of their homes out into the 
streets, a difficult step for anyone, and a big leap for most”.   
Despite these differences, however, the African-American working class 
communities and their white counterparts are similar in a number of ways in terms of the 
ecological grassroots struggles they wage, which set them apart from the professional 
environmental movement.  
The grassroots wing of the U.S. environmental movement has a community-based 
organizational structure. The regional and national environmental justice networks 
incorporating hundreds of grassroots organizations reflect a decentralized, geographically 
scattered, web-like organizational formation, as opposed to the centralized, pyramid-like, 
top-down structure of the professional environmental organizations (Cole and Foster 
2001:151).  
A strength of the EJM organizations is that their leaders and activists come from 
communities directly affected by environmental and economic injustices they fight 
against (Bullard 1993, 2000, Moore and Head 2002, Taylor 1993), as opposed to the 
many members of the professional environmental organizations whose sensitivity to 
environmental problems stems mostly from published or broadcast sources rather than 
personal experience. EJM organizations rely on tactics of public protest, demonstrations, 
public meetings, fact-finding and hearings to educate local residents, petitions, lobbying, 
and occasional litigation (Been 1992-1993, Bullard 1993, Cable et.al. 2002, 2005, Faber 
1998, Moore and Head 2002, Szasz and Meuser 1997).  
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The constituencies of the EJM organizations mistrust government agencies 
(Brulle 2000, Bullard 1993, 2004, Cable et.al 2002, 2005, Cole and Foster 2001, Harper 
2000, Moore and Head 2002, Walsh 1981, 1988). Realizing that they were the targets of 
environmental risks that more affluent communities could avoid, and that the government 
sided more with the economically and politically powerful stakeholders than the 
disenfranchised groups who were left to bear the brunt of the environment- and health-
related side effects of economic growth, low-income and minority communities 
organized to achieve environmental and social justice. In Bullard’s (2004:3) words, 
“today, a healthy paranoia pervades many communities beset by environmental racism, 
guarding them from falling victim to a false sense of safety and government protection”.  
EJM activists criticize the implicit paternalism in the professional environmental 
organizations’ approach to dealing with the issues of environmental justice (Di Chiro 
1998:113). They consider self-representation and self-definition an essential 
characteristic of their movements distinguishing them from the mainstream 
environmental movement. This insistence on independence is best exemplified in their 
powerful slogan of “We speak for ourselves!”(Alston 1990).  
Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the EJM is the way movement 
actors (re)define the environment. The professional environmental organizations 
conceive of the environment and nature as “a threatened wilderness separate from 
polluted, overpopulated cities; ….the wild animal species and the non-human world in 
general” (Di Chiro 1998:130-n.2). Rejecting this human/nature dichotomy, the EJM 
groups incorporate people and the places they “live, work, play, worship, and go to 
school” (Bullard 2004, Novotny 2000) in their definition of the environment. This 
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redefinition provides a context for the grassroots groups of the EJM to address issues that 
are central to the everyday survival of low-income and minority communities.  Thus, old 
houses with lead-based paint; homes, schools and playgrounds built on abandoned toxic 
waste sites; congested freeways crossing poor and minority neighborhoods; polluting 
industries and waste facilities in disenfranchised communities; factories and farmlands 
exposing their workers to health risks, are all considered environmental problems from 
the vantage point of the EJM.   
 
Milestones in the Struggle for Environmental Justice 
 
 According to EJM scholars, protests by African Americans against a toxic dump 
in Warren County, North Carolina in 1982, marked the beginning of the EJM as a large-
scale, organized struggle against environmental racism (Bullard 1990a, 1992, 1994, 2000, 
2004, Bullard and Wright 1992, Cable et.al. 2002, 2005, Cable and Shriver 1995, Chavis 
1993, Cole and Foster 2001, Di Chiro 1998, Faber 1998, Faber and McCarthy 2003, Field 
1998, Lee 1992, 1993, Martinez-Alier 2003, Sandweiss 1998, Szasz and Meuser 1997, 
Taylor 1993). Demonstrations were instigated upon the selection of Afton, a poor and 
predominantly (84 percent) African American rural community in Warren County, as the 
site for a new, 142-acre hazardous waste landfill that would receive more than 32,000 
cubic yards soil contaminated with highly toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The 
disputed siting decision came after the clean-up of a 210 mile stretch of roadside 
shoulders in North Carolina where PCB-laced oil had been illegally dumped in 1978. 
Aggrieved by the choice of their community as the site for the proposed landfill, which 
they considered to be a political decision based on racial discrimination, residents 
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organized and formed a grassroots organization, the Warren County Citizens Concerned 
About PCBs. With the support and active participation of religious leaders, political 
officials, and representatives of a number of civil rights advocacy groups, such as the 
United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ), the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), county residents marched in protest against the construction 
of the landfill in their community (Bullard 1994, 2000, 2004, Cable et.al.2002). The 
demonstrations culminated in the mass arrest of more than 400 protesters. Moreover, the 
landfill was constructed and the contaminated soil disposed of in Afton, as planned. What 
could be viewed as the dramatic ending of a local struggle, however, turned out to 
constitute the onset of a national movement in the case of the Warren County incident.16   
The national media attention paid to the demonstrations of non-violent civil 
disobedience in Warren County helped environmental justice activists to carry from local 
to the national milieu their conviction that violations of civil rights and environmental 
rights converged to create environmental inequalities. Warren County protests also gave 
                                                 
16 Corresponding to its prominence in the struggle for environmental justice, the 
Warren County resistance continued well after the landfill was constructed and its 
operation started. Two decades of protests and pressure by the community leaders for the 
decontamination of the site culminated in the detoxification of the contaminated soil in 
the landfill by the state and federal authorities between 2001 and 2003. Even after the 
detoxification, however, some residents are still concerned that the clean-up might not be 
complete. Considering the high toxicity of the soil dumped in the landfill, residents 
express concern that contamination might have migrated beyond the landfill site into the 
buffer zone that surrounds the site and the nearby creek and outlet basin. Environmental 
justice activists and scholars are also cautious in evaluating the outcome of the Warren 
County struggle. As stated by Bullard (2004:4), for example, detoxification of the Warren 
County landfill is “a major victory for local residents and the EJM….. (However) Justice 
will not be complete until the 20,000 residents receive a public apology and some form of 
financial reparations from the perpetrators of environmental racism against the local 
citizens”.         
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impetus to a number of groundbreaking studies that lent support to activists’ claim of 
institutionalized discrimination disadvantaging low income and minority communities 
(Bullard 1983, Bullard and Wright 1986-87, 1989, United States General Accounting 
Office 1983, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice 1987). 
With the impetus provided by the findings of these studies, the growing publicity 
concerning polluted communities, and the concomitant increase of public interest in and 
awareness of environmental inequities, local struggles for environmental justice steadily 
developed into a nationwide movement throughout the 1980s. This momentum gained 
further strength when a number of community-based organizations built coalitions, and 
national and regional communication networks to act in solidarity. By 1990 a variety of 
coalitions of people of color environmental justice organizations had emerged (Di Chiro 
1998: 110), including Citizens’ Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste - now known as 
Center for Health, Environment and Justice – (1981), Southwest Organizing Project 
(1981), Gulf Coast Tenants’ Organization (1983), Indigenous Environmental Network 
(1990), and Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice (1990).     
A watershed event for the EJM came in October 1991 when more than 300 
delegates and 400 observers and supporters convened in Washington D.C. for the First 
National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit (Brulle 2000, Bullard 1994, 
2000, Cable et.al. 2002, Cole and Foster 2001, Di Chiro 1998, Ferris and Hahn-Baker 
1995, Hofrichter 2002, Martinez-Alier 2003, Miller 2002, Moore and Head 2002). 
Initiated by Rev. Ben Chavis, Executive Director of the CRJ, and organized by Charles 
Lee, Director of the Environmental Justice Program of the CRJ, academics like Robert 
Bullard, Bunyan Bryant, and activists, such as Dana Alston, Richard Moore, and Donna 
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Chavis, the Summit brought together environmental justice activists and advocates from 
across the country, Canada, Central and South America, and the Marshall Islands “to 
develop a statement of principles and a call for national and worldwide action” (Ferris 
and Hahn-Baker 1995:69).  According to Rev. Ben Chavis, the summit was “a significant 
and pivotal step in the crucial process whereby people of color are organizing themselves 
and their communities for self-determination and self-empowerment around the central 
issues of environmental justice.” (quoted in Miller 2002:129). Along the same lines, Di 
Chiro (1998) and Cole and Foster (2001) call attention to the emphasis placed by the 
conference participants on the autonomy of the EJM, rendering the movement’s motto of 
‘we speak for ourselves’ ever stronger. Providing a collective forum for EJM activists 
and advocates to manifest their firm rejection of “a partnership based on paternalism with 
the professional environmental organizations” (Di Chiro 1998:113), the summit was 
essentially EJM’s “declaration of independence from the traditional environmental 
movement” (Cole and Foster 2001:31). Among the many other achievements of the 
summit, such as formation of alliances between participant grassroots groups, 
establishment of conceptual linkages between various grassroots struggles, development 
of renewed understanding of the need for environmental justice and new strategies to 
fight for it, probably the most significant was the formulation of the Principles of 
Environmental Justice (Cole and Foster 2001). The seventeen principles collectively 
adopted by the delegates at the end of the summit shaped the ideological contours of a 
multiracial grassroots movement and informed a concomitant political project to achieve 
environmental justice (Di Chiro 1998).  
 40
The EJM literature saw a remarkable upsurge in studies throughout the 1990s, 
testing the hypotheses of unequal distribution of environmental risks and unequal 
protection from those risks according to race or income, and in cases where evidence for 
unequal distribution was established, testing whether race or income was a better 
predictor for disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards (Adeola 1994, 
Anderton et.al. 1994, 1997, Been and Gupta 1997, Boer, et.al. 1997, Bowen et.al. 1995, 
Burke 1993, Cutter et.al. 1996, Daniels and Friedman 1999, Downey 1998, Goldman and 
Fitton 1994, Hird 1993, Hird and Reese 1998, Lavelle and Coyle 1992, Mohai and Bryant 
1992a, 1992b, Perlin et.al. 1995, Pollock and Vittas 1995, Ringquist 1997, Stretesky and 
Hogan 1998, Szasz and Meuser 2000, Yandle and Burton 1996, Zimmerman 1993).  
Whereas studies by Adeola (1994), Boer, et.al. (1997), Burke (1993), Daniels and 
Friedman (1999), Downey (1998), Foster (1998), Gelobter (1992), Goldman and Fitton 
(1994), Hird and Reese (1998), Lavelle and Coyle (1992), Mohai and Bryant (1992a, 
1992b), Perlin et.al. (1995), Ringquist (1997), Stretesky and Hogan (1998), Zimmerman 
(1993) found evidence for unequal distribution of environmental risks according to race 
and/or income, Anderton et.al. (1994, 1997), Been and Gupta (1997), Cutter et.al. (1996), 
Yandle and Burton (1996) disputed in their studies any claims for systemic, consistent 
pattern of environmental racism.     
Some scholars also examined the relative strength of race and income in 
predicting disproportionate exposure to risks and found race to be more strongly related 
than income to the unequal distribution of environmental hazards (Gelobter 1992, 
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Goldman 1994, Mohai and Bryant 1992a, 1992b, Ringquist 1997, Stretesky and Hogan 
1998).17   
In addition, EJM scholars carried out theoretical, conceptual, and organizational 
analyses of the movement. Čapek (1993), Cable and Shriver (1995), and Taylor (2000) 
analyzed the emergence of the environmental justice frame and the EJM from the 
theoretical perspectives of social constructionism and resource mobilization.  In their 
theoretical critique of the EJM, Been (1992-1993) and Foster (1993) focused on the 
movement’s failure to tie the concepts of ‘environmental justice’ and ‘fair siting’ to a 
specific theory of justice. Been (1992-1993:1085) warned that, unless grounded in a 
theoretical framework, EJM’s call for fair siting will be nothing but a “vacuous slogan”.  
In a similar vein, Dobson (2003) criticized the EJM scholars for failing, both theoretically 
and empirically, to support their claim regarding the compatibility between social justice 
and environmental sustainability objectives. 
The current phase of the EJM literature comprises of the appraisals of the 
movement. Studies by individual scholars (Agyeman 2005, Cable et.al. 2002, Cole and 
Foster 2001, Novotny 2000) and edited volumes containing collected contributions from 
prominent movement scholars and activists (Agyeman 2003, Faber 1998, Hofrichter 
                                                 
17 It seems paradoxical that movement scholars sought to measure the relative 
weights of race and income in determining the unequal distribution of environmental 
risks, when one of the claims of the EJM is that “race interacts with class to create special 
environmental and health vulnerabilities” (Bullard 1993:21). Downey’s (1998:767) apt 
criticism deserves mention here: “…race and income should not be theorized as 
competing explanatory variables…..such an approach decontextualizes race and income 
by forcing researchers to abstract them from social, political, and historical processes 
involved in the formation of environmental hazard distribution. Rather than thinking of 
race and income as competing with one another, our understanding of environmental 
discrimination would be better served by conceptualizing race and income as 
interdependent factors”.     
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2002, Pellow and Brulle 2005, Sandler and Pezzullo 2007) assess the achievements and 
failures of the EJM, evaluate its challenges, and discuss the future path of the movement.        
Regarding the achievements of the EJM on the legislative and institutional front, 
Brulle (2000:218) pointed to the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund, as commonly known) as the 
first significant federal institutionalization of environmental justice concerns.  The 1986 
modification of CERCLA, which created the Community Right to Know Act, required 
industries to report on the quantity and nature of their emissions, and allowed for public 
access to this information (Brulle 2000, O’Connor 2002, Freudenberg and Steinsapir 
1992). Communities used the Right to Know Act as an effective tool to monitor 
environmental externalities in their neighborhoods. Bullard (2000:138) called attention to 
EPA’s definition of environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect 
to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations 
and policies”, and considered it evidence for the recognition of the concept and EJM’s 
cause at the federal administrative level. The establishment of the EPA’s Office of 
Environmental Justice in 1992 and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council 
in 1993, and President Clinton’s issue of Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to 
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations”, in 
1994, mandating all federal agencies to take initiatives aimed at reducing environmental 
inequities, were also cited as achievements of the EJM (Agyeman et.al. 2003, Benford 
2005, Brulle 2000, Bryant 1995, Bryant and Hockman 2005, Bullard 1996, Cole and 
Foster 2001, Faber 1998).   
 43
Cole and Foster (2001), Di Chiro (1998), and Martinez-Alier (2003) also pointed 
out the success of the EJM actors in framing their goal with respect to environmental 
externalities under the motto of ‘Not In Anyone’s Backyard’, and thus destroying the 
particularistic, self-interested ‘Not In My Backyard’ image of the anti-toxics movement. 
According to Martinez-Alier (2003:214), the greatest achievement of the EJM was its 
emphasis on the “incommensurableness of values”. By framing their grievances in terms 
of environmental racism, EJM actors simultaneously rejected monetary compensation as 
the only means of reparation for their disproportionate exposure to environmental 
externalities, and shifted the debate revolving around ecological distribution conflicts 
“beyond the obsession of ‘taking nature into account’ in monetary terms” to cope as well 
with other structural problems underlying environmental injustices.18  
With respect to internal movement dynamics, the EJM probably achieved its most 
remarkable success in terms of organizing. Environmental justice centers and information 
networks facilitated a strong sense of solidarity among grassroots groups (Bullard 2000, 
Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992), which in turn empowered community activists 
because, as Bullard (2000:147) noted, “for grassroots groups, especially underdog 
groups, knowing that others in similar circumstances have triumphed gives them an 
added incentive to keep up the struggle”. Along similar lines, Cole and Foster (2001:151) 
referred to the transformative politics of the EJM as the “most important legacy of the 
grassroots movement for environmental justice in the United States”. In the process of 
                                                 
18 Martinez-Alier’s assessment of the significance of the environmental racism 
claim can be taken as a justification for empirical studies by movement scholars 
measuring the relative weight of race as a variable factoring into fair/unfair siting 
decisions (see footnote 16).  
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transformative politics, Cole and Foster (2001:14) asserted, “grassroots groups help 
transform marginal communities from passive victims to significant actors in 
environmental decision-making processes”.  
One of the most significant challenges facing the EJM lies in the juridical realm 
due to the difficulty of proving environmental racism in court (Bullard 2000, Cole and 
Foster 2001, Martinez-Alier 2003, Pellow and Brulle 2005).  Although legislation against 
racism, such as Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, forbids discrimination 
based on race, it requires proof of intent. For environmental racism cases, this means that 
it is not sufficient to prove disproportionate environmental impact but it must also be 
shown that there is an explicit intention to cause harm to the affected group (Martinez-
Alier 2003).   
Due to its primary emphasis on human well-being at the expense of ecosystem 
health the EJM was denounced by some scholars for being an anthropocentric discourse 
(Benford 2005, Brulle 2000, Dobson 1998). EJM was also criticized for the discrepancy 
between its radical discourse and reformist course of action (Benford 2005, Faber 1998), 
and its failure to generate structural changes (Cable et.al. 2005). At the global level, 
Rhodes (2003) and Martinez-Alier (2003) criticized the EJM for neglecting 
environmental injustices outside the U.S.  
 
Application of New Social Movements Theories to the EJM 
 
The new social movements (NSM) theories fail to explain the EJM on several 
grounds. In contrast to the observation of the NSM theorists that new conflicts underlying 
contemporary social movements transcended class distinctions, the EJM is a class-based 
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movement. The distinction drawn by Offe (1985) between “politics of a class” versus 
“politics on behalf of a class”, attributing merely the former to the new social movements, 
does not apply to the EJM either, because the latter is class-driven not only in its social 
base but also in the grievances and demands articulated by movement activists. EJM 
constituents comprise of low-income and minority communities of low levels of formal 
education. Movement activists identify themselves as a class of oppressed people 
aggrieved by environmental risk burdens that are localized in their communities while 
benefits are disproportionately distributed to Whites and people at the upper end of the 
education and income scales. Thus, underlying the EJM is not a socio-cultural conflict 
but a distributive and procedural one of socio-economic nature. Locating the source of 
their problem in the structure of political economy and the institutionalized 
discrimination it fosters, movement actors call for equitable distribution of environmental 
inequalities on behalf of the socio-economic class they represent.  
The EJM actors asserted that the disproportionate distribution of environmental 
externalities in the communities of people of color was a manifestation of an 
institutionalized form of racism. This form of racism, which they termed environmental 
racism, referred to “racial discrimination in environmental policymaking, the 
enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for 
toxic waste disposal and siting of polluting industries, the official sanctioning of the life-
threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in communities of color, and the history of 
excluding people of color from the mainstream environmental groups, decision-making 
boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies” (Chavis 1993:3). The Euro-centric analyses 
of the NSM scholars miss the way in and extent to which race factors into structural 
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inequalities in U.S. society. Consequently, the NSM approach fails to explain the role of 
race in the collective identity formation and grievance articulation of the EJM.  
In terms of internal and external modes of action, however, the EJM displays 
similarities to the new social movements, as conceptualized by NSM theorists. Thus, 
EJM activists reject proxy and control, and consider self-representation and self-
identification an essential characteristic of their movement, as expressed in their 
prominent slogan of “We speak for ourselves!”. Also consistent with the assertions of 
NSM theorists is the EJM’s organizational structure and unconventional direct action 
tactics. Locating themselves outside the boundaries of institutional politics, not affiliated 
with any party or political organization, EJM groups work through national and 
transnational networks of decentralized, informal, non-hierarchical organization model, 
and rely on tactics of public protest, demonstrations, public meetings, dissemination of 
information, petitions, and lobbying to influence public opinion and affect a change in 
policy.  
 
Analysis of the EJM Literature 
The EJM scholars aptly identified the root causes of environmental problems in 
the structure of power relations by demonstrating the nationwide pattern of unequal 
distribution and disparate impact of environmental externalities on low-income 
communities of color, raised public awareness about institutional discrimination, and 
helped low income and minority communities mobilize against environmental inequities. 
Thus, the EJM has successfully passed the stages of framing, verifying their claims, and 
winning several struggles against local environmental injustices. But, in view of EJM’s 
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aspiration for structural change, I argue that to rely predominantly on community-based, 
local tactics as the ultimate means to bring about qualitative social change is to 
underestimate the complexity of the problem at hand, ignoring the interconnectedness of 
political, economic, social, and environmental injustices. This ignorance, however, is a 
mistake that the EJM cannot and should not afford, considering that this very 
interconnectedness is the underlying claim of the movement with respect to the root 
causes of environmental inequalities. For EJM scholars, the most challenging task at this 
stage is to produce strategies for further action, in line with the movement’s structural 
critique of political economy. A step to take to this end could be to tie the EJM to similar 
environmental injustices faced by disenfranchised communities worldwide, and to the 
global political-economic context.   
The EJM literature also showed that some of the community groups, initially 
organized against local environmental threats affecting their neighborhoods, transformed 
over time extending their environment-based struggles to a justice, equity, and rights-
based movement when they realized the compounded nature of inequalities they faced on 
political, economic, social, and environmental grounds. The literature, however, failed to 
study the structural conditions under which such transformation occurred. 
This study aims to address the gaps identified in the EJM literature, by analyzing 
the grassroots struggle against goldmining in Bergama, Turkey; by couching the Bergama 
villagers’ movement in the context of political, economic, and social changes in Turkey; 
and by exploring the dynamics of the transformation of the movement from a local 






This section elaborates on the methodological framework employed in this study, 
and spells out the techniques used for gathering, processing, and analyzing my data.  
My selection of a methodological approach is informed by a combination of 
considerations, such as the nature of my research problem, my research questions and 
goals, the availability of resources and accessibility of data, as well as personal 
preferences. This is a case study investigating the complex dynamics of the Bergama 
villagers’ movement and its transformation from an environmental to a rights-based 
movement. Direct observation, qualitative in depth interviewing, and secondary data 
analysis are the specific techniques used in the study.    
Field research is conducted in compliance with the University of Tennessee 
requirements for research involving human subjects.  
 
Case Study As A Methodological Tool 
 
According to Yin ([1984] 2003), “case studies are the preferred strategy when 
“how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (p.1).  Since there are no conclusive criteria for what may constitute a ‘case’ the 
term is used broadly by researchers. Thus, case studies focus on, inter alia, specific social 
programs or policies (e.g. an educational initiative), entities (e.g. an industry or firms in 
an industry), individuals (e.g. leaders of a gang), or groups of individuals (e.g. social 
movement activists).  
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The case study approach strives towards a holistic perception of the interrelated 
activities engaged in by the actors in a social situation (Tellis 1997). As such, case studies 
provide researchers with an in-depth understanding of why the case under investigation 
took the course it did, which, in turn, may lead to new questions to investigate in future 
research.  Although case study is a particular method of qualitative research this approach 
also lends itself to quantitative data gathering and analysis techniques. Data collection 
techniques in case studies can include surveys, interviews, archival records, observation, 
and the collection of physical artifacts (Soy 1997, Tellis 1997). 
Critics of the case study approach claim that this method is weak in establishing 
external validity or generalizability of findings due to its dependence on a single case. 
Another point of criticism is that the researchers’ intense exposure to the case they 
investigate may bias their findings.  
Proponents of the case study contest the external validity criticism by 
distinguishing between analytic generalization and statistical generalization. Thus, Yin 
([1984] 2003) states that case studies employ analytic generalization, using previously 
developed theory as a measure of comparison for the findings of the study. In other 
words, generalization of case study results is made to theory, as opposed to populations. 
To address the latter criticism, case study researchers can minimize bias in their analyses 
and increase the reliability of their findings by using multiple techniques to gather data, 
for example unobtrusive methods, such as archival records, along with direct observation.  
Due to the nature of social scientific investigation, researchers are faced with a 
choice among different methodological approaches. This choice is based on a tradeoff 
between the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Keeping in mind the caveats, I 
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believe case study is the most appropriate method for my research for several reasons. 
First, I’m seeking a holistic and in-depth understanding of why and how the Bergama 
movement took the course it did without identifying in advance clearly defined variables 
to focus on exclusively. Second, the case study approach allows me to cover both the 
processes and the outcomes regarding my case by going beyond quantitative data and 
investigating the case from the perspective of the actors. Finally, due to the flexibility of 
this approach I will be able to modify my interview questions or add new ones as my 




 In-depth interviews and direct observation constituted the primary sources of data 
for this case study. These qualitative techniques provided me with an understanding of 
the movement’s dynamics as perceived and experienced by local activists as well as the 
defining elements of the collective identity assumed by movement participants. Data thus 
collected are supplemented by the use of archival records. This data collection and 
analysis method helped me explore the transformation of the movement over the course 
of its history of nearly two decades.   
Fieldwork is conducted in six villages located within one-mile radius of the gold 
mine in Bergama for a period of eight weeks starting on May 22, 2006. Although I did 
not have prior contact with any of the movement participants I had two contact persons 
that were willing to facilitate my access to the field. One is a farmer and resident of the 
town of Bergama, active in local politics. Another is the producer and director of a 
documentary on the Bergama movement who, at the same time, has been following the 
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developments of the movement in his capacity as a journalist over the course of more 
than ten years.  
I entered the field as a participant observer making my goals explicit. As the first 
step I informed my contact persons about my research project, inquired about movement 
activists I could initially contact in the field, and asked my contact persons to introduce 
me.  After making my initial contact with a movement activist I told her/him about my 
research project and asked her/him to participate in the study. Interviews were mostly 
held in the village coffeehouses. I asked my first respondent to suggest other people that I 
could interview. Thus, I used the snowball sampling technique to figure out whom to 
meet and interview next. Beside villagers I interviewed other movement actors such as 
the former mayor of Bergama who played a key role in mobilizing the movement; several 
lawyers of the villagers in Bergama and in İzmir; professors in İzmir and İstanbul that 
played a role in informing the villagers of the risks associated with the mine; the Public 
Relations Director of the company currently owning and operating the goldmine; former 
mine workers; and the sub-provincial governor of Bergama.  A total of 30 in-depth 



























A.H. F Professor Against Y 
A.Z. M Engineer Against Y 
B.Y. M Olive grower Against Y 
C.U. M Lawyer Against Y 
D.A. F Farmer Against Y 
D.T. M Businessman Against Y 
E.S. M Lawyer Against Y 
F.R. M Professor Against Y 
G.P. M Lawyer Against Y 
H.N. M Farmer Against Y 
I.A. M Farmer Against Y 
K.H. M Businessman Neutral N 
K.M. M Farmer Against Y 
L.H. M Former Mine Worker Pro N 
M.D. M Professor Against Y 
M.K. F Farmer Against Y 
N.L. F Professor Against Y 
O.G. M Former Mine Worker Against N 
P.A. M Farmer Against Y 
P.T. M Engineer Against Y 
R.B. F Businesswoman Against Y 
R.C. M Businessman Against N 
S.C. M Lawyer Against Y 
T.D. F Farmer Against Y 
U.G. F Mine Employee Pro N 
V.T. M Municipality Official Neutral N 
H.E. M Sub-Provincial Governor of Bergama  Neutral N 
Y.B. M Professor Against Y 
Z.M. M Mine PR Manager Pro N 





Since I conducted qualitative in-depth interviews my role in the interview process 
was to establish a general direction for the conversation, keep track of this direction, and 
to pursue specific topics, in line with my research focus, raised by respondents. I 
employed the funnel pattern of question sequence in my interviews, starting with a broad 
question such as “How would you describe the movement to someone who hasn’t heard 
about it before?”, and narrowing the scope down to more specific questions as the 
interview progressed. For example, in an attempt to explore the movement’s 
transformation pattern as perceived by its participants, I would direct respondents’ 
attention to a specific instance, and ask: “What do you think of the 1997 Supreme 
Administrative Court decision? Was it significant for the movement in any way?”  
Within the framework of the field research I also observed a social gathering for 
solidarity against the mine, organized in a village by Bergama villagers on the World 
Environment Day; an anti-mining demonstration in İzmir; and a panel discussion on the 
risks of goldmining in Eşme, Uşak. Newspaper articles and editorials; published 
interviews with movement leaders, activists, supporters; press releases; judicial records 
concerning court decisions; official correspondence between government authorities and 




SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES IN TURKEY:  
THE BUMPY ROAD TO THE WEST 
 
 The resistance of the Bergama villagers against gold mining in their region started 
out as a local ecological movement, and transformed, over the course of nearly two 
decades, into an environmental justice movement with national implications when the 
villagers adopted a rights-based discourse by incorporating into their claims the notions 
of justice, democratic participation, and citizenship rights. As such, it is a unique 
grassroots struggle in the history of social movements in Turkey that behooves 
sociological investigation. However, any analysis with the exclusive focus on the internal 
dynamics of the movement will miss the connection of this specific case to the contextual 
backdrop against which it was carried out. With this understanding in mind, the current 
chapter provides an account of the history of Turkey, and lays out the socio-economic 
and political context in which the Bergama villagers’ resistance movement unfolded.  
 
The War of Independence and the Establishment of the Republic of Turkey  
(1919-1923) 
 
Built on the Turkish remnants of the Ottoman Empire, present day Turkey was 
established in 1923 as a republican parliamentary democracy. The founders of the 
Republic instituted radical and swift reforms to restructure the society along the lines of 
Western civilization, and carve out a nation state, rising on this new foundation. 
 The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War signified the onset of 
the Empire’s dismantling by the Allied forces. In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
between 1918 and 1919, British, French, Italian, and Greek forces occupied several 
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provinces throughout Anatolia. The domestic political reaction to the Allied occupation 
of the Empire’s territories crystallized in two opposing camps. The Sultan and his 
followers in İstanbul favored cooperating with the Allies in an attempt to save the 
monarchy. The other camp comprised of army officers who established patriotic 
resistance organizations, known as the Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri (Associations for 
the Defense of Rights - ADR), in several provinces in Thrace and Anatolia to defy Allied 
occupation, preserve the territorial integrity of the country, and ultimately achieve 
national independence. The resistance front was led by Mustafa Kemal19, an undefeated 
general in the Ottoman army, especially prominent as the hero of the Dardanelles 
campaign during the First World War, defending Gallipoli against the British navy 
(Keyder 1987, Ahmad 1993).  
The appointment of Mustafa Kemal by the Palace as the Inspector General  to 
oversee the  demobilization  process  of the  Ottoman  army  in eastern Anatolia gave him 
the perfect cover for organizing resistance. In his capacity as the Inspector General, 
Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun, a coastal province on the Black Sea in the North, on 
May 19, 1919. This date marked the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence 
against Allied occupation. Soon after his arrival in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal met with the 
local leaders of the ADR to coordinate resistance. Being informed of and alarmed by 
Mustafa Kemal’s activities, the Sultan sent for him to return to İstanbul. The clash 
between the Sultan and his followers, on the one hand, and the nationalist resistance 
front, on the other, irrevocably surfaced when Mustafa Kemal rejected the Sultan’s order, 
                                                 
19 Later given the surname Atatürk, meaning the “father of the Turks”. 
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subsequently resigned from the army on July 8, 1919, and continued organizing 
resistance in Anatolia.  
 Legitimacy Crisis and the War of Independence 
The contours of the War of Independence took shape at two consecutive 
conventions held in the Anatolian provinces of Erzurum and Sivas in July and September 
1919, respectively. The principles set forth in these conventions, which came to be 
known as the Misak-ı Milli (National Pact), emphasized the goals of territorial integrity 
and national sovereignty. Accordingly, the National Pact rejected any policy of accepting 
foreign mandates or granting special privileges to Christian minorities. In a contradictory 
development in İstanbul, the Sultan signed a secret agreement with the British, accepting 
their mandate over the country (Karpat 1959, Kongar 2006).  
Meanwhile, the elections for the House of Deputies in İstanbul, held in December 
1919, shifted the balance between the two camps in favor of the nationalist resistance 
front. As the political leverage of the nationalists in Anatolia extended to the capital, the 
Sultan’s clout decreased. On February 17, 1920, the House of Deputies, now controlled 
by the nationalists, adopted the National Pact, further undermining the authority of the 
Sultan’s collaborationist government. 
Alarmed by the ever increasing influence of the nationalists throughout the 
country, including the capital, the Allied troops formally occupied İstanbul on March 16, 
1920, arrested prominent nationalist deputies, journalists, intellectuals, and exiled them to 
the Mediterranean island of Malta (Karpat 1959, Ahmad 1993). On March 18, 1920, the 
Sultan abolished the House of Deputies. The nationalists in Anatolia responded to this 
development by convening a parliament of their own in the central Anatolian city of 
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Ankara on April 23, 1920. The new parliament, called the Grand National Assembly, 
consisted of bureaucrats and nationalist deputies of the abolished House of Deputies in 
İstanbul, and of Anatolian provincial notables (Keyder 1987: 73). For the members of the 
Grand National Assembly, this parliament was the depository of national sovereignty and 
the only legitimate body representing Turkey and the Turkish people. Thus, they declared 
null and void all the treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the İstanbul 
government after March 16, 1920 (Karpat 1959:37).   
The resulting political picture displayed two disparate sources of power, vying for 
legitimacy in ruling the country: On the one side, there was the Grand National 
Assembly, defying the Allied forces and aiming at national independence. On the other 
side, there was the Sultan-Caliph20, a virtual prisoner of the Allies, who strived for saving 
the monarchy, even at the expense of alienating himself from the larger public by 
cooperating with the Allies and condemning the nationalists (Karpat 1959:36).     
The legitimacy crisis reached a peak in August 1920. On August 10, 1920 the 
Sultan’s government signed the Treaty of Sèvres, a peace agreement with the Allied 
powers, dividing Anatolia into Greek, Italian, French, Armenian, and Kurdish zones, and 
reducing Turkish territories to the city of İstanbul and parts of Anatolia. Two weeks later, 
the nationalist government in Ankara reached an understanding of collaboration with the 
Bolshevik government in Russia, which was formalized in the Russian-Turkish Treaty of 
Friendship the following year. This agreement was significant for the nationalists both 
                                                 
20 Caliph is the Arabic word for successor. It is the title given to those who ruled 
the Islamic community following the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. After 
being carried by several dynasties the title was assumed by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 
1517. Successive Ottoman Sultans kept the title until Mustafa Kemal abolished the 
institution of Caliphate in 1924. 
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because it provided them with much needed supply of arms for the resistance against 
Allied occupation, and because it marked the first recognition of the Ankara 
government’s legitimacy at the international level.  
It was not diplomatic relations but military successes, however, that eventually 
defined the victorious side in the legitimacy struggle between the İstanbul and Ankara 
governments. In parallel to the increasing influence of the nationalist government in 
Ankara among the Turkish populace who resented the Sultan and his government for 
collaborating with the Allies, Anatolia gained strategic significance as the heartland of 
the country, and the principal territory to wage the war of independence. Thus, the 
nationalist front mobilized all available material and human resources to halt the advance 
of the Greek army from the Aegean coast towards the interior of Anatolia. The first battle 
with the Greek forces, fought between January 6-10, 1921 in İnönü, a district of the city 
of Eskişehir, 155 miles west of Ankara, culminated in the victory of the Turkish army. 
Realizing the extent of the impotence of the Sultan’s government, as well as the military 
and political leverage of the nationalists in the aftermath of the İnönü Battle, the Allies 
for the first time invited the Ankara government to a conference in London as a 
legitimate interlocutor. The London Conference, held between February 21 and March 
12, 1921, aimed at forcing the Ankara government to reconcile with the İstanbul 
government and endorse the Treaty of Sèvres. However, due to severe disagreements 
among themselves the Allies proved to be in no position of imposing the terms of the 
Treaty of Sèvres on the Ankara government.  
Upon the failure of the London Conference, the Greek troops launched a renewed 
offensive and resumed their advance into Anatolia in June 1921. Due to the general mood 
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of war-weariness and the concomitant lack of public support at home for a new war none 
of the Allied powers was willing at that time to support the Greek army in its Anatolian 
campaign (Keyder 1987:73). Thus, breaking the Allied solidarity, the Italian and French 
governments concluded separate ceasefire agreements with the Ankara government, and 
Britain abandoned the Greek forces to their own resources (Keyder 1987:73, Ahmad 
1993:50). Between August 23 and September 13, 1921, at the Battle of Sakarya, fought 
by the Sakarya River near the town of Polatlı, about 50 miles west of Ankara, the Turkish 
army defeated the Greek forces. After the Battle of Sakarya the Greek army was forced to 
retreat further west and abandon the territories under its control. Early in 1922, Britain, 
France and Italy realized that the military victory of the nationalists in Anatolia rendered 
the Treaty of Sèvres meaningless and that a new peace agreement was necessary. Thus, in 
March 1922, the Allies proposed a ceasefire and negotiations for a peace treaty. Mustafa 
Kemal refused to take the offer unless the Greek army withdrew from Anatolia. The 
subsequent Battle of Dumlupınar near Afyon, a city about 155 miles southwest of 
Ankara, culminated in the defeat of the Greek army on August 30, 1922. By September 
1922, when the Turkish army recaptured the Aegean coastal province of İzmir, the Greek 
forces were forced to evacuate Turkey. Thus, the Turkish War of Independence ended 
with the victory of the nationalists, which was formally sealed on October 11, 1922 with 
the Armistice of Mudanya.  
The Founding of the Republic 
On October 28, 1922 the Allies invited both the Ankara and İstanbul governments 
to attend a conference in Lausanne, Switzerland to negotiate the terms of a new peace 
agreement. Encouraged by the military victory and the high prestige of the nationalists, 
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Mustafa Kemal considered the time ripe to end the legitimacy crisis between the Ankara 
and İstanbul governments once and for all, and abolished the Sultanate on November 1, 
1922, before the peace negotiations started.  Thus, at the Lausanne Conference, convened 
on November 22, 1922, Turkey was represented solely by a nationalist delegation headed 
by İsmet Pasha (a general, later to be given the family name of İnönü due to his success 
against the Greek army as the Commander in Chief at the İnönü Battle).  
As the nationalist representatives were conducting negotiations with the Allies in 
Lausanne to ensure the territorial integrity of the country the government in Ankara was 
working on a development strategy to lift up an economy in ruins and set the country on a 
path of industrialization and economic growth. By the end of 1922, Turkey was an 
extremely underdeveloped country, overburdened by fiscal deficit and huge amounts of 
debt inherited from the Ottoman Empire, stricken with structural problems, and 
devastated by the materially and demographically destructive effects of ten years of war. 
Industry accounted for only 10% of the GNP. Agriculture, though the backbone of the 
economy, was backward and had low productivity (Hale 1981). The banking system, the 
mining sector, and the railroads were mostly controlled by foreign capital. 
Probably the most important barrier to economic growth at the time was the lack 
of an entrepreneurial base in the country. In the ethnically diverse structure of the 
Ottoman Empire, top positions in the bureaucracy and the military were held by the 
Turkish elite whereas manufacturing industry, business and commerce mostly constituted 
the dominion of Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities. Due to forced deportations 
during the First World War and the mass emigrations effected by the War of 
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Independence there had been a drastic drop in the minority population. Thus, the state 
had to step in the economic sphere as a major entrepreneur.  
However, the necessary role of entrepreneurship for the industrialization of the 
country was not exclusively assumed by the state. The idea underlying the development 
strategy of the Ankara government was for the state to play a leadership role in the 
economy at the beginning stages but gradually move to the background as private capital 
accumulated over time.  In the republic’s first Economic Congress held in the province of 
İzmir on February 17, 1923 with the participation of more than thousand delegates, 
representing farmers, industrialists, traders, and workers, Mahmut Esat, the Minister of 
Economy, identified the role of the state in the economy as follows: “We are not attached 
to laissez-faire, socialist, communist, étatist or protectionist schools of thought. We have 
a new school of thought… I call it the New Turkish Economic School… The new Turkey 
should follow a mixed economic system. Economic enterprises should be undertaken 
partly by the state and partly by private individuals.” (quoted in Hale 1981: 39-40). The 
government also adopted a liberal approach to trade and foreign investment, which was 
spelled out in the addresses of Mustafa Kemal and Mahmut Esat to the Economic 
Congress, stating that the government was always ready to give the necessary assurances 
to foreign capital, provided it conformed to the country’s laws and regulations, and was 
not granted any more privileges than Turkish entrepreneurs (Hale 1981:40). 
Challenges faced by the nationalist government in this era were not limited to the 
domain of the economy and international diplomacy but extended to internal politics. The 
biggest challenge with respect to the latter was to preserve the political unity within the 
Grand National Assembly - now called the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).  
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In a state tradition of over six centuries that entrusted the Sultan-Caliph with both 
temporal and spiritual powers, blurring the distinction between the two, the abolition of 
the Sultanate led to confusion as to the position of the Caliph, who was now stripped of 
his concurrent role as the Sultan. With the newly adopted Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu 
(Constitution) stating that sovereignty unconditionally belonged to the nation and that all 
powers were concentrated in the TGNA as the only representative body of the nation, the 
role and authority of the Caliph became even more questionable. The debate over this 
issue led to a rift between modernists and conservatives in the parliament.  
Modernists advocated separating the religious and the temporal powers, and 
placing the Caliph in charge of the former and the government in charge of the latter. 
Conservatives objected to this position, arguing that the institutions of government and 
Caliphate were indivisible, and that separating them was against the very nature of the 
Caliphate (Karpat 1959:41). Following the deadlock over this issue as well as the 
realization on the part of the modernists that it was virtually impossible for them to pass 
any reform measures in the parliament in its existing composition, the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly dissolved itself on April 1, 1923 to hold new elections. Modernist 
deputies in agreement with Mustafa Kemal won the majority of the votes in the elections.   
The concurrent diplomatic success at the international level helped increase the 
prestige of Mustafa Kemal at home. Peace negotiations with the Allies culminated in the 
Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923. The Treaty established the frontiers of  
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Turkey, virtually in its current boundaries21, and agreed to the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Turkish soil; the abolition of capitulations; the assumption of part of the 
Ottoman debt by Turkey; the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece; and 
the demilitarization of the Turkish Straits22. 
 
The Era of Radical Reforms (1923-1938) 
Socio-Cultural Transformation and Resistance to Change 
Having successfully fought off military occupation and secured the independence 
of the country, Mustafa Kemal and his followers established the Halk Fırkası (People’s 
Party)23, and took to instituting radical reforms to transform Turkey into a secular, 
modern, industrial nation, taking the West as its role model. As the first step to that end, 
the TGNA adopted a regime change on October 29, 1923, declaring Turkey a Republic, 
                                                 
           21 According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the frontier between Turkey and Iraq was 
to be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great 
Britain within nine months. Unable to reach a settlement over the province of Mosul, the 
two parties took the dispute to the League of Nations, as stipulated in the Treaty of 
Lausanne. The issue was resolved in July 1926 when Ankara signed a treaty, leaving 
Mosul to Iraq (Pipes 1995).   
22 Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. 
Due to their strategic importance as the only waterways connecting the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Turkish straits are considered international waterways. Thus, 
Turkey is obligated to allow free passage to any ship in peacetime. The debate during 
Lausanne negotiations, however, was not over the terms of passage in peacetime but over 
military control of the Straits and control of passage of combatant vessels in wartime. 
Upon Turkey’s request of refortifying the Straits, an international conference was 
convened at Montreux, Switzerland in 1936, and Turkey was given complete sovereignty 
over the Straits, including military control.  
23 At its convention on November 10, 1924, the name of the party was changed to 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party - RPP). RPP still occupies a 
prominent position in Turkish politics, referred to as Atatürk’s party. In the current 
parliament RPP is the main opposition party, holding 112 seats out of a total of 550.     
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in line with Mustafa Kemal’s proposal for an amendment to the 1921 Constitution. 
According to the amendment, the TGNA was to elect the President who, in turn, would 
appoint the Prime Minister from within the Assembly.  The TGNA would then approve 
the Prime Minister and his government. Thus, the republican era in Turkish history 
began, with Mustafa Kemal elected as its first President, and İsmet Pasha its first Prime 
Minister.  
The next politically and ideologically crucial, radical reform was the abolition of 
the Caliphate and the expulsion of the Caliph from Turkey on March 3, 1924. The same 
day, the TGNA also approved the replacement of the Şeriyye ve Evkaf Vekâleti (Ministry 
of Religious Law and Pious Foundations) by the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of 
Religious Affairs) under Prime Minister’s office, and the unification of all educational 
institutions under the secular administration of the Ministry of Education (Karpat 
1959:44). Secular reforms, aiming at removing religion from politics and delegating it 
exclusively to individuals’ conscience, continued with the abolition of religious courts on 
April 8, 1924. 
Discontent with the deracination of the religious tenets of the state and the 
concomitant orientation toward secularism manifested itself in fierce criticism directed at 
the RPP in the TGNA. Dissidents within the RPP resigned from the party and established 
the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party) on November 17, 
1924. Expressing concern over the authoritarian proclivity of an omnipotent National 
Assembly, unbridled by any opposition, the Progressive Republican Party declared its 
purpose as to preserve individual freedom by “opposing the despotic tendencies of a few 
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people and their oligarchic aims” (quoted in Karpat 1959:46 from the declaration 
preceding the party program).  
Before the Progressive Republican Party got the chance to establish itself as an 
effective opposition, challenging RPP’s domination in the TGNA, a Kurdish revolt broke 
out in the East. The revolt was a full-scale insurrection with religious and separatist 
motives, led by Sheikh Sait, aiming at establishing an independent Kurdistan and 
restoring the Caliphate (Karpat 1959:46, Keyder 1987: 83, Ahmad 1993:58). On March 
4, 1925 the TGNA passed the Takriri Sükûn Kanunu (Law for the Maintenance of Order), 
which gave the government extraordinary powers to crush the rebellion. In the short run, 
the Law for the Maintenance of Order enabled the government to suppress the revolt. At 
least as significant as its short-term effect, however, were the consequences of the law for 
the RPP government in the long run. Staying in effect for four years, the Law for the 
Maintenance of Order “provided the government with an institutional framework for 
authoritarian rule” (Keyder 1987:83). Independence Tribunals, revolutionary courts of 
supreme authority that were established in 1920 to try cases of treason and all activity 
against the regime, were reactivated (Karpat 1959:47). The Progressive Republican Party 
was abolished on June 5, 1925, alleged of being connected with the rebellion.  The press 
was also strictly censored. Thus, RPP was able to suppress all existing and potential 
channels of opposition, clearing the way for prospective reforms envisaged.   
After securing full control of the TGNA and extending its authority throughout 
the country, the RPP gave impetus to reform measures. Radical changes, aspiring to 
transform Turkey from an agrarian, traditional society based on faith to an industrial, 
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modern society based on reason, were instituted in economic, juridical, social, and 
cultural realms.  
The initial step for economic recovery was taken on March 19, 1924 with the 
adoption of the Budget Law and the reorganization of the Ziraat Bankası (Agricultural 
Bank), a domestically owned credit institution established in 1888 by the Ottoman 
government. This was followed by the establishment of Türkiye İş Bankası (Turkish 
Business Bank), the first national bank of Turkey, on August 26, 1924 and of Türkiye 
Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası (Turkish Bank for Industry and Mining) on April 19, 1925 to 
address the country’s pressing need for long-term industrial capital. Alongside these two 
banks, Emlak Bankası (Bank for Housing) was established on June 3, 1926 to finance 
housing investments and lend housing credits.   
On juridical, social, and cultural fronts, the Headgear and Outfit Law on 
November 25, 1925 replaced the fez with the hat and introduced European attire; dervish 
lodges and shrines were closed on November 30, 1925; international solar calendar 
replaced the Islamic lunar calendar on January 1, 1926; the article denoting Islam the 
official religion of Turkey was removed from the Constitution, and the state was declared 
secular on April 10, 1928; the Turkish Civil Code, based on the Swiss Civil Code, was 
adopted on February 17, 1926, replacing the Islamic Legal Code, and introducing civil 
marriage, thus prohibiting polygamy, and divorce by renunciation; Arabic letters were 
replaced by the Latin alphabet on November 1, 192824.  
                                                 
24 The literacy drive that followed the adoption of the Latin alphabet led to a 
dramatic increase in the level of literacy from 8 percent in 1928 to over 20 percent in 
1935, and 30 percent in 1945 (Ahmad 1993:82). 
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As progressive as the Kemalist reforms were, however, they were not the product 
of consensus among different segments of society but imposed and implemented in a top-
down approach by an authoritarian- revolutionary regime under the hegemony of a 
single-party, comprising of a military-bureaucratic elite that ruled the country for twenty-
seven years.  
Economic and Political Crisis 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s Turkey faced a severe economic crisis triggered 
by domestic and international factors. A major structural shortcoming of the economy 
was its heavy reliance on the agricultural sector. This shortcoming became manifest when 
agricultural productivity dropped drastically due to the drought of 1927-1928 and 
agricultural prices fell down due to the Great Depression. The effect of these 
developments on the balance of payments was devastating. With close to 90% of its 
exports consisting of agricultural products, the trade deficit of Turkey almost doubled 
between 1928 and 1929. This prompted the policymakers of the era to focus on 
industrialization in an attempt to reduce the economy’s dependence on the agricultural 
sector. Since the industry’s share in GNP only slightly increased over the 1920s despite 
the incentives provided to private entrepreneurs, it was argued that the government 
should take a bigger role in the economy to step up the process of industrialization. To 
cope with the balance of payments deficits the state was to invest in domestic production 
to substitute imported goods. The resulting strategy was an étatist course of economic 
development in which the state acted as the primary investor and entrepreneur.  
Concomitant with the economic crisis the RPP government faced a political 
challenge in this era, which led to another attempt of transition to the multi-party political 
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system. The effects of economic decline facilitated the resurgence of dissent within the 
RPP. Those who had been loyal followers of Mustafa Kemal but favored a more liberal 
policy took issue with the economic and political stranglehold of the RPP over the TGNA 
and the whole country. For many of them, RPP’s draconian measures until then might 
have been a necessity in a transition period when major reforms were introduced. Once 
these reforms were carried out, however, there was no plausible justification for not 
instituting a democratic government, checked by opposition (Karpat 1959:64). To avoid 
the risk of a full-blown mass protest Mustafa Kemal encouraged the formation of an 
opposition party. The resultant Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party), 
established on August 12, 1930 by deputies who resigned from the RPP, was loyal to 
Mustafa Kemal but critical of the RPP. Focusing mainly on the failure of the RPP 
government in the economic field the Free Republican Party enjoyed wide popular 
support from its inception. Alarmed by the opposition’s growing popularity, the RPP 
government claimed that the Free Republican Party received most of its support from 
religious reactionaries who used the party for their own purposes. Thus, RPP reasoned, 
the regime was in danger. Based on these allegations, Mustafa Kemal, who had initially 
remained neutral vis-à-vis the two parties, eventually changed his position to support the 
RPP  (Karpat 1959:67). To avoid having to oppose Mustafa Kemal, the Free Republican 
Party dissolved itself on November 17, 1930. The two minor opposition parties, Ahali 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Populist Republican Party) and Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi 
Partisi (Turkish Republican Workers and Peasants Party), established during the same 
time period, were abolished by the government (Karpat 1959:67). 
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Analogous to the outcome of the first failed attempt at multi-party democracy in 
1925, the aftermath of the failure of the second attempt in 1930 was characterized by the 
augmented hegemony of the RPP and intensified efforts at instituting reforms in every 
aspect of society. The third convention of the RPP held in 1931 was significant in that it 
spelled out the ideology of the regime. Six fundamental principles adopted at the 
convention and incorporated in the party program were republicanism, secularism, 
nationalism, étatism, populism and reformism25. In line with these principles the RPP 
government adopted further reform measures throughout the 1930s. Thus, women were 
allowed to vote in municipal elections in 1930; the Surname Law adopted on June 21, 
1934 replaced the Arabic nomenclature with Turkish surnames (following the passage of 
this law Mustafa Kemal was given the surname Atatürk by the TGNA); women were 
granted full political rights on December 5, 1934 (in 1935 fifteen women were elected to 
the TGNA).  
The Étatist Course of Economic Development 
After the elimination of opposition in the TGNA the RPP saw a significant shift 
of power within the party from a group led by Prime Minister İnönü that placed priority 
on the state’s political duties, to another led by Celal Bayar that saw the state’s primary 
responsibility in the economic realm. Due to his increased prestige in the party Bayar 
became the Minister of Economy in 1932. This intra-party shift of power played an 
important role in moving the country toward an étatist course of development.  
                                                 
25 The official emblem of the RPP consists of six arrows, representing these six 
principles.  
 70
Although étatism became an officially accepted principle of the RPP in the early 
1930s it remained subject to controversy throughout the decade due to the striking 
contrast between its various definitions and interpretations by different groups. Two of 
these interpretations are especially worth noting for the ascendancy of one over the other 
eventually shaped the path of Turkey’s economic and political development in the era.  
Following RPP’s official recognition of the regime’s ideology and its six 
principles, a group of Kemalist intellectuals established Kadro (Cadre), a monthly socio-
political journal, in 1932, to explicate and publicize these principles. Although Kadro 
theorists borrowed from Marxist theory and socialist state planning in their attempt to 
equip the Kemalist regime with a solid theoretical framework they were opposed to 
socialism on the grounds that it rejected nationalism. They were equally opposed to 
capitalist exploitation of labor and colonialism. Kadro argued that a strong and impartial 
state envisaged by étatism would both accumulate capital through public ownership of 
the means of production and avoid class conflict, protecting the interests of all social 
classes brought together under national solidarity. Thus, for Kadro theorists, étatism was 
a third way, providing a preferable alternative to both capitalism and socialism (Karpat 
1959, Hale 1981, Ahmad 1993).  
In contrast to this interpretation, Bayar and his supporters viewed étatism as “the 
nursemaid rather than replacement for capitalist development, whose purpose was to 
encourage the accumulation of capital and industrial experience” (Hale 1981: 56).  
The views expressed in the Kadro were harshly criticized both by liberal and 
conservative groups in the RPP. Liberals accused Kadro theorists for being fascist, 
whereas conservatives vilified the journal as a medium for communist propaganda. Due 
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to mounting criticism, Kadro was closed in 1934, and the interpretation of étatism by the 
Bayar front shaped the economic policies of the era. Thus, along with state-led 
industrialization through State Economic Enterprises, the étatist era saw a gradual process 
of private capital accumulation.  
As put in practice in the case of Turkey’s development experience during the 
1930s, in line with Bayar’s interpretation of the term, étatism translated into the 
hegemony of a bureaucratic elite and nascent bourgeoisie that collaborated to create a 
national economic sphere for themselves, in which capital accumulation was achieved by 
heavy oppression of the working class and exploitation of the agricultural sector (Keyder 
1987). In the political sphere, this hegemony was established through “an ideology of 
national solidarity, more or less xenophobic, which denied the existence of conflicting 
class interests in favor of a corporatist model of the society” (Keyder 1987:107)26. 
The first manifestation of the new economic development strategy was the 
introduction of the first five-year industrialization plan, drawn up in 1933 and set in 
motion in 1934. In line with the industrialization plan, the government established several 
industrial plants to reduce the country’s need for imports. To finance the nascent state 
industrial sector two development banks, Sümerbank and Etibank, were set up in 1933 
and 1935, respectively.  
                                                 
26 In his analysis of the way in which nationalism was practiced in Turkey, Karpat 
(1959) notes that “[t]he birth of modern Turkey resembles that of national states in 
Western Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. The birth of national states in Europe 
was preceded and then accompanied by a centuries-long cultural and economic evolution, 
which eventually gave nationalism in Europe ….a liberal form. In Turkey, however, 
nationalism was identified with and represented in the form of a political state almost 
from its inception, and this identification gave to it both exclusiveness and cultural-
political absolutism in all fields of human activity” (p.252).  
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Sümerbank came into being as a continuation of the Turkish Bank for Industry 
and Mining (TBIM) that was established in 1925. The TBIM was first reorganized in 
1932 into two separate agencies, the State Industrial Office (SIO) and the Turkish 
Industrial Credit Bank (TICB). In 1933, these two organizations were brought together 
under Sümerbank, which took over their operations.  
Etibank was put in charge of the mining industry. Etibank’s major activities 
consisted of mining coal, iron ore, copper, and chromite. Another state institution in the 
mining sector, the Maden Tetkik ve Arama Genel Müdürlüğü (Directorate of Mineral 
Research and Exploration) was established in 1935 to assist Etibank in its mining 
operations by exploring the mineral potential of the country. 
The shift in the internal terms of trade in favor of industry, brought about by the 
étatist industrialization policies, was not reflected in benefits for the workers (Ahmad 
1993:99). As a medium of social control over dissatisfied workers the government passed 
a Labor Law in 1936. The law banned trade unions and strikes, and required labor 
disputes to be settled by compulsory arbitration (Hale 1981:65). The ideological 
motivation behind the law was populism, which suggested that Turkey was not a class-
based society and that the workers’ interests, like the interests of any other occupational 
group, were protected by the impartial state. The Association Law of 1938, prohibiting 
the establishment of associations based on common interests, and the Press Union, 
established the same year to muzzle the press, served as other means of social control by 
the government in this era.   
Meanwhile, the political scene saw some changes toward the end of the decade. 
Due to his growing influence within the party circles Bayar replaced İnönü as the Prime 
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Minister in 1937. The same year, the six principles of the RPP were incorporated in the 
Constitution. Upon Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death in November 1938, the TGNA 
elected İnönü as the second President of the Republic. With his strengthened political 
clout as the Head of State İnönü removed Bayar and some other members of the cabinet 
from office in January 1939.  
 
Turkey During World War II (1939-1945) 
The Politics and Economics of the War 
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 shifted the government’s focus from 
industrialization to preservation of the country’s neutrality in light of the risk of invasion 
by Germany or Russia, and the pressure of being surrounded by countries that were either 
at war or occupied by belligerents (Hale 1981:54).   
Although Turkey was able to remain neutral throughout the war the mobilization 
of the armed forces due to persistent threat of invasion increased the government’s 
defense spending dramatically. The rising demand of the army for consumption goods in 
the market increased the prices of virtually every item, which, in turn, led to black 
marketeering and hoarding. Exploiting the food shortage, especially bread, the staple of 
Turkish diet, landlords growing wheat made big profits by saving a portion of their 
production from procurement by the state, which bought their crop at much lower prices 
than its free market value in order to keep the bread prices down (Karpat 1959:90).  
As a radical and highly controversial measure to cope with the pressing need for 
production increases in the face of shortage of labor, the government introduced the Milli 
Koruma Kanunu (Law for National Defense) in 1940. The Law for National Defense 
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empowered the government to fix prices, confiscate property or impose compulsory labor 
obligations on citizens, mostly peasants living near the coalfields, to work in the mines 
for a given period every year (Karpat 1959:91, Hale 1981: 59). This compulsory labor 
provision of the law led to widespread discontent among the peasants.  
However, the RPP was politically secure in its monopoly of power under the 
conditions of war. This sense of safety enabled the government to finance a significant 
portion of its overburdened war budget by raising taxes. Thus, between 1941 and 1946 
the existing property and consumption taxes were increased; a supplementary 
transactions tax was levied on all manufactured goods; a payment-in-kind tax was applied 
on agricultural produce; and exports were subjected to tax (Hale 1981:70, Ahmad 
1993:70). 
Among the new taxes Varlık Vergisi (Capital Tax), introduced in 1942, was the 
most notorious in its material, social and political consequences. The tax was a one-time 
levy to be applied to wealthy landholders, businessmen, property owners and 
corporations. As justified by the government, it was an attempt to absorb the windfall 
gains of wartime profiteers. The rate of taxation was “to be determined by local 
commissions empowered to assess each individual taxpayer’s responsibility” (Keyder 
1987: 113). This arbitrary criterion of assessing who would be charged how much led to 
an extremely unjust and discriminatory practice to the detriment of non-Muslim 
taxpayers, especially the Greek and Jewish bourgeoisie of İstanbul. Seventy five percent 
of the tax collected was levied on taxpayers in İstanbul. Sixty five percent of the total tax 
was collected from non-Muslims, and foreigners residing in Turkey. Also, non-Muslims 
were levied ten times higher rates than Muslims. The tax was imposed even on the non-
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Muslim artisans and low-paid workers whereas their Muslim counterparts escaped the 
tax.  Those who failed to pay the tax were either shipped off to a labor camp in eastern 
Anatolia or forced to sell their businesses and property to Muslim profiteers (Hale 
1981:71, Keyder 1987:113). The Capital Tax was abolished in 1944. During the two 
years it was in effect, however, it not only afflicted those who were levied the tax but also 
did serious damage to the republic’s reputation for fair treatment of the minorities (Hale 
1981:71).    
From Neutrality to Integration into World Politics 
In the international sphere, Turkey came under increasing pressure from the Allies 
after 1943 to join the war and open a second front against Germany in southeast Europe. 
In August 1944, concurrent with the Allied conference in Washington D.C. to discuss the 
plans for establishing the United Nations (UN), Turkey cut economic relations with 
Germany, and in February 1945, two months before the San Francisco meeting 
commenced to draft the UN Charter, declared war on Germany and Japan to ensure her 
status as a founding member of the UN.  
During the same time, Turkey faced Soviet claims on Kars and Artvin, the two 
farthest northeastern provinces of Turkey, bordering on the Soviet Union. Stalin also 
demanded a renegotiation of the Montreux Convention, regarding the regime of Turkish 
Straits, in favor of the Soviet Union. This diplomatic Soviet offensive played into the 
hands of the majority of government bureaucrats aspiring to the West, and factored into 
the decision of Turkey to side with the Allies in the Cold-War.  
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Experimentation with Democracy (1945-1957) 
On the home front, the policies of the wartime had not only left the workers, 
farmers, landlords, and the bourgeoisie alienated from the state but also severed the 
strong bond between the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie that had shaped the étatist era. 
These social conditions profoundly affected the post-war transition to multi-party 
democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, the need to justify the country’s claim to U.S. 
economic and military assistance prompted İnönü to democratize the political system. 
In his speech at the TGNA in November 1945 İnönü encouraged the formation of 
an opposition party. Two months later, in January 1946, four prominent members of the 
RPP, highly critical of the government, established the Democrat Party (DP). Among 
them were Bayar, and Adnan Menderes who came to be the opposition party’s most 
popular leader. Focusing mainly on economic and religious freedom the DP defended 
market liberalism as opposed to state intervention and local traditions as opposed to the 
political oppression and ideological onslaught of the center (Keyder 1987:117).  
The immediate effects of post-war political liberalization were also felt in the 
change in government policies. To illustrate, state control over the sale and pricing of 
goods was eased and retailers were given broader opportunity to sell the products of state 
enterprises; the compulsory labor obligation was abolished; the Law of Associations that 
prohibited the establishment of associations on class basis was amended; the Press Union 
that was established to control the press was disbanded and journalists were allowed to 
join professional associations; the universities were given autonomy in their 
administration and internal affairs (Karpat 1959:157-9). 
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The general elections of July 1946 were held against this backdrop. Although the 
DP had little time to organize before the elections it received enough votes to win 64 out 
of a total of 465 seats in the TGNA (Karpat 1959: 164).  
The shift to the multi-party system drastically changed political discourse in 
Turkey. Underlying the popular support enjoyed by the DP from its inception was the 
assertion that it voiced the will of the people as opposed to an elite group. Hence, ‘going 
to the people’ became a powerful motto in the new political configuration, frequently 
used by the opposition and the government alike. For DP, it was a constant reminder to 
the constituents of the way in which the opposition differed from the governing party. For 
RPP, it was a means to offset the opposition’s claim to power. 
RPP perceived the surprisingly swift success of DP as a serious threat to its 
power.  However, instead of suppressing the opposition, as it had done in the past, the 
government this time chose to address the points of criticism raised by its opponents. 
Thus, in the aftermath of the 1946 elections the RPP government instituted policies based 
on the accomodation and appeasement of its critics, including the abandonment of 
militant secularism in favor of a more liberal interpretation that manifested itself as 
concessions in the realm of religion (Karpat 1959, Keyder 1987), which, in turn, led to 
the politicization of religion.   
To counteract the opposition’s attacks on its economic policies and to respond to 
increasing demands of the fledgling capitalist class for a market economy free of state 
intervention RPP took steps in the direction of economic liberalization. The gradual 
transformation of the country’s economic development strategy from étatism to liberal 
economy was also greatly effected by the post-war shifts in global power relations, 
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marked by the emergence of the United States (U.S.) as the hegemonic economic and 
political power, and RPP government’s choice of alliance with the U.S. Thus, “American 
experts were allowed to draw the post-war economic program” (Keyder 1987: 115) of the 
country. At the heart of this program lay investment in agricultural development, 
agriculture-based industry and infrastructure. 
The U.S. military and economic aid that Turkey received under the Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan fortified her position in the political-economic 
constellation of the post-war era. Also in this era, Turkey became a founding member of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (later to become the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development-OECD) in 1948.  
The general elections of 1950 brought DP to power. In a lanslide victory the 
opposition party won 396 out of a total of 487 seats in the TGNA (Karpat 1959:241, Hale 
1981:55). Thus, a new era began in the history of the Republic, with Bayar as the 
President and Menderes as the Prime Minister. In the new TGNA, RPP was relegated to 
the position of the opposition party, with İnönü as its leader.  
The primary focus of the new government’s economic policies was on 
agricultural development and infrastructure, in accordance with the economic program 
prescribed for Turkey by the U.S. The mechanization and commercialization of 
agriculture was financed by World Bank loans that stipulated Turkey’s integration into 
the world division of labor as an agricultural exporter. Whereas the previous governments 
had concentrated their efforts on extending the railways network the DP government 
heavily invested in road building to facilitate the marketization of agricultural products. 
As imported agricultural machinery enabled the farmers to open up new land and 
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increase production, ground transportation made their produce, even the perishable crops, 
speedily accessible to the national market. The liberal economic policies of the DP 
government also included trade liberalization, inflows of foreign capital, and a shift in the 
economic function of the state from the lead role of primary entrepreneurship to that of 
supporting actor, providing infrastructure services and subsidies to the private sector. By 
the end of the first four years of DP rule, agricultural production had boomed, increasing 
the overall level of economic activity; foreign exchange was freely available for the 
import of industrial inputs; and the rate of inflation was kept at a relatively low level 
(Hale 1981: 90-91). 
On the international diplomacy front, DP took steps to foster the country’s 
commitment to the West. In 1950, Turkish troops were sent to the Korean War in support 
of Western allies, which paved the way for Turkey’s acceptance as a member at the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. The DP government also applied for 
membership to the then European Economic Community, the current European Union, in 
1959. 
To appeal to its devout constituents, DP lifted the ban on the  Arabic reading of 
the call to prayer at the mosques, and allowed religious programs to be broadcast over the 
radio. Moreover, accelerated politicization of religion under the DP rule facilitated the 
emergence of an anti-secularist discourse in the party circles. A resolution introduced at a 
convention of the DP in 1951, for example, demanded to abolish the hat and reintroduce 
the fez; restore the veil and the Arab letters; destroy the existing statues; reestablish 
polygamy; and reinstate the Islamic legal code. In addition, requests were voiced for 
Islam to become the state religion (Karpat 1959:287 n.53).  
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In terms of democratization, DP not only fell short of its election campaign 
promises but also took actions to violate democratic rights. To illustrate, the government 
confiscated RPP’s assets and took over Ulus, the official newspaper of the RPP; passed a 
new Press Law that sanctioned “heavy punishments for those publishing inaccurate 
information deemed harmful to the political and financial prestige of the state” (Hale 
1981:86-87); and took measures to curb the autonomy of the universities. All of these 
actions alienated the liberal intelligentsia that had supported the DP from the beginning 
due to its promises of promoting democracy and freedom (Ahmad 1993:112). 
Nevertheless, DP increased its votes by three percent in the general elections in 
1954. Now more secure in its electoral support than ever before, DP continued its policies 
rigorously, threatened neither by the opposition of the RPP, which came out of this 
election weaker than before, nor about the dissident factions within its own party.  
However, the economy hit a bottleneck after 1954. Agricultural production 
declined, inflation rose to high levels, and the industry was hit by a chronic shortage of 
foreign exchange, on which it depended for the import of some raw materials and new 
equipment. To avoid a slowdown in economic growth and maintain the appearance of 
increasing prosperity the government was forced to abandon its commitment to private 
industry, and increased its investment in the state sector, aiming at filling the gap caused 
by the shortfall in private investment. This strategy failed, however, due to the inefficient 
management and the resultant low returns of the state industrial plants (Hale 1981:91).    
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Decennial Cycles of Economic Crisis and Coups D’état (1957-1980) 
The 1960 Coup: From Liberalism Back to Étatism in Economic Development 
The result of the general elections in 1957 was a major setback for the governing 
party.  DP’s votes declined ten percent as compared to the previous elections whereas 
RPP increased its votes by six percent. However, DP still kept its position as the leading 
party, receiving the majority of the votes.  
The economy continued to decline and Turkey experienced her first major 
macroeconomic crisis in 1958, prompted by uncontrolled expansionism (Öniş 1996). This 
crisis eventually led to a shift from liberal economy back to the étatist development 
strategy after 1960. 
To restore its authority DP resorted to populist policies and heightened its 
denunciation of the RPP, which increased the tension between the government and the 
opposition. The government also continued its oppressive measures to curb democratic 
rights. In April 1960, the DP majority in the TGNA approved to set up a commission to 
investigate the opposition’s activities deemed subversive by the government. The 
commission was equipped with arbitrary powers to search and arrest. This measure led to 
student demonstrations in İstanbul and Ankara. The government responded by declaring 
martial law in the two cities.  
These developments led up to the military’s first direct involvement in politics. 
Until then the Turkish military had not stepped onto the political scene, strictly following 
Atatürk’s maxim for the army to stay out of politics. However, this rule was irrevocably 
broken on May 27, 1960 when the military, under the leadership of General Cemal 
Gürsel, staged a coup to put an end to the escalating social unrest and the rapid 
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polarization of the country into two opposing camps: pro- and anti-Menderes (Hale 
1981:87). Menderes was removed from power, arrested along with all other DP deputies 
in the TGNA, as well as the leading members of the party, including Bayar, and put on 
trial. Among others, Bayar, Menderes, his Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, were sentenced to death, charged with 
violation of the constitution and of corruption. The death sentences of Bayar and twelve 
other DP members were later converted to lifetime imprisonment, whereas Menderes, 
Polatkan and Zorlu were executed in 1961. 
The military intervention of 1960 came to signify the onset of a notorious 
tradition of coups in the history of the Republic, making the military a powerful authority 
for future politicians to reckon with.  
Soon after the takeover of power the military regime convened a group of 
academics to draw up a new constitution. The resulting constitution, liberal in many 
aspects, was put to a referendum and adopted in 1961. The 1961 Constitution recognized 
the right to strike, collective bargaining, universal social security, medical care, and 
included “explicit guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association and 
publication, as well as other civil liberties” (Ahmad 1993:129). The constitution also 
introduced the Constitutional Court whose function was to review the constitutionality of 
legislation passed by the TGNA. As another novelty, the constitution recognized and 
institutionalized the role of the military in politics. The National Security Council, 
established to “advise the Council of Ministers in making decisions on matters of national 
security and in their coordination” (Official Gazette 20/07/1961, No.10859, Law No. 334, 
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Article 111 § 3), consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the 
Ministers, and the chief commanders of the armed forces.   
Following the coup, the country went back to the étatist trajectory of economic 
development. It had been widely accepted that the lack of an economic development plan 
under the DP rule was a major factor leading to the economic crisis of the late 1950s. 
Thus, the new constitution required the establishment of a State Planning Organization to 
draw up and publish long-term plans for economic development. The return to planned 
economy increased the role of the state in the economy. The subsequent development 
model entailed an import substituting industrialization strategy with heavy protectionism, 
export pessimism, and restrictions on foreign direct investments. This model stayed in 
effect for the next two decades. 
1960s also marked the beginning of an era of political instability in Turkey, 
characterized by successive short-lived coalition governments. Following the coup the 
military junta had closed the DP. In 1961, when political activity was restored, Adalet 
Partisi (Justice Party - JP) was established as the successor of the DP, claiming the 
center-right of the political spectrum. The first general elections after the coup were held 
in October, 1961 with the participation of the JP, the RPP, and a number of newly 
established, smaller parties. RPP received 36.7 percent of the votes, preceding the JP by a 
margin of two percent. Since none of the parties won the majority of the votes, a coalition 
government had to be established. As the party with the largest electoral support the RPP 
set out to do so. Between 1961 and 1965, the RPP formed three tenuous coalition 
governments, first with the JP, then with the smaller parties, and finally with the 
independents. By 1965, RPP was weakened by the instability of the successive coalition 
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governments established under its leadership. Before the general elections of 1965, RPP 
leader İnönü announced his party’s political orientation as ‘left of center’, in an attempt 
to boost the fading image of the party and justify its name of ‘people’s party’ (Hale 
1981:118). The general elections in 1965 brought the JP to power, allowing its leader 
Süleyman Demirel to establish a single party government with 53 percent of the votes.  
Despite the political instability that characterized the first half of the 1960s the 
economy grew almost seven percent between 1963 and 1967 (Hale 1981:147, Ahmad 
1993:133). This performance was effected to a large extent by favorable developments on 
the international milieu.  In 1963 Turkey became an associate member of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The associate membership entailed economic cooperation, 
in the short run, and the establishment of a customs union between the parties, in the long 
run, as a means of preparing Turkey for a prospective full membership. Thus, 
economically “Turkey gradually entered the European sphere of influence during the 
1960s, as reflected in trade patterns and in the dominance of Swiss and German 
investments over American” (Keyder 1987:184). This influence was limited, however, 
for two reasons. First, it made more economic sense for European entrepreneurs to invest 
in the member countries whose economies were linked by customs union, allowing free 
trade.  Second, although it was more lucrative to invest outside the EEC due to cheap 
labor, Turkey was not favorable in that respect due to her relatively high wages (Keyder 
1987). There was one development in this era, however, that facilitated Turkey’s 
integration into the European economy and boosted her economic growth beyond 
expectations. The economic boom in Europe, particularly in Germany, created a rising 
demand for labor, which Turkish workers exploited in growing numbers, starting in the 
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early 1960s. From 13,000 in 1962, the number of Turkish workers in Europe increased to 
480,000 in 1970 (Keyder 1987:184). The remittances these workers sent back home made 
a significant contribution to the economy as a source of foreign exchange, which, in turn, 
fostered industrialization.  
Remittances provided by migrant workers also had an indirect effect on politics. 
Partly due to the ensuing economic prosperity the governing JP increased its electoral 
support in the general elections of 1969, receiving 57 percent of the votes. However, the 
concurrent process of deepening ideological polarization in the society turned the tide 
against the JP government. 
The political and social landscape of Turkey in the 1960s was remarkably 
different from that in any other period before. The new freedoms provided by the 
constitution fostered a social transformation in Turkey by facilitating a process of 
unprecedented mass politicization. As a part of this process, the penetration of class-
consciousness into the social fabric found its expression in the establishment of 
ideologically motivated, highly politicized organizations. To exemplify, a group of 
workers split from the non-political, pro-government Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu-Türk-İş (Confederation of Workers’ Unions of Turkey), and formed the 
Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-DİSK  (Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers’ Unions of Turkey) in 1967 (Ahmad 1993:134). To counteract 
the growing politicization of the working class and advance its own interests, the 
bourgeoisie established the Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği – TÜSİAD (Turkish 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) in 1971. 
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The same era also witnessed the formation and increasingly fierce confrontation 
of the left wing and right wing youth groups. Leftist college students established political 
associations, some of which were affiliated with the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish 
Workers Party – TWP) that was formed in the immediate aftermath of the coup in 1961. 
Translations of leftist political literature that became readily available in this era assisted 
students in cultivating their worldview. At the other end of the political spectrum, the 
right wing began to mobilize its own forces in what was described as the struggle against 
communism (Ahmad 1993:139). Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party - 
NAP), a neo-fascist party under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, an ex-member of the 
military junta of 1960, and Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves), the youth organization of the NAP, 
assumed the lead role in the mobilization of the right.  
The disproportionate rise in the share of the population of age 30 and under 
indirectly factored into the ideological polarization of the youth. To meet the needs of a 
growing student body universities and colleges doubled their enrollment in the 1960s, 
making these institutions “recruiting grounds for fringe political groups of the left and 
right” (Ahmad 1993:145). Thus, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, antagonism between 
the hard-line right and the revolutionary left grew to the point of boiling over to the 
streets, manifested in acts of terror carried out by extremist urban guerilla groups.  
In the hotbed of ideological politics of the decade political Islam also found itself 
a niche. Although Islamists had been active in politics under the roof of center-right 
parties since 1950s, first within the DP, then within the JP, it was in 1970 that they 
entered the political stage as an independent actor with the establishment of the Milli 
Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan.  
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The 1971 ‘Coup by Memorandum’ 
Early 1970s saw a downturn in the economy. Industrial expansion and high 
growth rate of the previous decade created ever-rising expectations, which the economy 
could not meet. Consumption was restricted to an affluent minority due to high inflation, 
and unemployment was rising (Ahmad 1993:144).  
Economic decline, coupled with ideological polarization, political tension, and 
social unrest took an explosive dimension in the early 1970s. In Ahmad’s (1993) account 
of the prevailing conditions in Turkey at the time: 
By January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. The universities 
has ceased to function. Students emulating Latin American urban guerillas 
robbed banks and kidnapped US servicemen, and attacked American 
targets. The homes of university professors critical of the government 
were bombed by neo-fascist militants. Factories were on strike…… The 
Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the 
National Order Party, openly rejected Atatürk and Kemalism, infuriating 
the armed forces (P.147).  
 
This chaotic state of affairs culminated in a military intervention on March 12, 
1971 when the Chief of the General Staff and the chief commanders of the armed forces 
issued a memorandum, calling for the establishment of a strong and credible government 
capable of putting an end to the existing anarchic situation and undertaking reforms 
envisaged in the constitution (Hale 1981:119, Ahmad 1993:147). The generals also 
threatened to assume power if the government refused to resign. The subsequent 
resignation of Demirel launched another period of unstable coalition governments for the 
following two and a half years. Under the shadow of the military, the governments during 
this period instituted anti-democratic measures curbing the rights guaranteed by the 1961 
Constitution.  
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In 1972, Islamists formed Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party-NSP) as 
the successor of the National Order Party, which had been dissolved by the military junta. 
Meanwhile, in the RPP Bülent Ecevit, the architect of the shift in the party’s political 
orientation to ‘left of center’ became the leader of the RPP, replacing İnönü.   
The first general elections after the so-called ‘coup by memorandum’ were held in 
October 1973. RPP came out as the first party with 41 percent of the votes, followed by 
Demirel’s JP with 33 percent. Since no party received the majority of the votes another 
series of successive, short-lived coalition governments ensued.  
The first coalition between the RPP and the National Salvation Party faltered due 
to profound disagreements between the constituent parties. Hoping to form a new 
coalition, this time with the JP, Prime Minister Ecevit of the RPP resigned in 1974. 
Contrary to Ecevit’s expectations, an unlikely coalition was established between the 
right-wing parties in the parliament, which had been hostile to each other until then 
because of their competition over the votes of the same constituency. The main 
motivation behind the coalition of the center-right JP, the centrist Republican Reliance 
Party, the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party, and the Islamist National Salvation Party, 
was to establish a united front against what they saw as the communist threat to the 
regime posed by the left-wing parties. Under the government of the right-wing coalition, 
between 1975 and 1977, the country came to the brink of a civil war between the radical 
left and radical right youth groups. The ideological schism turned into political violence 
and terror, which was aggravated at an unprecedented scale during the right-wing 
coalition due to the encouragement and direct support of the fascist youth groups by the 
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government. By the end of the 1970s violent acts of terror claimed about 20 to 30 victims 
each day (Ahmad 1993, Birand 1987, Kongar 2006).  
In 1977, Ecevit’s RPP came out of the general elections as the first party again but 
it still did not have the majority of the votes to establish a single party government. With 
the support of the independent members of parliament, Ecevit was able to form a 
government. To straighten up the economy Ecevit was forced to “swallow the bitter pill 
offered by the IMF as the price of its economic bailout” (Ahmad 1993:177). However, 
this decision placed the Prime Minister in a double-bind: According to the IMF and the 
Turkish business community, the economic measures Ecevit agreed to take were not 
sufficient for recovery. His working class constituency, on the other hand, resented 
Ecevit for compromising too much at their expense. Upon the defeat of his party in the 
mid-term elections held in October 1979, Ecevit resigned. 
In the late 1970s Turkish economy experienced its worst crisis since the 
establishment of the republic. A significant determinant of the crisis was the economy’s 
dependence on the remittances sent home by Turkish workers in Europe. This source of 
foreign exchange was unpredictable due to its reliance on the economic boom in Europe. 
In fact, remittances began to decline after 1974 when Germany began to introduce 
schemes to send home foreign workers in an attempt to address the country’s growing 
unemployment problem (Keyder 1987:185, Ahmad 1993:134). Thus, as noted by Keyder 
(2004), “Despite a respectable growth performance, the economy could not generate the 
foreign exchange earnings that were needed for essential imports, such as oil and new 
technology” (p.66). The government’s response to the crisis, based on short-term 
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measures, such as continuing protectionist policies at home by borrowing abroad, came 
under heavy attack.  
By the end of the decade Turkey had once again become a setting of economic, 
social, and political chaos. The rate of inflation mounted to over 80 percent in 1979. 20% 
of the working population was unemployed, and the trade deficit was on the rise (Hale 
1981). The economic crisis, exacerbated by political instability, virtually paralyzed the 
regime.  
The resulting picture was grim. Turkey was on a dangerous downward spiral, 
falling apart at a swift pace but there seemed to be no way out of this vicious circle within 
the existing political system. Following Ecevit’s resignation, Demirel formed a minority 
government in November 1979. In the meantime, alarmed by the extent of the political 
and socio-economic crisis facing the country, the generals presented a letter of warning to 
the President on December 27, 1979, stating that “the armed forces strenuously request 
that in view of the life-and-death question facing our country, political parties should 
immediately put national interest to the fore and cooperate…..to take all the measures 
required to oppose attempts to demolish the state by means of anarchy, terror and 
separatism” (quote from Birand 1987: 101).  
The 1980 Coup, IMF and the Shift to Neoliberal Economy 
The political and economic stability of the country during this period was a 
primary concern not only to Turks within the context of peace and prosperity at home but 
also to the West within the context of Cold War.  Developments at the international level 
and the subsequent shift in U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s had a direct and profound 
effect on the course of Turkish politics in this era.   
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1979 marked one of the most crisis-laden years of the Cold War. The U.S. lost its 
major ally and its crucial military bases in the Persian Gulf with the fall of the Shah and 
the consequent establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran through the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979. In a concurrent development the same year, a group of Iranian 
militant university students took sixty-six U.S. citizens hostage in the American Embassy 
in Tehran. During the ongoing hostage crisis the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in  
December 1979. This incident came as a sharp blow to the fragile balance between the 
two superpowers. The U.S. Administration was convinced that the underlying motive of 
this aggressive Soviet military move was to control the rich oil fields in the Gulf. In his 
State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, which came to be known as the Carter 
Doctrine, President Carter proclaimed that “[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of 
the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force”.  In the same speech, Carter also announced that 
Washington would strengthen political and military ties with the nations in the region. 
Within this framework, a rapid deployment force (RDF), a flexible military force capable 
to reach any trouble spot in the Middle East at short notice, was to be established. At this 
juncture, as a long time U.S. ally and NATO member with already existing military 
technological infrastructure necessary for the establishment of RDF bases, and with its 
geographical location, bordering on Syria and Iraq in the South and Iran in the East, 
Turkey proved to be a valuable strategic asset for the U.S. However, the viability of such 
a critical military and political investment in a country required the economic and 
political stability of that country. 
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Meanwhile, with the possibility of a military intervention hanging over its head 
like the sword of Damocles the new government of Demirel passed the so-called January 
24 Decisions in 1980. Along the same lines of the economic stability program adopted by 
the previous government in 1979, this package of IMF-sanctioned austerity measures was 
based on transforming the economy by encouraging exports and curbing public spending. 
However, there was a marked difference between the two programs in terms of the scope 
of the measures endorsed. The January 24 Decisions of the Demirel government went as 
far as to fully satisfy both the IMF and the Turkish business community. Devoted to both 
short-term stabilization and long-term structural adjustment, the program included 
measures such as opening the Turkish economy to international markets, reducing the 
state’s role in the economy, adopting realistic exchange rate and monetary policies, 
reducing subsidies and price controls, and encouraging exports and foreign direct 
investment (Öniş 2003a: 6). This move was not the first attempt of Turkish policymakers 
to liberalize the economy but, ironically, it was for the first time in this turbulent era, 
marked by critical national and international developments, that the country’s radical 
transition to a liberal economy could be carried out. The adoption of the neo-liberal 
reform package by Turkey “received immediate recognition and support from 
international organizations like the World Bank and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)” (Şenses 1988:9).  
  January 24 Decisions were devised by Turgut Özal, the principal economic 
advisor of and undersecretary to Demirel, who had worked for the World Bank in the 
early 1970s, and was a fervent proponent of the IMF- patented panacea for economic 
recovery in Turkey. However, as an experienced technocrat, Özal was aware of the 
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difficulty in implementing this stability package within the limitations of ordinary party 
politics due to the potential cataclysmic social consequences of the required severe 
measures.  
At this critical stage two powerful forces came to the rescue of Özal: the Western 
Allies and the Turkish military. Efforts of the West to adapt to the unexpected turn of 
events within the context of the Cold War crystallized in a rescue mission comprising of 
economic aid to help Turkey restore economic stability. Under the auspices of Germany, 
an immediate aid package was provided by the OECD for the economic recovery of 
Turkey. Securing the necessary political stability for the full implementation  of the  IMF 
program was the next step, which the Turkish army took with the coup on September 12, 
198027. Beside its immediate outcome of putting an end to political violence and terror, 
the 1980 coup had the effect of providing “the period of tranquility Özal was seeking, 
marked by an absence of politics and dissent in all forms” (Ahmad 1993:179).            
 
Neoliberalism Under the Shadow of the Military (1980-?) 
Until 1983, the country was ruled directly by the military junta through the 
omnipotent National Security Council (NSC), comprising of the Chief of the General 
Staff and the chiefs of the armed forces. A shadow government led by a retired admiral 
was delegated executive authority by the NSC. The NSC restored stability in a totalitarian 
                                                 
27 With respect to U.S. involvement in the coup, Mehmet Ali Birand (1987), a 
prominent Turkish journalist, recounts: “The United States National Security Council 
adviser and head of the Turkish desk Paul Henze had just returned home when his 
telephone rang. It was the ‘Situation Room’ in the White House…..The duty officer in 
the ‘Situation Room’ announced: ‘Paul, your boys have finally done it!’ Paul Henze was 
taken aback: ‘What are you talking about? What do you mean? The voice went on: ‘Your 
generals, Paul, they’ve pulled a coup’ ” (p.185).  
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fashion by proscribing anything political in the society. Thus, “the trade union movement 
was smashed, the universities were purged and centralized, the press was muzzled, the 
parties were dissolved and many former politicians banned from politics” (Ahmad 
1993:13). This process of depoliticization was institutionalized in the 1982 Constitution, 
which replaced the liberal 1961 Constitution. Under the new constitution, the powers of  
the NSC were expanded “to form what amounted to a parallel government, while the 
State Security Courts [established by the junta] became a parallel legal system with 
jurisdiction over ‘crimes against the state’” (Keyder 2004:66).   
When the ban on politics was lifted in April 1983, new parties led by new figures 
entered the political stage. This was not due to innovation and diversity in politics in the 
post-coup era but because of necessity, since all previous parties had been abolished and 
their leaders detained by the military junta. One of the new parties, the center right 
Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party - MP) of Özal, the architect of the January 24 
Decisions, won the general elections in November 1983.   
Although the MP was not the continuation of any one of the dissolved parties it 
incorporated all three tendencies of the right. It was conservative like Demirel’s Justice 
Party, Islamist like Erbakan’s National Salvation Party, and nationalist like Tūrkeş’ 
Nationalist Action Party (Ahmad 1993:192). As a means of holding together the 
representatives of these tendencies within the party Özal skillfully exploited patronage, 
buying off the leaders of factions with office and allowing them to further their personal 
interests (Ahmad 1993:194). Özal’s policies reflected the overwhelmingly conservative 
character of his party. With little concern for democratic values and democratization Özal 
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left the NSC to maintain law and order as he primarily focused on economic policy 
(Ahmad 1993, Keyder 2004).   
One of the problem areas entrusted to the military was the ethnic separatism claim 
by the Kurds living in eastern and southeastern Turkey28. According to the dominant 
ideology of the Turkish state, there is only one people in Turkey, comprising the totality 
of the country’s citizens who enjoy the same rights and obligations (Kramer 2000:40). 
The indivisibility of this totality is one of the sacrosanct principles of the Republic. Thus, 
Kurdish claims for ethnic difference were rejected by the state, and forcefully suppressed 
by the military after the 1980 coup under martial law in Kurdish provinces, which lasted 
for over twenty years. Cultural and political suppression, combined with economic 
underdevelopment, culminated in an armed Kurdish insurgency against the state. Under 
the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as PKK after its 
Kurdish name Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan29, started guerilla attacks on Turkish security 
forces in 1984. The state responded by intensifying its repression, and an armed conflict 
ensued to last for the next fifteen years. 
Although the ban on politics for the pre-coup party leaders and their parties was 
still in effect by 1986, major parties in the political setting were surrogates of the 
principal parties of the past, with proxy leaders on the foreground guided by the doyens 
                                                 
28 Kurds comprise the largest ethnic group in Turkey, estimated to represent 
between 10 to 20 percent of the total population (Keyder 2004:73). Since their ethnicity 
is not accepted as an identity code the state does not acknowledge Kurds as a minority 
group. As sanctioned in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the only minority groups 
officially recognized by Turkey are the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities.  
 
29 A Marxist separatist organization, established in 1978, with the aim of creating 
an independent Kurdish state in southeastern and eastern Turkey, and parts of the 
neighboring Iran, Iraq, and Syria, inhabited by Kurds. 
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of the old parties. Thus, the center right Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party - TPP) was 
associated with Demirel; the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party - WP) with Erbakan; 
and the neo-fascist Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Labor Party - NLP) with 
Türkeş. On the left, the legacy of the RPP was carried on by two parties: the Demokratik 
Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party - DLP), guided in the background by RPP’s pre-coup 
leader Ecevit; and the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party - 
SDPP), led by Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü, RPP’s long time leader before Ecevit.  
In September 1987, political rights of the old party leaders were restored. Thus, 
the new parties participated in the elections of November 1987 under the official 
leadership of the previous leaders. Özal’s MP came out as the first party, winning 65 
percent of the seats in the TGNA with only 36 percent of the votes. This disproportionate 
representation was due to the amendments in the electoral law in favor of the ruling 
party30. The amendments increased the ruling party’s representation vis-à-vis the small 
parties, which failed to pass the 10 percent threshold imposed by the NSC, and thus won 
no representation in the TGNA (Ahmad 1993:196).     
Under the protection of the NSC, Özal radically restructured the economy. 
Manufacturing employment in the public sector decreased due to privatization and 
downsizing. Agricultural subsidies were reduced. There was a marked change in the 
pattern of income distribution in favor of the upper class as the share of wages and 
salaries in the GNP plummeted from 36 percent in 1977 to 18 percent in 1987 (Ahmad 
                                                 
30 Between 1983 and 1987, the Özal government amended the electoral law four 
times. Thanks to these amendments, the ruling party was able to increase its seats in the 
TGNA in 1987 even though its votes had declined with reference to 1983. MP held 211 
seats in 1983 with 45 percent of the votes but 292 seats in 1987 with only 36 percent of 
the votes.   
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1993:205). With the increase in the number of small enterprises, the growth of the service 
sector, and the spread of subcontracting, unionized labor force declined (Gülalp 2001, 
Keyder 2004). On the positive side, the adoption of export-oriented growth strategy 
resulted in an unprecedented upsurge in exports from $3 billion in 1980 to $13 billion in 
1990 (Keyder 2004:68), which, to a large extent, owed to the increase in manufactured 
exports, especially textiles. This structural shift in the exports from agricultural to 
manufactured goods was made possible by market liberalization and a subsequent 
development, which was significant not only in its economic consequences but also in its 
political ramifications.  
Market liberalization gave rise to a new entrepreneurial class investing in small 
and medium-scale export-oriented businesses in the manufacturing sector. These small 
entrepreneurs predominantly invested in “a number of smaller Anatolian cities with craft 
traditions and non-unionized workforces, where households could be incorporated in 
subcontracting deals” (Keyder 2004:68). These cities, referred to as ‘Anatolian Tigers’, 
gradually grew into regional industrial centers.  Being born into a free market economy at 
home, and having to compete in a cutthroat global market on their own, the new breed of 
entrepreneurs was considerably different from the bourgeoisie of İstanbul whose large 
holding companies thrived under the protection of the state in a closed economy. The 
rapport of the İstanbul bourgeoisie with the policymakers in Ankara had allowed the 
former to accumulate wealth but at the same time rendered it dependent on the state. In 
contrast, the new entrepreneurs were less directly dependent on Ankara because their 
business decisions were based more on the dictates of the market rather than the 
bureaucratic measures. Still, the small entrepreneurs resented the state for treating them 
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as its step-children while favoring the large businesses (Gülalp 2001:439). Another 
notable difference between the two groups was that the new businessmen “did not share 
the westernized style and militant secularism of their more entrenched counterparts in 
İstanbul” (Keyder 2004:68), and tended to support an Islamic party. Aggrieved by the 
state’s neglect, and unable to find any representation in the existing business associations 
to match their growing economic power, small entrepreneurs organized and established 
their own association of Müstakil Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği - MÜSİAD 
(abbreviation for the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen)31 in 
1990 as a counterweight to the TÜSİAD of the İstanbul bourgeoisie.  
After a decade of rapid economic growth, the economy began to worsen in the 
late 1980s. This decline was largely due to the failure of the government to contain severe 
distributional pressures, which had been highly repressed under the military regime. 
Economic growth was restored with the liberalization of the capital account and the 
establishment of full convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989. These neo-liberal policy 
measures resulted in a dramatic increase in inflows of short-term international capital. 
However, premature financial and account liberalization prior to the establishment of a 
stable macroeconomic environment and a strong regulatory framework for the banking 
sector resulted in “a pattern of a highly fragile debt-led growth which was heavily 
                                                 
31 The skillfully chosen name for the association denotes the group’s emphasis on 
its differences from the big business: One difference is noted in the signifier of 
‘Independent’, referring to ‘Independence from Ankara’ versus ‘Dependence on Ankara’. 
The other is alluded to in the first three letters of the abbreviated name of MÜSİAD.  
Although with reference to its official name in Turkish “MÜS” stands for “MÜSTAKİL”, 
i.e. “INDEPENDENT”, it also constitutes an allusion to the first three letters of another 
Turkish word: ‘MÜSLÜMAN’, i.e. MUSLIM.    
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dependent on domestic borrowing to finance the large fiscal deficit and inflows of short-
term capital”32 (Öniş 2003a:25).  
   Economic decline further eroded the electoral support of Özal’s Motherland Party 
(MP), as manifested in the local elections in 1989 when the party’s votes dropped to 22 
percent. An equally significant reason for the declining popularity of Özal was the 
pervasive corruption associated with him and his party. Through his connections with the 
World Bank and the U.S. Özal recruited young liberals, referred to as the ‘Princes of 
Özal’, who “brought with them ideas and schemes from Reagan’s America on how to 
make quick and easy money” (Ahmad 1993:193). The popular idiom of ‘Özal Dynasty’ is 
revealing in that respect. It refers to the loyal supporters of Özal who “had acquired great 
wealth, which they displayed with unbridled ostentation” (Ahmad 1993:198).  
In 1989 TGNA elected Özal as the country’s next President. In the absence of a 
leader capable of unifying the different groups within the party, the MP witnessed an 
internal power struggle between the factions. Taking advantage of the resultant political 
instability and the economic decline Kurdish guerillas escalated their attacks to which the 
state responded with more stringent military and legislative measures. As the army’s 
presence in the Southeast was strengthened, the government passed the Anti-Terrorism 
Law in 1990, allowing the authorities to exercise extraordinary powers in the name of 
national security (Ahmad 1993, Keyder 2004).   
In the general elections in 1991 True Path Party (TPP), Demirel’s center-right, 
post-coup party, came out as the first party with 27 percent of the votes, followed by the 
                                                 
32 This unstable pattern of growth instigated the economic crises in 1994, 2000 
and 2001.  
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Motherland Party (MP) with 24 percent, and Erdal İnönü’s center-left Social Democratic 
Populist Party (SDPP) with 20.8 percent of the votes. Once again, the election results 
called for a coalition government.  
The ensuing left-right coalition was formed between TPP and SDPP. Meanwhile, 
in 1992, a group of SDPP members left the party and reestablished the Republican 
People’s Party (RPP) under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. With the ascension of the 
coalition leader Demirel to Presidency following the death of Özal in 1993, Tansu Çiller 
replaced the former as the leader of TPP and the Prime Minister, thus becoming Turkey’s 
first female premier.   
Under Çiller’s premiership in December 1995, Turkey took a step forward in its 
integration with Europe with the establishment of a Customs Union in industrial and 
processed agricultural goods, thus, completing the long transition period between its 
associate membership in 1963 and the last stage for its aspired full membership, i.e. the 
official candidate status and the onset of negotiations for membership. 
The following general elections in 1995 shook up politics in Turkey when, for the 
first time in the Republican history, an Islamic party took the lead. Erbakan’s Welfare 
Party received 21 percent of the votes, leaving behind the Motherland Party with 19.5 
percent, the True Path Party with 19.18 percent, and the Democratic Left Party with 
14.64 percent.  
The steady increase in the electoral votes of the Welfare Party (WP) from 8 
percent in 1987 to 21 percent in 1995 was not so much due the increase in the number of 
its fundamentalist supporters who wanted to see the modern state replaced by an Islamic 
state but due to the movement of what Göle (1996) refers to as Cultural Islam, which 
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gave rise to counter-communities with new value systems. Exploiting an opening that the 
system acknowledged33, these communities used the Islamic value system as a marker of 
difference and social distinction against the official construction of identity. Thus, along 
with the urban poor, the new class of small entrepreneurs under MÜSİAD found an outlet 
in Cultural Islam for their grievances and a representation in the Welfare Party for their 
interests.  
Following WP’s election victory, the center right agreed to join forces in an 
attempt to prevent the establishment of a coalition, led by an Islamic party. Thus, a 
coalition government was formed between the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path 
Party (TPP). The MP-TPP government lasted only for three months however, due to 
profound disagreements between the coalition partners. Upon the ensuing crisis President 
Demirel was forced to give Erbakan the mandate to establish a new government. The 
resulting Erbakan-Çiller (WP-TPP) government was another short-lived coalition, 
interrupted this time by the so-called ‘post-modern coup’ on February 28, 1997, when the 
National Security Council warned Erbakan against his provocative Islamist rhetoric and 
increasing threat to the regime. As a result, Erbakan was forced to resign, and his party 
was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998. This led to the reorganization of 
Political Islam under a new party, the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party).          
                                                 
33 Keyder (2004) points out the way in which the state fostered cultural Islam as 
follows: "[a]fter the coup in 1980, the military junta subscribed uncritically to the 
American policy of encouraging Islamism as a buffer against the socialist movement. 
With the education system undermined by IMF fiscal austerity measures enrollment in 
government-backed religious lycées grew faster than that in general secondary schools 
during the 1980s, and religion was made a compulsory element of the curriculum. During 
these years, party leaders competed for good relations with various moderate and 
modernist Islamic factions, Özal winning their support in 1983" (p.70). 
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As political instability continued with short-lived coalition governments under 
accusations of corruption and cronyism, the economy suffered two consecutive crises in 
the 1990s due to debt-led growth. The economy shrank by 6 percent in the crises of 1994 
and 1999 (Keyder 2004:75).     
Along with the political and economic crises, two specific developments left their 
mark on the 1990s. In February 1999, PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 
Nairobi, Kenya by a commando team of Turkish security forces, with the help of Israeli 
and American intelligence agencies. Öcalan was brought back to Turkey, put on trial at 
the State Security Court, found guilty of separatist treason, and sentenced to death34. The 
same year in August, Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms (Kramer 2000, 
Keyder 2004). Consequently, PKK guerillas withdrew from Turkish soil to Northern Iraq, 
and its leadership renounced armed struggle35. The second politically crucial 
development of the decade was the decision by the EU heads of state at the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999 to accept Turkey as an official candidate for membership at 
the EU.  
 Upon the closure of the Virtue Party in 2001 there has been a split   in the Islamic 
ranks between older hardliners and younger reformers, which culminated in the 
establishment of Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), representing the hardliners around 
Erbakan, and Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – abbreviated as AKP or AK Parti (Justice and 
                                                 
34 Öcalan’s sentence was converted to life imprisonment in 2002 when Turkey 
abolished the death penalty as part of her reform measures to join the EU.  
35 PKK took up arms again in 2005. Following Öcalan’s sentence in 1999, his 
lawyers had disputed the legality of his trial and brought the case to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR). ECHR decided in 2005 that Öcalan’s trial was unfair. 
Although not legally binding, the ECHR ruling puts political pressure on Turkey to grant 
Öcalan a new trial.  
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Development Party) by Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime 
Minister, representing the moderate wing.  
 Meanwhile, due to another crisis the economy shrank by 9 percent in 2001. 
Investments fell, bankruptcies and unemployment exploded, and state indebtedness 
reached the alarming level of 150 percent of GNP (Keyder 2004:75).     
In November 2002 elections, AKP became the first party, winning 34% of the 
votes, followed by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) that received 19 percent of the 
votes36. The 10 percent threshold that had been instituted by the military junta in 1980 to 
keep the fringe parties away from the TGNA ironically disqualified all the other major 
parties but the RPP from being represented in the Assembly, leaving AKP with 60 
percent of the seats. Thus, AKP became the first party in fifteen years to establish a single 
party government.  
AKP’s victory, like that of the Welfare Party in 1995, was partly shaped by the 
reaction of the electorate to the political turmoil in the second half of the 1990s owing to 
corruption allegations directed at the then governing parties. The political importance of 
this factor is notable in the strategic name choice of AKP. In its campaigns for election, 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi promised Turkish voters not only Justice (Adalet) and 
Development (Kalkınma), but also, as the abbreviated name AK (“white” or “clean”) 
suggests, a government free of corruption (Koçer 2005). Also, like the Welfare Party, the 
social base of AKP extends to the new entrepreneur class and the urban poor. In this 
respect as well, the reference to ‘Justice’ and ‘Development’ is eloquent, since it 
responds to the grievances of small entrepreneurs by promising to remedy their ‘unfair 
                                                 
36 The Erbakan-supported Felicity Party received only 2.5 percent of the votes. 
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treatment by the state’ with ‘justice’; and to the grievances of the urban poor by 
promising to remedy ‘poverty’ with ‘development’.   
During their period of government of over four years Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
his cabinet focused primarily on Turkey’s further integration into the global economy by 
enacting laws to facilitate the inflow of foreign direct investment, among them the 
Mining Law of 2004, and on Turkey's relations with the EU by instituting sweeping 
political reforms in an attempt to meet EU's criteria for Turkey's accession. The reward 
came in October 2004 when the European Commission issued its Progress Report on 
Turkey, which announced that the country met EU's political criteria as required. The 
Commission also recommended to the European Council to start membership 
negotiations with Turkey.  At the following Summit of the European Council in 
December 1994 the heads of state of the EU declared that official negotiations with 
Turkey for full membership would be opened on October 3, 2005. Negotiations started on 
the specified date and are currently ongoing.  
The Balance Sheet of Turkey’s Neoliberal Development Experience 
 
According to Öniş (2003 a, 2003 b, 2003c) and Şenses (1988), the major 
achievement of the Turkish neo-liberal development program lay in the dramatic increase 
in exports and the sharp structural shift in export composition toward manufactured 
goods. The success on the export front also included “market expansion to include 
Middle Eastern and North African countries” (Şenses 1988:11). Rapid economic growth 
of four to five percent per annum, at least in the first decade of the liberalization process, 
was another consequence on the plus side of neo-liberal policies.  
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However, the transition to neo-liberal development model was also accompanied 
by high socio-economic costs. A sharp fall in real wages and salaries, rise in inequalities 
in income distribution, removal of subsidies in agricultural production together with a 
sharp increase in the prices of agricultural inputs, dissolution of class ideologies and 
traditional values, and depolitization of the masses, are among the costs of the 
liberalization program.  
Neo-liberal policies had negative impacts on both workers in the agricultural 
sector and on the industrial labor force in urban areas. In the agricultural sector, structural 
adjustment measures taken in line with IMF guidelines, together with World Bank 
policies, largely factored into the economic hardship facing small farmers and the decline 
in their living standards. Agricultural credits, provided to a wide spectrum of farmers by 
the World Bank from 1950s onward, led to a significant increase in agricultural 
production due to the use of improved technology and chemicals, the development of 
infrastructure, and the increased use of agricultural machinery. However, this credit 
policy, along with the government’s agricultural support encouraged by the World Bank, 
resulted in a remarkable transformation in the countryside, “characterized by the 
integration of small, family-based agricultural units into market relations and their 
subordination to capital” (Aydın 1993:119). After the commercialization of agriculture 
and the integration of a large number of farmers into the capitalist system, interest rates 
on agricultural credits have gradually increased and subsidies have been gradually 
withdrawn from agricultural inputs. In the absence of a corresponding rise in the prices of 
agricultural commodities, small farmers “are left with the dilemma of either defaulting on 
their debts or facing the confiscation of their means of production” (Aydın 1993:121).  
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Even though the Reform Program of 1980 did not include any explicit statement 
about labor policies, restraint on the real wages of industrial workers was compatible with 
certain aims of the program. According to Şenses (1993), “the creation of an exportable 
surplus beyond domestic requirements, as well as controlling inflation, required domestic 
demand restraint, especially restraints on wages” (p.99). Wage restraint was also 
instrumental in achieving international competitiveness under an export-oriented growth 
strategy because wages were considered significant cost elements in the manufacturing 
sector. Real wage reduction was easily achieved in the restrictive labor environment of 
the military regime between 1980 and 1983. Under the circumstances of highly restricted 
trade union activity, wage settlements were carried out by the Supreme Arbitration 
Board. Once the Board set wages on the basis of government’s target rate of inflation, 
there was no room for readjustment when the actual rate often proved to be much higher 
than the target rate. Even after the return to free collective bargaining in the aftermath of 
the military regime, “a highly bureaucratized process of collective bargaining and strike 
procedure strongly discouraged workers’ demands for higher wages” (Şenses 1993: 104). 
Another economic cost of Turkey’s neo-liberal development path has been the 
emergence of financial crises due to rapid capital account liberalization before attaining 
sufficient macroeconomic stability and developing the appropriate regulatory institutions 
Öniş (2003a, 2003b). 
The shift to neo-liberal development model in Turkey was not carried out on the 
basis of a broad social consensus but in a top-down fashion (Öniş 2003a), under the 
shadow of the military regime of 1980. This process involved the redefinition of 
economic power relations by the state in favor of the bourgeoisie, which was achieved  
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through strict control of economic class struggles and distributive pressures by means of 
legal and institutional restrictions, as well as military measures. Consequently, a political- 
legal super-structure of military- corporate character was established, in which the 
economic bargaining power and political leverage of the working class was minimized 
(Öngen 2003). 
 The working class was not only de-politicized but also manipulated to surrender 
to the neo-liberal ideology through the propaganda that presented major elements of the 
neo-liberal reform agenda, such as increase in consumption and competition, and 
privatization of state economic enterprises, as the sine qua non of economic growth and 
development. In the long run, the depolitization of the masses resulted in their alienation 
from their class identities and their search for other identity codes, such as nationalism 
and political Islam (Öngen 2003:175). 
Beside their measurable socio-economic costs, the neo-liberal policies in Turkey 
also raise concern about the non-quantifiable costs of this development model. The 
following questions posed by Şenses (2003) point out such costs:   
What is the cost of the state of hopelessness among large sections of the 
population, blaming the whole social, political, and economic system for 
their problems and losing confidence in the system’s ability to provide 
them with a secure social and economic life? …How do we measure the 
socio-economic cost of increased desire for emigration, especially among 
the younger population including recent graduates, as a result of declining 
employment opportunities and real wages and salaries? (P.108) 
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Present-Day Turkey: A Regime in Crisis? 
As of May 2007, political tension is at its highest in Turkey due to the crisis 
revolving around the Presidential election. The present crisis is the latest manifestation of 
the struggle between Islamism and secularism; democracy and repression; the modern 
and the traditional, that has characterized the history of politics in Turkey since the late 
Ottoman era.  
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the current President whose term officially ended in May, is 
an unyielding Kemalist, determined to protect the founding principles of the Republic, 
especially secularism. With his power to veto any legislation that he views as likely to 
crack the foundation of the Republic he is seen by the majority of the population as a 
counterweight to the AKP government. The currently ongoing crisis emerged in mid-
April as the deadline for Presidential nominations approached. Since the President is 
elected by the TGNA where AKP currently holds the majority of the seats there is 
widespread concern that if someone from the ranks of AKP is elected President AKP will 
run the country with all the powers available to it to change the constitution and the 
Republican regime.   
The political tension escalated with the press conference held by Yaşar 
Büyükanıt, the Chief of the General Staff, on April 12, before Presidential nominations 
were announced by the TGNA, stating that Presidential elections closely concerned the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) because the President was at the same time the Commander 
in Chief of the TAF. Büyükanıt also told the press that both as a citizen and a member of 
the TAF he hoped to see a President who “embraces the fundamental principles of the 
Republic, not only in words but also in essence” (Radikal Daily, April 13,2007). Two 
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days later, a mass demonstration was held in Ankara with the participation of hundreds of 
thousands people to express commitment to the Republican regime.   
On April 24, Abdullah Gül, one of the founders of AKP and the current Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, announced his nomination for Presidency. On April 27, the same day 
of the first round of the Presidential elections, the High Command of the TAF posted on 
its website a threatening press release, that was dubbed ‘e-coup’ by the Turkish press. 
The press release warned the government against mounting attacks on secularism, and 
stated that, when necessary, the TAF would make its stance clear in action (Turkish 
General Staff Press Release, No: BA-08/07).  
On May 1, the Constitutional Court cancelled the first round of the Presidential 
election for violation of the voting procedure that required the presence of two-thirds of 
the TGNA members at the time of the voting. The following day, in an attempt to 
dampen the mounting political tension due to the deadlock over the Presidential election, 
the TGNA set July 22 as the date for early general elections.  
The second round of the Presidential election in the TGNA was held on May 6. 
When the Assembly failed for the second time to attain the required two-thirds majority 
for voting, Gül withdrew his nomination for Presidency. As stipulated by the 
Constitution, Sezer continues to hold the office of Presidency until the new TGNA elects 
a new President after the general elections on July 22. 
Alarmed by the possibility of another electoral victory by AKP in the upcoming 
July elections, the political parties on the left and right started negotiations to join their 
forces and challenge AKP with an expanded electoral base. Thus, as the two center-right 
parties, Motherland Party and True Path Party, announced their decision to unite in a new 
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party, to be established under the name of the Democrat Party, the center- left Republican 
People’s Party and Democratic Left Party declared that they would participate in the 
elections as a united left front.    
The reaction to the crisis at the societal level materialized in a series of 
unprecedented mass demonstrations in support of the regime. Following the first rally in 
Ankara, millions of people took to the streets in demonstrations held in six provinces 
throughout the country over April and May. In addition, five thousand Turks rallied in 
Duisburg, Germany, in an act of solidarity with their fellow regime supporters in Turkey. 
The significance of these demonstrations lay not only in the number of the participants or 
in the extent of their commitment to the Republican regime but also in their commitment 
to democracy, as a common slogan in all the demonstrations suggests: “Neither Islamic 
law nor military coup; we want democracy for Turkey!”   
The commitment to democracy was more radically expressed in two public 
statements. In a press release issued the day after the General Staff Press Release of April 
27 the Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (Freedom and Solidarity Party – FSP), a left-wing 
political party established in 1996, stated: “We want democracy, not in words but in 
essence [this particular phrase was a direct reference to the statement of the Chief of the 
General Staff in his press conference on April 12]. Turkey is rapidly moving toward a 
new crisis…..The mentality that curbed through coups the left and its democratic forces 
is once again engaged in social engineering with no consideration of the harm it inflicts 
on the society and the future of the country. This is unacceptable. It is equally 
unacceptable that the General Staff acts as a political power center….Let people and civil 
politics be the subject of ‘protecting and defending’ democracy and the republic. Let 
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Turkey overcome her problems through people’s discretion and participation. It is a need 
and hope for the Turkish society to live democracy ‘not in words but in essence’” 
(Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi Press Release, April 28, 2007). Another public statement 
was issued on May 14, by a group of 500 intellectuals, consisting of academicians, 
lawyers, authors, journalists, and artists. Referring to the military’s press release of April 
27 as a ‘memorandum’ threatening democracy, the signatories stated that the operation of 
political life under the custody of the military was unacceptable, and that the secular 
Republic could be maintained only through democracy, not by relying on memoranda. 
The group declared that, as citizens committed to a free, democratic, and secular Turkey, 
they were entitled to resist any intervention attempting to destroy democracy (Milliyet 
Daily-May 14, 2007). 
 Currently, the heat of the crisis seems to have subsided and the streets calmed 
down but the country is holding her breath for July 22, 2007, the day of the dreaded but 
dared trial of democracy for Turkey.     
Postscript 
 
 To the dismay of the military, the majority of the political parties and the millions 
who took to the streets during April and May in defense of the secular state the AKP won 
the July 22 elections in a landslide victory, increasing its votes to 46.47 percent from 34 
percent in the 2002 elections. Political tension in the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA) surfaced again on August 13 when AKP renominated Abdullah Gül as its 
candidate for President.   
 On August 27, the day before the third and final round of the presidential 
elections at the TGNA, Yaşar Büyükanıt, the Chief of the General Staff, posted a note on 
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the website of the High Command of the Turkish Armed Forces. The note was issued to 
mark the 85th anniversary on August 30 of the military victory that ended the Turkish 
War of Independence on the battlefield, and prepared the ground for the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkey. Warning that the secular system was under attack from “the 
centers of evil seeking to systematically erode it”, Büyükanıt stated, “nefarious plans to 
ruin Turkey’s secular and democratic nature emerge in different forms every day…The 
military will, just as it has so far, keep its determination to guard social, democratic and 
secular Turkey” (Ant 2007, Culpan 2007, Knickmeyer 2007, Tavernise and Arsu 2007).  
On August 28, Gül was elected by the AKP-dominated TGNA as the Republic’s 
eleventh President. In his inaugural speech at the TGNA Gül announced: “The Turkish 
Republic is a democratic, secular and social state based on the rule of law.... I will work 
with determination to protect and strengthen all those tenets…The principle of secularism 
is both a model that ensures freedom for different lifestyles and a rule of social peace... 







A RELENTLESS FIGHT FOR JUSTICE: THE BERGAMA CASE 
 
[T]he 20th century has been characterized by three developments 
of great political importance: The growth of democracy, the 
growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate 
propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against 
democracy. 
Alex Carey -  
Taking the Risk Out of Democracy (1997) 
 
Neither tension-laden trials of democracy nor unrelenting demands and efforts for 
democratization are unfamiliar phenomena in the political and social history of Turkey. 
However, an unprecedented social movement was added to the repertoire of collective 
democratization struggles in the country in the early 1990s when a rural community in 
the Aegean town of Bergama organized a grassroots movement based on acts of civil 
disobedience to protect its life-sustaining resources and defend its democratic rights 
against a pervasive corporate assault, which was supported by the government in the 
name of economic development.   
Bergama is a town in the northwestern part of the Aegean region (ancient Mysia) 
in Turkey. Located in the basin of Bakırçay River37 (ancient Caϊcus), one of the four 
biggest rivers in Anatolia entering the Aegean Sea, the town is surrounded by the 
mountains of Madra (4,400 ft.) in the north, Kozak (4,078 ft.) in the northwest, and Yunt 
(2,565 ft.) in the south. The Kalarga Hill of the ancient region of Teuthrania constitutes 
the western border of Bergama. Although Bergama is not a coastal town, it has easy 
access to the sea, being located 15 miles inland of the Aegean Sea.  Administratively, the 
                                                 
37 ~ 80 miles long. Originates on Davullu Mountains, 40 miles northeast of 
Bergama, and flows in east-west direction. Joined by tributaries stemming from the 
mountains of Ömer in the east, Madra in the north, and Yunt in the south, it enters the 
Aegean Sea at the Gulf of Çandarlı. 
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town is a district of the Province of İzmir, the third largest city of Turkey, which is 
located about 65 miles south of Bergama. Other big cities in close proximity to the town 
are Manisa in the southeast and Balıkesir in the northeast, each about 65 miles from 
Bergama; and Çanakkale, located 90 miles northwest of the town.  
Shaped by Mediterranean climatic characteristics, summers in Bergama are hot 
and virtually rain-free, winters are of frequent and heavy rainfall with occasional fall of 
snow for short periods of time. The vegetation of the surrounding mountains comprises of 
widespread maquis, pine trees, and isolated oak trees.  Due to the favorable 
environmental and climatic conditions along with the fertile land of the valley, fed by the 
alluvial deposits of the Bakırçay River, the economy of Bergama and its surroundings has 
depended on agriculture from ancient days38, through the Ottoman Empire, and 
throughout the history of Turkey as a republic. Despite the steady decline of the share of 
agriculture in the national economy since the late 1950s in favor of industry and services 
sectors (Appendix Table A-1), agriculture still comprises the primary source of income 
for the villages surrounding Bergama. Olives, pine nuts, grapes, figs, grains, cotton, and 
tobacco are the major income-producing crops cultivated in the region. In addition, 
various vegetables and fruit are grown for sale in the local/regional/national market and 
for household consumption. Animal husbandry and honeybee production constitute other 
major economic activities in the region. In the early 1980s, Bergama’s economy saw an 
                                                 
38 In his Geographica, written in 7 CE, Strabo (1917) refers to the land 
surrounding Bergama as follows: “The Caϊcus flows past Pergamum, through the Caϊcus 
Plain, as it is called, traversing land that is very fertile and about the best in Mysia” 
(p.169).  
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increase in the share of trade, small manufacturing, textile, food processing, and in 
services, such as tourism, education, and transportation. 
Bergama has 114 villages under its administrative jurisdiction. As of the latest 
census in 2000, the town’s total population is 106,000, with 52,000 living in the center, 
and 54,000 in the villages. 67 percent of Bergama’s population is between 15 and 64 
years old. With its literacy rate of 87.4 percent, Bergama scores slightly above the 
national average. The demographic composition of Bergama, like anywhere else in 
Turkey, changed in parallel to the shift in the population dynamics of Anatolia since the 
late Ottoman era. The Ottoman losses of territory in the Balkans effected a mass 
migration of Turks living in those areas to Anatolia. The settlement of the newcomers, 
first in the coastal regions, and then in the interior parts of Anatolia, changed the 
demographic composition of these areas in favor of Turks, leading to the decrease in the 
number of Greek, Jewish, and Armenian minorities. The population exchange agreements 
signed between the governments of Turkey and Greece in the aftermath of the Turkish 
War of Independence augmented the demographic homogenization process started by the 
mass migration from the Balkans. Following this pattern, the minority population of 
Bergama, which constituted 22 percent of the town’s total population in 1879, was 
completely replaced by the Turkish population after the establishment of the Republic in 
1923 (Emekli 2001). 
The residents of Bergama are proud of the long history and heritage of their town 
going back to antiquity. In the case of the villagers of Bergama, this pride, combined with 
the respect for and attachment to the land as their source of living, served as a factor of 
motivation to act in solidarity against goldmining in the region. In the interviews 
 116
conducted for this study, the villagers, as well as other participants and supporters of the 
movement, unequivocally traced the beginning of mass protests to the day when the 
company felled thousands of pine and olive trees. “Those beautiful, centuries-old pine 
trees….They cut them within minutes!” This expression of resentment by D.A., a 71 
year-old village woman and movement activist, is explained by the following observation 
of N.L., a professor and movement supporter from İstanbul: “The people of Bergama 
were surely going to defend their land. They were the boss of those lands; they lived 
there since the time of Zeus.”  
Bergama is built upon the ruins of the ancient city of Pergamon. The exact date 
and story of Pergamon’s establishment is not known but the name of the city, which 
stems from the language of the Luwi, a people that lived in Western Anatolia around 
3000 B.C.E., is taken as evidence to the settlement of Pergamon in the prehistoric era 
(Kekeç 1993, Radt 1999, Süß 2000, Bergama Belediyesi Stratejik Planı 2006). The Luwi 
culture left its traces in the entire Eastern Mediterranean region, especially in the place 
names. In the Luwi language, Pargama meant ‘people of the high place’. Pergamon is the 
form the name took in the Hellenic language (Umar 1993). The ancient city was built on 
top of a hill (1165 ft.), enclosed by two tributaries of the Caϊcus River, Selinus on the 
west, and Ketios on the east. The remains of the oldest defensive walls around Acropolis, 
the fortress of Pergamon located at the summit of the mountain, date back to 7th century 
B.C.E.  
From 7th century B.C.E. till mid-6th century B.C.E. Pergamon was ruled by the 
Lydians, an indigenous Anatolian civilization that controlled a large part of Western 
Anatolia. The city went under the control of the Persians in 546 B.C.E. The defeat of the 
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Persians by the Macedonian King Alexander the Great in 334 B.C.E. ended the Persian 
rule in Anatolia and ushered in the Hellenistic Age. Despite its central geographical 
location, and its strong fortress favorable for defense purposes, Pergamon remained a 
small town during its early history.  
It was during the 3rd and 2nd century B.C.E. that Pergamon became an influential 
regional power as the capital of a kingdom under the Attalid Dynasty whose territories 
stretched from Troy in the northwest to Taurus Mountains in the southeast, and from the 
Aegean Sea in the west to Ankyra (modern Ankara, the capital of Turkey) in central 
Anatolia (Süß 2000).  In parallel to its growing political influence, Pergamon’s economy 
thrived in this period. The Attalid Dynasty benefited largely from the rich natural 
resources of the region, exploiting precious metals, such as gold, silver, copper, and raw 
materials, such as wood, charcoal, and resin from the surrounding large forests. 
Agriculture, mining, bee-keeping, horse-rearing, and pottery production constituted the 
main economic activities of the Attalids. In its golden age under the Attalid Dynasty, 
Pergamon became a famous metropolis in Asia, renowned for its arts, architecture, 
sciences, and literature39.  
In 133 B.C.E. Pergamon went under the rule of the Roman Empire. Rome 
incorporated the Western part of the Attalid Kingdom in its territories as the Province of 
Asia, with Pergamon being the capital of the Province. In late 4th century C.E. Pergamon 
                                                 
39 With its holding of 200,000 books, the Library of Pergamon became the second 
largest library of the era, rivaling the famous Library of Alexandria in Egypt. When the 
Egyptians halted their export of papyrus, and Pergamon was thus deprived of its single 
source of writing material, Pergamenes invented the parchment paper as a substitute for 
papyrus. Since they took great pride in their library, the Pergamenes considered it 
ignominious that the Roman Emperor Antonius gave this valuable treasure to the 
Egyptian Queen Cleopatra as a present in 40 B.C.E.   
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entered the Byzantine Period under the rule of the East Roman Empire. The city’s 
significance started to decline in this era.  
At the beginning of the 14th century Pergamon came under Turkish rule as part of 
the Karasi Principality. After two decades of Karasi reign the city was conquered by the 
Ottoman ruler Orhan, and incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Under the rule of the 
Ottomans, Pergamon lost its importance as a castle and became a small provincial town, 
now called Bergama.  
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and during the 
subsequent Turkish War of Independence, Bergama was occupied by Greece. The 
resistance against the occupation culminated in the defeat of the Greek army in 1922. 
With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Bergama became a town of 
Turkey, continuing its existence as such today.   
In 1989, Bergama witnessed a local manifestation of the wholesale shift in 
Turkey’s economic development strategy from the import substituting industrialization 
model of the 1960s and 1970s to neo-liberal economy in 1980. Prompted by the 
liberalization of capital flows and the concomitant incentives for foreign direct 
investment provided by the Turkish government within the framework of neo-liberal 
development, a multinational company introduced the agricultural town of Bergama to an 
economic territory uncharted in Turkey until then: goldmining.  
As the villagers found out about the environmental and public health risks 
involved in the process of gold extraction they gradually resisted mining in the region. 
Their initial environmental movement transformed into a struggle for democratic rights 
over time as the government facilitated the operation of the mining company on the 
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grounds of the potential economic benefits of the latter despite the contrary decision of 
the Supreme Administrative Court, ruling that the risks involved outweighed the potential 
benefits, and thus, there was no public interest in the operation of the mine. 
In this chapter, I present the story of Bergama villagers’ resistance to gold mining 
in the region, with a focus on the distinct phases of transformation in the movement over 
the course of fifteen years.  
 
The Awakening: Life With Cyanide=Life With Death 
The most important battle of the Turkish War of Independence was fought 
in the Aegean region. It was the Aegean that won the war; it was due to 
the Aegean that Turkey was independent. Hence, the awakening in the 
Aegean.                
           N.L., a female professor and  
movement supporter from İstanbul 
 
For the mining sector, economic liberalization of the post-1980 era crystallized in 
the Mining Law of 1985 that sanctioned incentives for mining investments (Official 
Gazette, June 15, 1985, No.18785, Law No. 3213, Article 9).  Encouraged by this 
particular opening, and the general liberal approach to foreign capital, several 
multinational mining corporations, like the Canadian Inco Ltd. and Cominco Ltd., the 
German Preussag Co. and Metallgesellschaft Co., the Australian Normandy Resources 
LLC., and the South-African Anglo American Corporation, entered the domestic mining 
sector in 1986, by establishing subsidiary or associated companies, such as Eurogold 
Mining Company, Tüprag Metal Mining Industry and Commerce Ltd.Co., Cominco 
Resources International Ltd., Dardanel Mining Industry and Trade Co., and Anglo-Tur 
Mining Co., in Turkey.   
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Eurogold Mining Company40  (henceforth referred to as Eurogold) was a joint 
venture of Normandy Resources LLC 41 (66.67%) and Metall Mining Corporation42 
(33.33%). In 1989, Eurogold obtained a permit, by way of transfer43 from Esan 
                                                 
40 To obtain consistent background information on the company, even at the basic 
level, has been a challenge. This is, first, because Eurogold Mining Company no longer 
exists today due to acquisition. Thus, any information regarding the company is 
accessible with restrictions, at best, and not accessible, at worst. A more general 
explanation for the lack of an unequivocal report on the company might be sought in the 
complex corporate structure of the global mining industry. As it will be noted in the 
context of the current study, this complexity is manifest, locally, in the five shifts of 
capital configuration of the Bergama-Ovacık gold mine in sixteen years, and, globally, in 
the name changes of the big mining companies over the years as they acquire other 
companies or merge with other giants in the industry. Another intricacy of the corporate 
mining industry is the tendency of the big corporations to invest in mining operations 
worldwide by buying controlling interests in smaller companies. This allows the giant 
conglomerates of the industry, such as the South African  Anglo American Corporation 
(AAC), owned by the Oppenheimer Family; the British Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ); the 
German Metallgesellschaft AG, among others, to carry out their operations overseas 
without revealing their identities.  
41 Australian mining company. In 1991, Normandy Resources LLC merged with 
Poseidon Gold Ltd. - which was owned by the South African Minorco (considered as the 
‘overseas flagship’ of Oppenheimers’ AAC) - the Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) 
Ltd., and Normandy Mining Ltd., to establish Normandy Poseidon Ltd. The new company 
changed hands in 1995, and became Normandy Mining Limited. Before being acquired by 
the US-based Newmont Mining Corporation in 2002, Normandy Mining Limited was 
Australia’s largest gold producer and had operations in 11 countries throughout the 
world, producing gold, copper, lead, and zinc. 
42 Canada-based mining company, established in 1986 with  Metallgesellschaft 
AG as its major shareholder. In 1995, Metall Mining Corporation became INMET Mining 
Corporation. Currently, INMET has interests in six mining operations: Çayeli and 
Cerattepe in Turkey (copper and zinc); Las Cruces in Spain (copper); Pyhäsalmi in 
Finland (copper and zinc); Troilus in Canada (gold and copper); and Ok Tedi in Papua 
New Guinea (gold and copper). 
43 According to the Turkish mining legislation, mines are under the state’s 
ownership and jurisdiction but the state delegates its exploration and extraction rights to 
natural or legal persons, or state enterprises, for a specified time period by granting 
permits in return for a fixed percentage as royalties (Official Gazette, March 11, 1954, 
No.8655, Law No. 6309, Articles 4, 13, 115, 117; Official Gazette, June 15, 1985, 
No.18785, Law No. 3213, Articles 4, 6, 14). As sanctioned in Articles 6 and 39 of the 
1954 Mining Law, and Article 5 of the 1985 Mining Law, mining rights can be 
transferred to third parties. 
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Eczacıbaşı Industrial Raw Materials Industry and Commerce Co., a company within the 
Eczacıbaşı Group, a prominent Turkish corporation, to explore for gold in and around the 
village of Ovacık, 5 miles southwest of Bergama.44  
   All villagers interviewed for this study agreed that the company was initially 
welcome by the local population, who considered the investment a source of employment 
and wealth for the region. In retrospect, H.N., a 44 year-old male farmer and movement 
activist, complained that “they [Eurogold] played on our sentiments and our ignorance. 
All we knew about gold was that it was beautiful, that it meant wealth”. Similarly, I.A., a 
55 year-old male farmer and movement activist, conveyed the initial reaction of the 
villagers as follows:  
We didn’t know how gold was extracted. We thought it lay there 
underground in the form of coins, as we know it, waiting to be dug out 
and make us rich. Until they came here, none of us knew anything about 
gold mining. 
  
 Shortly after the arrival of Eurogold in the village of Ovacık, the managers of the 
company visited Sefa Taşkın, the mayor of Bergama at the time, to convince him of the 
benefits of the prospective mine for the region and get his support. In that meeting the 
mayor found out that the company would use cyanide to extract gold. Being alarmed by 
the mention of this chemical compound that is historically associated with death, he 
                                                 
44  In parallel to Bergama, the multinational mining industry also initiated 
investments in other parts of Turkey. By 1989, the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources had granted permits to several multinational mining companies for gold 
exploration in 560 sites spread over 16 provinces throughout Turkey. One of these sites 
was in the Küçükdere Village of Havran, a town in Balıkesir, about 65 miles northeast of 
Bergama. The strong local resistance and victory against gold mining in Küçükdere in 
1993 has been instrumental in the mobilization of the villagers of Bergama against 
Eurogold. 
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wanted to get informed about the cyanide leaching method in gold mining and the risks 
associated with it: 
Once we found out that cyanide would be used we were concerned, and 
started asking questions. I asked several professional associations of 
engineers to study this method and inform us. Nobody knew anything 
about it. It was a first in Turkey. We also contacted universities. 
Information gathered through them was alarming. The picture was not at 
all bright like the company portrayed it to be……I was the mayor of 
Bergama then. At the same time I’m a Turkish intellectual who likes to 
read and write. ‘What is my responsibility as an intellectual or a civil 
servant?’ I asked myself. To inform people. I also looked at the matter this 
way: I am the mayor. These people turn on the faucet and drink water. 
They do so with their trust in me. They are convinced that the water they 
drink is safe because, they think, the mayor would not let anyone 
contaminate our water sources, or he’d have them take the necessary 
precautions to make sure our drinking water is safe. But, what if I don’t 
trust that the water is safe?  
 
Thus, the mayor started to share with the villagers the information he received 
from the universities and engineering associations. Committees were established in the 
villages, headed by elected local leaders, to disseminate the information at hand. 
According to P.A., a 64 year-old male farmer and movement activist, the villagers “read 
every piece of information put together by the municipality and distributed to the public”. 
Around the same time, the mayor found out that the Greenpeace vessel Cyrus came to the 
İzmir Harbor. Along with a group of villagers he went to İzmir in hopes of finding 
international support for their case. On this attempt, Taşkın recounted:  
We went aboard the vessel, told them about the risk we were facing, and 
asked them if they could help us out…… Greenpeace exemplifies a 
different type of environmentalism.  We never worked with them. Our 
way of thinking is different from theirs. They are environmental 
anarchists. In addition, they focus on exclusive topics, such as nuclear 
plants and waste. They are not interested in cyanide pollution. But I met 
two Greenpeace activists aboard Cyrus. One was from New Zealand; the 
other British, from London. The former was familiar with the operations 
of the corporate mining industry because there are gold mines in New 
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Zealand. They told me that they couldn’t help us but they’d gather 
information for us. In fact, in 15-20 days they sent us a sack full of 
documents, laying bare the extent of worldwide destruction caused by the 
corporate mining industry. We found out that the whole world was crying 
out loud, from Guyana to Ghana, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and 
more.   
 
As they got informed, the inhabitants of 17 villages within 6 miles of the mine 
became concerned that the operation of Eurogold in their region might negatively affect 
their health as well as the well being of their land, which was the very source of their 
livelihood. At this point, however, their concern was limited in its effect to mere 
suspicion rather than any form of collective action. In the words of Taşkın:  
They [the villagers] didn’t move a bit for three years. They used to say: 
‘May it [gold mining in the region] proceed if any good will come out of 
it, may it not if it will do harm.’ 
 
On the opposite front, Eurogold was undertaking a public campaign to convince 
the villagers that the mining operation would contribute to the region’s socio-economic 
development and that the cyanide leaching method would not have detrimental effects on 
their land. Besides the generic public relations methods of distributing leaflets and 
advertising in the media the company also resorted to culture-specific tactics to impress 
the villagers. As P.A. recounted: “They gave feasts for the villagers during Ramadan. 
They distributed food in Bergama, and even sent flour, sugar, and other food items to the 
homes of the villagers”. Eurogold also announced that it would construct a wedding hall 
and a mosque in Ovacık. In this regard, I.A. stated:  
They played the religion card to buy us off. One day, they came to the 
village coffee house and said they were going to construct a mosque in the 





Some villagers, however, were won over by these cultural gestures; others were 
convinced that the mine would help their region develop economically. As another way 
to appeal to the villagers Eurogold offered to buy villagers’ property at prices much 
higher than their market value45. In the words of O.G., a 42 year-old male villager who 
worked for the mine for eight years but was laid off two years ago when he got sick with 
spleen failure:  
They came and talked to us at the beginning, painting a wonderful picture 
of how rich we were going to get and how environmentally safe their 
technology was. We believed them then. They have a great skill of 
convincing people. Some of the locals were convinced by money. The 
company bought their land at very favorable prices. They have the power 
of money; they get whatever they want, however they want it. Their 
power is so great that it’s hard to fight against them. 
 
As Eurogold started its preliminary drilling operations in 1990, a chance 
occurrence bolstered the individual efforts of the mayor of Bergama in raising awareness 
about the potential harmful effects of cyanide use. While on vacation in Bergama, a 
professor in the Department of Public Health at the Aegean University in İzmir, and her 




                                                 
45 A more practical reason underlying this move by Eurogold, however, was to 
remove a significant legal obstacle in the way of the company’s mining operations. 
According to Article 7 of the Mining Law of 1985, at sites of up to 60 meters (65 yards) 
to buildings, and 20 meters (22 yards) to cultivated areas, mine exploration and extraction 
was subject to the permission of the property owner. The distance between the proposed 
mine site and the houses in Ovacık was 35 yards. 
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the Environmental Movement Lawyers46, witnessed the activities of the mining 
company, found out about the proposed method to extract gold, and upon their return, 
shared their concern with their colleagues in İzmir about its risks. F.R., a professor in the 
Department of Public Health at the Aegean University in İzmir, stated: 
We held a meeting and decided that the first reasonable thing for us to do 
was to visit the region, see, and evaluate the situation. A group of us - 
faculty members, assistants, Ph.D. students – got together, and went to see 
the mayor of Bergama. We sat down and talked to him to figure out what 
was going on in the region. The same day we went to see the mine site…. 
We came back and studied gold mining in more detail. In line with our 
discipline, our focus was on the effects of gold mining on public health 
and the environment. Soon we realized the necessity for other professional 
groups to do the same in their respective areas of expertise. Thus, under 
the auspices of the Environmental Commission of the İzmir Bar and the 
Environmental Movement Lawyers we established a task group, 
consisting of several professional organizations, such as engineers’, 
physicians’, foresters’, geologists’ associations. Each organization was to 
evaluate gold mining from the perspective of its own profession. 
 
They agreed that the assessments of these organizations, addressing the different 
aspects of gold mining in Bergama and its potential effects, should be published as a 
collective report and distributed to the related decision makers.        
Most of the villagers in Bergama, however, had a guarded approach toward the 
intellectuals voicing concern over the risks of gold mining. This was mostly because the 
villagers hoped Eurogold would solve the unemployment problem for the village youth. 
                                                 
46 An independent civil initiative group established by several lawyers in İzmir. 
The lawyers constituting this group were initially members of the Environmental 
Commission of the İzmir Bar Association, working within the institutional framework of 
the Bar. To avoid the bureaucratic limitations imposed on them by the way in which the 
Bar functioned they formed the Environmental Movement Lawyers Group, and carried 
out their work as a voluntary organization, independent of the Bar. The Environmental 
Commission, however, continued to exist in parallel to the Environmental Movement 
Lawyers group.  
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“At first we failed,” said E.S., a member of the Environmental Movement Lawyers group 
in İzmir, and a long term legal representative and consultant of the villagers:  
In two cars full of lawyers from İzmir, we went to the villages of Bergama 
and talked to the villagers. We told them about the risks of goldmining, 
and offered them help. We told them that if they would want to file 
lawsuits against the company we were willing to represent them in court 
for free. They responded: ‘The mine will employ young people from our 
villages. We are not happy that other villages send more kids to the mine 
than we do. We want our kids to work for the mine, too.’ We failed to 
convince them of the mine’s risks for their environment and health. So, we 
drove back.  
 
In 1990, Eurogold asked a group of Turkish scientists to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report for the prospective gold mine in view of 
the environmental legislation in effect at the time. According to Article 10 of 
Environmental Law No. 2872 of 1983, “[t]he institutions, agencies and establishments 
that can lead to environmental problems due to their planned activities will prepare an 
Environmental Impact Assessment Report. In this report all impacts on the environment 
will be considered, and the methods for eliminating the harmful effects of waste materials 
that may cause environmental pollution, and the corresponding precautions will be 
specified” (Official Gazette, August 11, 1983. No. 18132)47. Prepared by a group of 
professors at the Environmental Engineering Department of the September Nine 
University in İzmir, the EIA Report was published in 1991.  
                                                 
47 The article did not explicate the specific activities to be subjected to EIA, 
stating that “[t]he issues concerning the type of projects that this Environmental Impact 
Assessment Report will be required, its contents and the endorsement authority will be 
specified in a regulation.” Although the mentioned regulation was not enacted until 1993, 
Eurogold launched the process for an EIA report in 1990. The movement participants and 
supporters interviewed for this study interpret this move, in hindsight, as another tactic of 
the company to appease them. It seemed as if Eurogold was trying to say: ‘We did not 
have to do this but we did it anyway because we care about you and your environment!’  
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According to the report, Eurogold’s plan was to operate the mine for a total of 
eight years. Three years of this period would be allotted to open-pit mining, which was to 
be followed by five years of underground mining operations. The production capacity of 
the mine was estimated to be between 2.2 and 2.8 tons of gold per year for eight years. A 
total of 2.5 million tons of ore would be processed, which, according to the geological 
characteristics of the region, would include 2,500 tons of arsenic, 1,500 tons of antimony, 
mercury, copper, and 600 tons of lead and zinc. To extract gold from the ore a total of 
about 4,000 tons of cyanide would be used over eight years. The estimated total of 2.6 
million cubic-yard of waste over eight years would be deposited in a tailings pond to be 
built in the close vicinity of the processing facility. Of the total mine site of 111 acres, 
including the extraction and processing areas, the tailings pond was to cover an area of 37 
acres. In terms of the risks involved, the report noted contamination of groundwater due 
to cyanide and heavy metal seepage from the tailings pond, and acid mine drainage as the 
most significant potential negative impacts of the mine. Evaporation of cyanide from the 
tailings pond in the form of poisonous hydrogen cyanide gas; the noise pollution due to 
the use of explosives for excavating the ore; and the damage to the tailings pond due to a 
potential earthquake48, were among the other risks mentioned in the report49. The EIA 
                                                 
48 The active Zeytindağ-Bergama Fault Zone constitutes one of the most 
significant active fault zones of Western Anatolia (Ocakoğlu et.al. 2005). Due to its 
tectonic characteristics the region has numerous geothermal sources. The Kaynarca 
Thermal Spring, for example, which is the hottest of the eighty hot springs and 
geothermal outlets in the region with a temperature of 198o F, emerged after an 
earthquake in 1939 (Özürlan et.al. 2006:188). In the same earthquake, the village of 
Ovacık, which was then located by the Kalarga Hill on the western border of Bergama, 
was completely destroyed. Consequently, the village was moved about three miles to the 
north to its current location where the controversial gold mine is in operation.  
 128
Report also stated that the mine site would be rehabilitated within a year following the 
completion of the mining operations but cautioned that the potential impact of toxic 
elements on the groundwater might last for 20-50 years longer after the closure of the 
mine. On the plus side, the report noted that the company would employ 100 people from 
the region, increase the tourism potential of the town, and create revenue for the state. In 
conclusion, the report advocated that the establishment would contribute to the economy, 
and that its risks could be minimized with technical measures. (Ovacık Altın Madeni 
Çevresel Etki Değerlendirmesi Raporu 1991).  
Suspicion about the objectivity of the EIA Report brought about an upsurge in 
concerned voices among intellectuals. The Environmental Movement Lawyers and 
several professional associations highly criticized the EIA Report for omitting significant 
risk factors, such as the impact of the mining operations on agriculture, animal 
husbandry, flora, fauna, and geothermal resources. Thus, they argued, the potential 
damage of the mine to the region, its people, as well as to the national economy, was not 
adequately assessed by the report. Critics also took issue with the EIA Report for 
downplaying the risks it did mention, and misleading the public and the decision makers 
by overestimating the potential benefits. To illustrate, based on the figures in the EIA 
Report, the revenue of the state from the mine was expected to be USD 1.4 million per 
year. However, critics contended, the report failed to mention that the economic value of 
                                                                                                                                                 
49 The report noted that the area was a fault zone, with earthquakes of 9.25 
intensity on Modified Mercalli Scale (MMS). MMS indicates the strength of shaking 
produced by an earthquake, measured by its effect on people, human structures, and the 
natural environment. The scale values range between 1 and 12, 1 signifying a weak 
earthquake, and 12, total damage.   
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Bergama region’s annual agricultural production was USD 40 million. This contribution 
to the economy was going to be at risk now due to the potential negative impacts of 
goldmining on the region’s agricultural productivity.  
In a similar vein, M.D., a professor of chemistry who attended a public 
presentation of the report at the Aegean University in İzmir in 1991, remarked:    
As a chemist, I attended this presentation, along with colleagues from 
other disciplines. At that time, I was the Assistant Director of the 
Environmental Center at the Aegean University. They [the mining 
company] distributed a brochure at the meeting, introducing themselves, 
talking about the gold mine, and the cyanide leaching method. The 
information they provided in the brochure about cyanide gave one the 
impression as if it were as harmless as edible like candy. It was a very 
strange brochure…..When such exaggerated information is presented to 
the public one gets suspicious of the intention of those providing this 
information. So we asked for a printed copy of the EIA Report…..When I 
read the report as a chemist I noticed significant omissions. In sharp 
contrast to its ideal purpose of informing the society, the report was 
misinforming, as it was. 
 
Beside its content, M.D. also severely criticized the EIA Report based on the way 
in which it was prepared:  
As we further examined the report, we got contradictory answers to our 
questions. For example, to assess whether the mining undertaking will 
harm the environment, during and after its operations, we have to have an 
accurate analysis of the nature of the mineral, the region’s groundwater 
sources, as well as its surface waters, its soil, and its air. This analysis will 
be the basis of all the discussions regarding the mine’s potential 
environmental impact. If these data were incorrect we would be talking in 
vain. I asked the editor of the EIA Report where they did the analysis. He 
said they did it at the Environmental Engineering Department of the 
September Nine University.  I asked the mentioned department. They said 
they didn’t do it. There I was told that the Soil Sciences Department at the 
Aegean University did the analysis. When I asked them this time, I got the 
same response: ‘We didn’t do it!’ Eventually I asked the British General 
Manager of Eurogold, and he told me that it was the company that 
prepared the analysis report, which was used as the basis of the EIA 
Report. Now, this was against the very idea of the EIA in the first place. 
EIA requires that experts carry out their own analyses independent of the 
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company involved, and evaluate the potential impacts of the project in 
question according to those analyses. This is the basis of any EIA report. 
In the case of the EIA Report for the Ovacık Goldmine this basic principle 
was violated. 
 
Awareness raising efforts at the local level gained momentum in parallel to the 
scrutiny of the EIA Report by the scientific community. The mayor of Bergama, along 
with the Environment, Culture, and Arts Association (ECAA), a local organization 
established by the youth of Bergama in the late eighties, facilitated meetings that brought 
together the academia and the villagers, and thus, played a major role in informing the 
latter about the risks of the mining project. Early mobilization efforts took the form of 
press releases, movie showings, information meetings, conferences and panels in the 
village coffee houses, attended by professors from the provinces of İzmir, İstanbul, and 
Ankara to address the villagers.  This first-ever direct meeting of the villagers with the 
academia was significant in its consequences for the prospective movement. 62 year-old 
B.Y. from Bergama, who had been active in local politics since the 1970s and later 
became one of the leading figures in the villagers’ movement, especially instrumental in 
planning and organizing the actions of protest, pointed out the importance of these 
meetings for the mobilization of the movement: 
We met respectable, democratic, highly-educated people who used science 
to the benefit of the public. We started to communicate with them. They 
told us the stories of gold. What is gold? How is it extracted and 
processed? What is the per capita income in the countries where gold is 
extracted? Did they get richer or poorer? How do their lands look like 
now? And under which circumstances do people in those countries live 
after the gold mining? They told us all about these. …..We were startled 
by what we heard.  
 
Despite mounting criticism directed at the EIA Report and the increasingly voiced 
concern about the operation of the mine the Ministry of Forests granted a required permit 
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to Eurogold on August 12, 1991. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
followed suit by issuing an operation permit to the company on February 12, 1992. The 
permit, which was valid for ten years, authorized the use of cyanide leaching method in 
Eurogold’s operations.  
 
A Struggle on Three Pillars: Science- Politics-Law  
Following the granting of permits by the two ministries, local leaders of 15 
villages sent a petition to the Parliament and the related ministries on June 23, 1992, 
stating: “We are aware of the need for foreign capital for the developing economy of our 
Turkey. We also understand the worry about scaring away foreign investors. However, it 
is also a primary function of the state to balance the incentives for foreign investments 
with the efforts to eliminate the risks of those investments for the locals” (İzmir Barosu 
Çevre Komisyonu 1993, Appendix 17). The village leaders further asked political 
representatives to address the questions and concerns of the villagers with regard to 
goldmining in the region. Among the specific questions asked were:  
- Bergama is located in a first-degree earthquake zone. In the case of an 
earthquake, seepage from the tailings pond is likely to occur. In view 
of this likelihood, could the cyanide-laden waste be detoxified before 
being deposited into the tailings pond? If such a detoxification 
measure is possible is it not being taken because it will increase the 
cost of the company? Is this additional cost factor more important than 
the health of the people living in the region?   
- As reported by the company the reserves would be fully exploited in 
eight years. Who would control the tailings pond after this date? Who 
would monitor whether toxic waste is seeping into groundwater 
supplies? Who would prevent the overflow of the pond due to heavy 
rain? In case of such a flooding, who would guarantee that the 
cyanide-laden waste would not be carried over to our lands? 
- After the company finishes its operations, how long will it take for the 
cyanide in the tailings pond to become completely inactive?  
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- Is it likely for cyanide to harm the environment and the people by way 
of evaporation from the tailings pond? 
- How much water will be used daily for gold extraction? Is it likely that 
this amount would drain the already scarce sources of water for the 
surrounding lands under cultivation? 
- Considering that the houses in Ovacık are located 35 yards from the 
mine site, will the dynamite explosions to excavate the ore harm the 
buildings? Will the extension of this distance to 65 yards, as stipulated 
in the Mining Law, be enough to save the houses from harm by the 
effects of the explosions?   
- The excavation of huge amounts of ore will create dust.  Is it likely 
that this dust would accumulate on and harm the surrounding tobacco 
and cotton crops? If yes, what measures will be taken to prevent the 
damage?  
- What is the approximate revenue expected from the goldmine? Is this 
amount worth risking the lives of the locals? (İzmir Barosu Çevre 
Komisyonu 1993, Appendix 17).   
 
Villagers also expressed their concern about the risks of goldmining in the region 
at a public meeting organized in Bergama with the participation of the authors of the 
report and concerned scientists. As M.D., a professor of chemistry at the Aegean 
University, stated:  
Public attendance to the meeting was high. Everyone got to express their 
opinions and concerns freely. The Ministry of Environment must have 
been troubled by this event because, shortly after it, the EIA General 
Directorate of the Ministry organized a meeting in Bergama to inform the 
public. 
 
On October 26, 1992, a group of ministerial bureaucrats, headed by the 
Undersecretary to the Minister of Environment, held a public information meeting in 
Bergama as part of the EIA process. In the words of M.D.: 
We weren’t invited but we heard about it and attended the meeting, sitting 
among the locals. There were about 10-15 representatives of the Ministry 
of Environment. They all talked in support of the mine, of course. Upon 
request by the locals, we brought the potential harmful effects of gold 
mining to the attention of the speakers. 
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Meanwhile, the process of empowerment of the villagers through knowledge 
continued. “As we became aware we were convinced, and as we were convinced our 
resistance grew stronger” expressed I.A., a 55 year-old male farmer and movement 
activist.  It was also knowledge that united the different village communities in Bergama 
in pursuit of a common goal. In that respect Taşkın, the then mayor, stated:  
This is a socially complex region. It incorporates different ethnic and 
religious groups with different political orientations. One village is 
Alevi50, another Sunni, one is made up of Bulgarian immigrants, another 
of Romanian immigrants, yet another of nomads. That is to say, they don’t 
get together on any given day. Each group has its own village, and lives 
according to its own traditional ways of life. The Alevis are politically 
left-oriented, all the others vote for right-wing parties.…How in the world 
were these people to get together? They did. They needed a motivation to 
do so: knowledge, a point of departure, an ideology. There’s no movement 
without an ideology. Our ideology was ‘life’: People have rights to live! 
- What does cyanide do? 
- It kills. 
- Who does it kill? 
- It kills you, your children, your grandchildren, your  
animals, your environment.  
- Once cyanide enters your bloodstream does it ask whether you’re 
an Alevi or a Sunni?  
- It doesn’t. 
- What does it do? 
- It kills. 
- Once cyanide enters your blood stream does it ask whether you 
vote for a right or left-wing political party? 
- It doesn’t. 
- What does it do? 
- It kills. 
  They memorized, digested, and internalized this.  
- What does cyanide do? 
- It kills.  
                                                 
50 An unorthodox Islamic sect in Turkey, influenced by but distinct from Shiism. 
The Alevis don’t have an established doctrine or liturgy. Their belief “has developed in 
rural Anatolia through hereditary holy figures who transmitted esoteric religious thought 
through music, poetry and collective rituals” (Shankland 2003). The Alevis are adamant 
supporters of Atatürk and his secularist ideology. They constitute 15-20 percent of the 
population in Turkey where the Sunnis comprise the majority of the population. 
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- Do you want to die? 
- No.  
Hence, our slogan: “NO!” No, no, no! 
 
Taşkın also recounted how the villagers came up with a division of labor in an 
attempt to use the information at hand in the most efficient way possible:  
The amount of information gathered was overwhelming. So the villagers 
started to specialize. For example, someone specialized on heavy metals, 
another on cyanide. Ms. T.D. specialized on the Bergen Treaty. ….She 
knew it by heart. Why? Because it stated that any investment potentially 
damaging to the environment should take into consideration the opinion of 
the public. ‘Did they ask my opinion?’ she would ask. No, they didn’t. At 
a meeting in a village she once forced one of the prime minister’s aides 
into a corner with her arguments. 
 
 T.D. that Taskin referred to in his account above is a 52 year-old farmer. With her 
intelligence, her skill of articulating the villagers’ grievances, her unyielding oppositional 
stance and courage, T.D. became a symbol of the Bergama resistance and a spokesperson 
of the villagers on many occasions. Her formal education is limited to five years of 
elementary school but, as expressed by A.H., a female movement supporter from İstanbul 
and an academician who did research on the Bergama villagers’ movement, T.D. 
exemplified Gramsci’s ideal ‘organic intellectual’51. In the interview conducted with her 
within the framework of this study T.D. recounted her confrontation on national TV with 
a scientist who was a proponent of the mine:  
I attended a discussion program on TV as a speaker on behalf of Bergama 
villagers. One of the professors on the program said that the risk of 
cyanide was being exaggerated. She said cyanide exists even in nature, for 
                                                 
51 Distinguishing between traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals, 
Gramsci refers to the latter as “the thinking and organizing element of a particular 
fundamental social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their 
profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in 
directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong” 
(Gramsci 1971:3).  
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example in the seeds of an apple or in almonds. I interjected and said: 
‘Excuse me Professor, for interrupting you, but if cyanide is also found in 
nature, let’s take trucks full of apple seeds and almonds to the mine, and 
see if they can extract gold this way’. 
 
Significant developments in 1993 further bolstered the resistance of Bergama 
villagers against gold mining. During the preliminary drilling operations on the mine site 
in 1993, a chemical compound, used to protect the drilling equipment from overheating, 
leaked into local water supplies. Several households in nearby villages complained that 
their tap water turned milky and oily (Arsel 2005:267). Some locals reported health 
problems, like upset stomach and headache, which they linked to the consumption of the 
contaminated water. This incident reinforced the worries of the locals about the risks 
associated with gold mining.  
Meanwhile, the collective project of publicizing the potential impacts of the 
Ovacık gold mine, undertaken under the auspices of the Environmental Commission of 
the İzmir Bar and the Environmental Movement Lawyers, culminated in 1993 with the 
publication of a comprehensive report. Based on contributions from professional 
associations of engineers, physicians, public health experts, foresters, geologists, and an 
environmental non-governmental organization, the report called attention to the high 
risks associated with gold mining in Bergama. To illustrate, according to the Physicians’ 
Association, the intake of high levels of cyanide through the respiratory system damages 
the brain and the heart, and leads to coma or death. The symptoms of long term exposure 
to low levels of cyanide include headache, heartache, vomiting, breathing difficulties, 
numbness in the extremities, and increase in the size of the thyroid gland. Cyanide 
exposure through the skin leads to irritation and wounds. Acid mine drainage; seepage of 
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toxic waste into the groundwater, either due to the permeability of the soil or triggered by 
an earthquake; accumulation of dust; and noise pollution were among the other serious 
risks addressed in the report. Compiling all information provided, the report concluded: 
“Taking into consideration the relevant national and international legislation, the risks 
pointed out in the reports of scientific organizations, and the disproportionately high 
potential economic costs of the establishment with minimal benefits to the national 
economy, we believe that the establishment should not be allowed to operate and its 
current activities be halted” (İzmir Barosu Çevre Komisyonu 1993: 47).  Copies of the 
report were sent to the Offices of the President and the Prime Minister, to the Ministry of 
Environment, and other relevant institutions.   
This collective civil initiative, which started out as a task group under the auspices 
of the Environmental Movement Lawyers group, gradually transformed into a permanent 
support structure with the establishment of the Hand in Hand Initiative. With the addition 
of other concerned organizations and parties over time, the Hand in Hand Initiative grew 
to incorporate around 50 organizations, meeting on a regular basis, and participating in 
the lawsuits as a party alongside the villagers. 
Also in 1993, the ongoing struggle against goldmining in the village of 
Küçükdere in Havran, a town in Balıkesir, about 65 miles northeast of Bergama, 
culminated in victory when the Minister of Environment refused to grant permission to 
Tüprag Metal Mining Industry and Commerce Ltd.Co.’s goldmining project in the region 
due to the proximity of the proposed mine site to olive groves. In many ways, the 
Küçükdere case was similar to that of Bergama. Like Eurogold, Tüprag came to Turkey 
as a result of the neoliberal opening to global capital, and like Eurogold, Tüprag initiated 
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a goldmining investment in an agricultural village in the northwestern Aegean region of 
Turkey. Küçükdere was one of the 559 other exploration sites for goldmining in Turkey 
beside Bergama. Tüprag was established in 1986 in Ankara as a subsidiary company of 
the German Preussag Co. Like Eurogold, Tüprag obtained its exploration permit in 1989. 
However, there was a notable difference between the two cases: From the very 
beginning, the villagers of Küçükdere took an oppositional stance toward goldmining in 
the region. In the early 1990s, when the Bergama villagers turned down the 
environmental lawyers’ offer for legal help the same group of lawyers from İzmir had 
gone to Küçükdere and been welcome by the villagers there. Within the framework of a 
campaign against goldmining in the region, a group called the ‘Güzel Edremit Körfezi 
Bekçileri’ (Guards of the Beautiful Gulf of Edremit – GBGE), comprising of the villagers 
of Küçükdere, the mayors of several surrounding towns, local leaders of political parties, 
lawyers, businessowners, representatives of engineers’ and physicians’ associations, 
issued the ‘Declaration of NO’, also known as the ‘Divine Declaration’, and engaged in 
colorful acts of protest. To illustrate, the mayor of the nearby town of Gömeç applied to 
an insurance company to buy insurance for the 10,095 people in the town against the risk 
of death due to the prospective mining operations. The company refused the application 
because of the magnitude of the risk factor. In another symbolic act, the mayor of 
Burhaniye applied to the German Consulate requesting political asylum for himself and 
the 45,000 residents of the town, reasoning: “As the German companies are moving 
toward gold extraction in our region using cyanide we’re moving toward death. In 
Germany cyanide use in mining is banned” (Özay 1995:109). 
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Also within the framework of the Küçükdere campaign against goldmining, the 
GBGE attacked the parent company of Tüprag and its finance sources on their home 
front. Thus, when GBGE activists found out that the German Dresdner Bank was one of 
the main financiers of Tüprag, they publicized in Germany that the bank was violating its 
commitment to the United Nations Environment Program, in which it agreed not to 
finance any activity abroad that was banned at home. The GBGE established further 
international contacts to get support abroad. In that regard, an expert advisor for the 
Greens at the European Parliament (EP) was invited to and visited Küçükdere, prepared a 
report addressing the risks of the prospective mining project, and submitted it to the 
President of the EP.  International support continued with the visit of the region by the 
world-renown ecological chemist Friedhelm Korte, Emeritus Professor at the Technical 
University of Munich in Germany. Korte studied the environmental impact report 
prepared by Tüprag and announced his critical opinion on the report at a press conference 
held on May 16, 1993. Five days after Korte’s press conference, the Minister of 
Environment issued his decision to halt the goldmining project in the region (Özay 
1995:37).  
It was only after the Küçükdere victory that the Bergama villagers turned to the 
environmental lawyers group in İzmir for legal consultation and representation, which 
opened a new front in the struggle against goldmining in Bergama. In the words of P.A., 
a 64 year-old villager and movement activist:  
Mr. Senih, God bless him, and other environmental lawyers; they came 
and helped us. We had their support. 24 lawyers! Environmental Lawyers 
in İzmir. Go on, they said, we’re behind you. We’ll represent you for free. 
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Although not within a formal organization, the resistance against goldmining in 
Bergama gained ground under the auspices of the mayor, the Bergama Environment, 
Culture, and Arts Association, and the local leaders of the villages. Using tactics similar 
to that employed by the GBGE in the Küçükdere case, movement participants embarked 
on an international publicity campaign. As recounted by Mayor Taşkın: 
We went to Brussels and to Germany. I gave speeches at both the Green 
Party and the Socialist Party meetings. I told them that it’s hypocritical of 
them to produce cyanide, ban it in Germany but export it to Turkey. The 
German Green Party established a desk within the framework of the party 
organization to discuss our case. There’s a strong green movement in 
Germany. One of the influential figures is Friedhelm Korte, an Emeritus 
Professor at the Technical University of Munich. He is the professor who 
wrote the Turkish Environmental Law. He was the senior advisor to the 
German Prime Minister at that time. He is very old but he came all the 
way here to support us….. Fischer [Joschka] came here on his bicycle 
before he was elected. He became the Minister of Foreign Affairs later. 
Fischer is our friend…. We also found Turks in Australia to support us. A 
Turkish guy there, doing a program on the radio, stirred up Australia. 
Every other day I talked as a guest on his morning show in Australia. The 
stock prices of Normandy Poseidon [Australian corporation holding the 
controlling share in Eurogold] dropped to 30 cents from $ 1,5 as a result.  
 
In light of the Ministry of Environment’s decision against Tüprag and the 
increasing resistance in Bergama, Eurogold resorted to tactics of discrediting the 
Bergama movement, playing on nationalist sentiments. Thus, Ahmet Gürel, one of the 
Turkish executives of Eurogold, claimed that the Bergama resistance was provoked by 
Greece52. Behind this allegation lay the cooperation against goldmining between the 
people of Bergama and that of Olympiada in Greece where a multinational mining 
                                                 
52 There is a striking parallel between this tactic of Eurogold and the later 
allegations of ‘provocation of the movement by German foundations’, first, promoted by 
the government, then formulated in a book by a college professor in 2001. Whereas the 
former accusation regarding Greek provocation was not effective the latter swayed public 
opinion about the movement and its activists, and considerably harmed the villagers’ 
cause.  
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company set out to explore for gold. As proof to his claim of Greek provocation, Gürel 
pointed to the request of the mayor of Lesbos, the Greek island in the Aegean, to visit 
Bergama as an act of solidarity with the people of the town against goldmining (Taşkın 
1998:65). In another attempt to proceed its mining investment in the region, Eurogold 
suggested changes in its operation plan to the effect of increasing its environmental safety 
measures. For example, according to the original plan, Eurogold was to cover the bottom 
of the tailings pond with a 20-inch layer of clay to prevent seepage of toxic waste into the 
groundwater. The company proposed to increase this layer to 60 inches. As another step 
to the same end, Eurogold offered to coat this clay layer with a synthetic geomembrane 
liner. Also within the context of improving the environmental safety measures, the 
company suggested to install a detoxification unit, which would chemically detoxify the 
post-processing, cyanide-laden waste before it would be dumped into the tailings pond. 
Although Eurogold advertised these measures as the ultimate environmental 
safety precautions in mining the scientific community expressed concern about their 
effectiveness.  In terms of the usefulness of the geomembrane liner, M.D. from the 
Aegean University stated:  
Geomembrane liners are also used in the roofs of buildings. Even in that 
application they are not leakproof. A roof is probably 200-300 square 
meters of an area. What we’re talking about here in Ovacık is an area of 
160 dönüm [160,000 square meters], which is supposed to carry 60 tons of 
weight. This means that there will be 60 tons of pressure on the 
geomembrane liner. Also consider that region sits on a fault line. In case 
of the slightest earthquake I don’t think the geomembrane cover would 
stay intact. 
 
With respect to the process of detoxification, Y.B., a professor of chemical 
metallurgy at the Technical University of İstanbul, cautioned: 
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Detoxification with the proposed SO2 [sulfur dioxide]/air process involves 
the oxidation of cyanide into cyanate or thiocyanate. Thiocyanates [sulfur-
cyanide compounds] are toxic themselves. They are the major components 
of fungicides and herbicides, such as the Agent Orange.  
 
Similarly, in his evaluation of the other detoxification processes used in mining, 
such as the Alkaline-Chlorination and the H2O2 [hydrogen peroxide] process, Duman 
(2000) concluded that since they all rely on the oxidation of cyanide they lead to the 
formation of ammonia, dangerous nitrogen oxides, and additional, undesirable sulfur and 
chlorine compounds (p.153).  
Despite these caveats, however, the Ministry of Environment granted Eurogold a 
permit for operation on October 19, 1994, which led to the first lawsuit in the Bergama 
case. On November 8, 1994, the Environmental Movement Lawyers group in İzmir filed 
three separate lawsuits at the İzmir Administrative Court on behalf of 650 villagers and 
residents of Bergama for the annulment of the company’s permit.  
In an encouraging development for the movement, the European Parliament (EP) 
adopted a resolution53 at its sitting on November 17, 1994, entitled the “Resolution on the 
environmental disaster which is imminent as a result of the use by companies based in the 
European Union of chemical substances containing cyanide in goldmining operations 
near Pergamon and Edremit (Turkey)”. Acknowledging the risks associated with 
goldmining in Bergama, the resolution called on “the Turkish government to ban the use 
of substances containing cyanide in mining and to prevent the destruction of valuable 
regions with centuries old crops and forests”. The EP also called on “the member states, 
                                                 
53 Under the legal system of the EU, resolutions are non-binding legal norms, 
considered part of the secondary legislation. Although they don’t have legal force 
resolutions have political weight. 
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particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, to ban the use by German companies of 
cyanide, a toxic substance with negative historical associations, which will cause serious 
ecological and health damage to an entire region, and to oblige German companies and 
banks to comply with German and EU standards, even outside the EU” (European 
Parliament Resolution. 17 November 1994. B4-0410/94).  
1995 saw a shift in the initial capital configuration of Eurogold.   Metall Mining 
Corporation changed its name to INMET Mining Corporation, keeping its original 33.33 
percent of shares. A substantial change occurred in the Australian leg of Eurogold’s 
capital. With the establishment of La Source Compagnie Minière, a joint venture between 
the Australian Normandy Mining Ltd. and the French BRGM54, Normandy decreased its 
shares in Eurogold from 67 percent to 40 percent. According to this new capital 
arrangement, BRGM assumed 27 percent of Eurogold’s shares. 
On July 2, 1996, İzmir Administrative Court dismissed the villagers’ request to 
annul Eurogold’s operation permit, ruling that the gold mine fulfilled the criteria set out 
in the EIA Report and that the disputed decision had been adopted in accordance with the 
authorization procedure for environmentally sensitive projects. The villagers’ lawyers 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.  
 
The Villagers: From Reaction to Action  
 
With the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court still pending, Eurogold 
started constructing the mine early November in 1996, cutting down 3,000 pine trees and 
                                                 
54 Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (Office of Geological and 
Mining Survey) - French public institution with industrial and commercial interests, 
founded in 1959. 
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1,500 olive trees for the open pit operation (Reinart 2003:51). Enraged by this incident, 
the villagers blocked the İzmir-Çanakkale Highway, a major intercity road that runs in 
front of the mine, and stopped traffic for six hours on November 15, 1996. This first mass 
protest signaled the onset of a new phase in the movement, characterized by nationwide 
publicity through actions of civil disobedience, demonstrations, marches, road blockades, 
sit-ins, petitions, and organization of solidarity picnics and festivals, alongside the 
ongoing struggle on the judicial front.  
62 year-old B.Y. from Bergama, who became one of the leading figures in this 
phase, especially instrumental in planning and organizing the actions of protest, gave the 
following account on the transformation of the movement: 
The mayor did a whole lot to raise public awareness about the risks of 
goldmining. He announced these dangers in the press and on TV. But I 
told him: ‘We’re talking about a disaster here. It looks like death is at our 
door. Organizing press conferences and attending discussion programs on 
TV is not enough. Something else must be done. People should be more 
directly involved in this process, not just through the local leaders of the 
villages and the mayor of the town. The struggle should not look like it’s 
under the monopoly of one individual’.   
 
D.T. is a 44 year-old businessowner from Bergama and one of the founders of the 
Bergama Environment, Culture, and Arts Association. He was, at the time, the local 
leader of the newly established, left-wing Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (Freedom and 
Solidarity Party), and another movement activist who played a lead role in facilitating 
villagers’ direct actions. Like B.Y., D.T. also clearly identified this phase of the 
movement as distinct from the previous one: 
I evaluate the Bergama Resistance in two phases. Why two phases? The 
role of the mayor in this struggle can certainly not be denied. But there 
was a difference between his point of view and ours in terms of the 
organizational structure of the movement…Environmental problems 
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cannot be solved by individual struggles. As many environmentalists as 
you may bring here to protest you can’t get anywhere unless you reach the 
villagers, enlighten them, and unless they act on the problem….We always 
argued for the need for villagers to own their problems, as opposed to an 
organization model in which someone from the outside would come to 
lead them…We favored a structure that included everyone involved; a 
structure in which all decisions were taken and carried out by all 
participants. In the first phase, which lasted till 1996, a series of actions 
were taken in a way that the mayor thought was right. A couple of elect 
village leaders and a group of people from Bergama carried out these 
actions. Thus, they were not widely embraced but maybe served to clear 
the path in front of the people. The struggle went on like this until 1996. 
The mayor would call, summon the village leaders, and they would go to 
carry out an action. This was not our understanding of a grassroots 
movement……The people who lived in the close vicinity of the mine were 
experiencing the destruction directly under constantly exploding 
dynamites and the trees being felled. Thus, we thought the surrounding 15-
17 villages should be the epicenter of the struggle and the villagers as a 
collectivity should be the lead actors of this movement. 
 
Taşkın, the then mayor, agreed with B.Y. and D.T. about the way grassroots 
movements ought to be. He stressed that he never assumed a leadership role in the 
movement but only acted from the position of a concerned and responsible individual:  
Individually, I’m just a figure in this grassroots movement. I’m not the 
sine qua non of it…. I was neither alone in this struggle nor was I its 
leader. I just did my job. It was my job as a mayor then…..I played the 
role of a mediator, facilitating the meeting of experts with the villagers. 
Even if I hadn’t acted as a facilitator someone else would have…. Once 
the villagers reached a certain level of awareness they established their 
own committees, made their own decisions. When they consulted us, we 
helped them. This is indeed what ought to be. I don’t believe in a 
movement where people follow their mayor and do as he says; neither do I 
think it’s the right way to go about because once they find the leader they 
get him, and the movement ends there… Everybody swarms a movement 
like this to advance their own political goals….My advice to the villagers 
was this: ‘Don’t discard anyone. Let them join you but only if they are 
willing to follow you! Don’t let anyone get in front of you!’       
 
However, Taşkın had a different interpretation of the changing nature of the 
movement from 1996 on. For him, the movement followed a natural course of 
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development. The direct actions of the villagers did not signify a change in course but 
they were a manifestation of the natural progression of the movement:  
There is a chain of developments in social movements. First, people 
observe to figure out what’s going on. Then they learn. Then they decide. 
And once they decide, they act. This chain is experienced in the Bergama 
villagers’ movement. 
 
The difference in opinion between the mayor and B.Y., in particular, was manifest 
in the differing factors they considered necessary for movement success. The mayor’s 
emphasis on ‘diplomatic, ideological, and scientific confrontation’ in the struggle against 
goldmining contrasted B.Y.’s identification of ‘confrontation via direct action’ as the 
prominent means of struggle. In the former mayor Taşkın’s words:  
In your fight against them you have to win the ideological struggle. You 
have to be right. You can win no social movement if you’re not right from 
the sociological point of view. It is possible for you to lose even when 
you’re right but there’s no chance of winning if you’re not right. You 
simply have to be right. We had to be right and convict them and their 
arguments ideologically and scientifically.  
 
In contrast, B.Y. stressed:  
We told the mayor that he could continue being the means of scientific 
justification for the struggle, telling Turkey and the world about the risks 
of goldmining, and telling them our people don’t want it. But we needed 
to feed the fire that he ignited. The struggle needed to foster collectivity, 
to incorporate and be identified with the people. We needed to carry out 
non-violent but resistant, organized and loud actions.  
 
The post-1996 era saw the formation of the Bergama Environmental Executive 
Committee (BEEC), comprising of B.Y., D.T., the local organizations of the Freedom 
and Solidarity Party as well as the Workers Party, and the village leaders. Leadership of 
the committee was to be assumed alternately by the members for a term of one year. 
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Along with the BEEC, several committees were established in the villages. As recounted 
by B.Y.: 
There is a saying I like. It reads: ‘Those who struggle can’t always win but 
those who win are always the ones who struggled’. We started a collective 
struggle. We set out to carry Gandhi’s ideology to 2000s, engaging in non-
violent, non-destructive acts of civil disobedience. We circulated books on 
Gandhi, established committees in the villages, organized meetings in the 
homes of the villagers, and learned civil disobedience.  
 
Beside the BEEC and the village committees, the Bergama Environment, Culture, 
and Arts Association, the Environmental Movement Lawyers in İzmir, as well as 
individual lawyers from Bergama have been instrumental in carrying the struggle to the 
villages. C.U., a 40 year-old lawyer from Bergama and one of the legal representatives of 
the villagers stated: 
Taking to the streets is risky. You might run into other people there; your 
opponents, radicals, etc.... So, it was a necessity for the villagers to be 
informed on the legal aspects of protest…. At that point we did our part 
and taught them what they needed to know to protest within the 
framework of the rules of law.   
 
The instruction villagers received from the lawyers with respect to legitimate 
protest was one of the most essential factors in the success of the acts of demonstration 
and protest carried out by the villagers in this and the subsequent phase. Regarding this 
learning process B.Y. recounted:  
I wrote letters to the bar associations, to the Presidents of Turkey’s bar 
associations. I told them: ‘The mining company proceeds with its 
operations. Our voices apparently can’t be heard enough. We’re going to 
protest. Will you teach us how? Come to our villages, … come and tell us 
who the police, the gendarmerie, the National Intelligence Agency are; 
what we need to do when we see them; tell us when we need to disperse 
and when not; what we need to do in front of the judge; and what we 
should do when arrested by the gendarmerie’. They taught us all of these 
in six months. We worked hard, did our homework, and even tested each 
other on what we learned. Everyone knew what grade anyone else got. 
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One villager would say: ‘I got 2….Next time I will get 3. You’ll see, I’ll 
even increase my grade to 5 [highest possible grade].’ He would 
eventually get 5, indeed.  
 
This process contributed to the growth of solidarity among the villagers against 
goldmining in the region. As expressed by I.A., a 55 year-old villager and adamant 
movement activist: 
At first, people were divided. When the company first came here some 
started working for the mine. But in five or six years we became a single 
entity, as solid as a rock, everyone being on our side against the mine. 
 
44 year-old K.M., another villager and longtime movement activist recounted: 
There were a couple of people from the villages working for the mine. We 
held a meeting and decided to ask them either to leave the mine or the 
village. Most of them left the village and moved to Bergama. Few 
remained. We separated our coffee houses.   
 
On November 24, 1996, a week after the road blockage demonstration, the so-
called ‘Enough Is Enough Demonstration’, also known as the ‘Coffin Demonstration’, 
was held in Bergama. Carrying coffins, thousands of villagers marched in protest on the 
streets of Bergama, accompanied by the municipality band playing Chopin’s funeral 
march. Among the slogans shouted were: “Don’t dig our graves!” and “Bergama’s gold is 
its cotton and tobacco!” 
In another direct action on December 23, 1996, the villagers distributed leaflets in 
the streets of Bergama, men having stripped themselves down to their underwear. 
Nakedness is a social taboo in Turkish culture, especially in rural regions. The naked 
body is something to be ashamed of and hidden from public purview. Thus, it was an 
extremely difficult and radical move for the village men, who live and die for their honor, 
to strip themselves off their clothes. The rationale behind this protest was that it would be 
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the most manifest demonstration of the villagers’ determination to stop gold mining in 
the region if they’d go to such great lengths for their cause as to take the most difficult 
action in their lives. B.Y. gave the following account on this demonstration: 
Six or seven thousand of us came to Bergama to distribute leaflets reading 
‘We don’t want the goldmine!’ In the town where they sell their tomatoes 
and peppers the villagers were to distribute leaflets. We gathered in an 
auditorium. The women were waiting outside. I stood up on a desk and 
started to take off my clothes. I undressed down to a pair of shorts. The 
villagers were stunned. “Undress!” I said. They looked at me with a 
puzzled expression on their faces. “Friends, undress!” I repeated. Nobody 
dared to take off a piece of clothing. They broke into a cold sweat. One of 
them said: “Even in our wives’ presence we turn off the light when we 
undress. It embarrasses us.” The idea was this: What is the most difficult 
thing to do in the life of a villager? To undress. He was asked to undress, 
walk on the streets of Bergama in underwear….This was more difficult for 
him than to die but if he could do this he would be willing and able to do 
anything for the cause he was fighting for. Eventually, some five or six 
took off their clothes but others did not. The curious crowd was waiting 
outside, not knowing what was going on inside. I decided to proceed, got 
down from the desk, and asked the undressed ones to walk in front and the 
others to follow them. Among the undressed was Uncle Bayram, a big, 
130 kg. [~287 pounds] guy. He took his clothes and walked outside. His 
wife saw him. “What the hell are you doing? Are you out of your mind?” 
she shouted. Everybody was in shock. “I’m not alone,” Uncle Bayram 
responded. I was following him. The villagers respect and trust me. I 
asked the women: “Tell your husbands to undress.” “Undress!” they 
commanded. Thus, one after the other took off their clothes. 
  
On January 12, 1997, a referendum was held in eight villages to vote in favor or 
against the gold mine. Under the surveillance of the gendarmerie, 89% of eligible voters 
(2866 people) cast their votes (Reinart 2003:66). All voted against the mine. 
The villagers expressed their opposition to Eurogold also through culturally 
symbolic actions. For example, on February 22, 1997, they staged ortaoyunu. Ortaoyunu 
is a popular form of Turkish performance art, originated in the Ottoman era. It is an 
improvised play with minimal scenery, performed in an open-air space, surrounded by 
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the audience. Hence, the name ortaoyunu, which literally translates as the ‘middle play’. 
Ortaoyunu often carries a political message conveyed by way of dramatization and/or 
satire. 
In another culturally-inspired demonstration the next day, the villagers planted fig 
saplings in front of the mine. Underlying this symbolic action was the Turkish idiom of 
“to plant a fig tree by one’s house”, implying “to destroy it”. Fig trees are known to grow 
everywhere due to their extremely vigorous roots that are capable of destroying 
everything on their path, even rocks, walls, and foundations of buildings, to hold on to 
the soil. In the case of the villagers’ action, planting fig saplings symbolized their desire 
to get rid of the mine. The villagers also cooked lokma, fried dough, and distributed it to 
the public, which is an Anatolian tradition carried out after someone’s death.  
The movement activists and movement supporters interviewed for this study were 
unequivocal in their response as to the source of their tactics and slogans: the creativity of 
the locals, or ‘the ingenious mind of the locals’, as the then mayor put it. I.A., a 55 year-
old villager and adamant movement activist stated:  
Well, it [the struggle] is like a baby. You feed it to grow; you put effort in 
it. It wasn’t born overnight…There were three to five thousand of us. 
Some were skilled in poetry. They would say something that others liked 
and it became a slogan. The same is true for the actions we took. They 
were born as a result of the locals’ creativity. 
  
Similarly, S.C., a 44 year-old lawyer from İzmir, long-time movement supporter 
and one of the legal representatives of the villagers, asserted:  
Urban intellectuals voiced their views and opinions, of course. But tactics 
and slogans were mostly the product of the villagers’ creativity. I believe 
it also has a whole lot to do with their conviction. They believed in this 
cause, and the more they were convinced the more creative they got. 
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Upon the invitation by the mayor of Lefke, a town in the Northwest of Cyprus, a 
group of villagers, along with several journalists, went to Lefke on February 27, 1997, to 
visit and observe the environmental destruction caused by the now abandoned copper and 
gold mine site in the town. On the impact of this trip on the villagers, B.Y. said: 
There was a copper mine in Cyprus where cyanide was used to extract the 
metal. The mine finished its operations 30 years ago. We went there and 
saw that, even today, death was on duty there. That was an eye opening 
experience for everyone on the trip.  
 
Taşkın’s account of the Cyprus trip was similar: 
 
It was only in Lefke that Cumhuriyet [a prominent, politically left-oriented 
daily] was convinced of the risks associated with mining. Until then it 
only covered the Bergama case for the news value of the demonstrations. 
In the aftermath of the Cyprus trip they took sides with us. Like everyone 
else on the trip they were also struck by the extent of the destruction they 
saw. They said: ‘You were right’. 
 
Upon Eurogold’s commencement of explosions at the mine to excavate the ore, 
the walls of the houses in the nearby villages started to crack. On March 7, 1997, a group 
of village women went to Bergama on tractors to complain to the kaymakam, the sub-
provincial governor, about the company’s operations. The police didn’t let the protesters 
enter the building. Tractors carrying another group of village women were stopped by the 
police before they entered the town. Eventually, ten women, along with one of the 
movement leaders, were allowed to talk to the kaymakam in his office. Upon his promise 
that he’d notify the governor of the province of İzmir about the villagers’ complaints, and 
do whatever is necessary, the protesters went back to their villages.    
A week later, representatives of several NGOs from İzmir came to Bergama and 
met with the villagers at the town square before the commencement of a marathon from 
Bergama to İzmir as a protest against the goldmine. Folowing a demonstration of 
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solidarity the marathon started with participants carrying torches in their hands. The 
police let the demonstrators proceed, provided they did not block the traffic. 
In the subsequent direct action on April 22, 1997, over 4,000 villagers picketed 
the mine site for 12 hours, starting at midnight. The governor of İzmir, the kaymakam of 
Bergama, the Chief of Police, and the Commander of the Gendarmerie came to the mine 
site to convince the protesters to end their demonstration. The villagers left the mine upon 
the promise by the governor that the mine would be closed for a month. Upon the order 
of the governor of İzmir on April 25, 1997, the mine’s operations were suspended for one 
month.  
Following this event, 1500 soldiers were sent to the region. They established a 
large base on the mine site. In the words of D.T.:  
They did their daily morning exercises, jogging in the villages as an 
attempt to intimidate the villagers. They asked the villagers in tractors on 
their way to the fields for their driver’s licenses, and scraped off the 
stickers on the villagers’ cars that read: “No to Cyanide-Treated Gold!” 
 
Shortly after the picketing demonstration by the villagers, a letter was sent to the 
Turkish General Manager of Eurogold from the Office of the Presidency, dated May 2, 
1997. According to the letter, the State Minister Teoman Rıza Güneri, who had been 
consulted by the Office of the Presidency regarding recent events in Bergama, assured 
that the state would stand by its promise to the company’s representatives, and that the 
mine would definitely operate, but Güneri suggested to wait for about a week until peace 
was restored in the region (Milliyet Daily, February 14, 1998). 
The villagers also took their protest to the capital. On May 8, 1997, 25 buses full 
of villagers went to Ankara to submit to the parliament a petition of 50,000 signatures 
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against the mine. They also visited the offices of major political parties, and talked to 
their representatives.  
Despite the government’s support of the company, a development on the judicial 
front signified victory for the Bergama villagers. In its groundbreaking decision on May 
13, 1997, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) overturned the lower court’s 
judgment of July 2, 1996, and ruled that the ministerial permission granted to Eurogold 
did not serve public interest, and was in violation of Articles 17 and 56 of the 
Constitution. According to Article 17, “everyone has the right to life and the right to 
maintain and develop their material and spiritual entity”, and according to Article 56 
“everybody is entitled to live in a healthy and balanced environment. It is the duty of the 
state and the citizens to improve the environment, to protect environmental health, and to 
prevent environmental pollution” (Official Gazette, November 9, 1982, No.17863, Law 
No. 2709). Considering the effects of the proposed mining activity with cyanide 
treatment on human life, the atmosphere, groundwater, flora, fauna, and land use, as 
addressed in the Environmental Impact Assessment and various expert reports, the SAC 
(Supreme Administrative Court File No: 1996/5477, Decision No: 1997/2312, dated 
05/13/1997) decreed: 
It is essential that human life is sustained in a healthy, balanced, pristine 
environment….Since the risks associated with the operation method of the 
disputed goldmine directly or indirectly concern human life the statutory 
audit of the administrative decision in question [The Ministry of 
Environment’s decision to issue an operation permit to 
Eurogold]…requires, before all else, the consideration of public interest 
and the priorities that this concept entails. If the economic value to be 
gained from the activity in question….is weighed against the destruction 
that will be wrought on the environment and, directly or indirectly, on 
human life, in case the risk factor materializes, it is natural to assess public 
interest primarily in favor of human life. In the case of goldmining with 
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the cyanide leaching method, it is impossible to talk about the reduction in 
risk factors based on the trust in the mining establishment and in the 
supervision of the facility to be carried out. In light of the technical and 
judicial ascertainments above, and considering the right of humans to life, 
as well as the state’s obligations to protect environmental health, to 
prevent environmental pollution, and to ensure that everyone leads a life in 
physical and mental health, there is no public interest in the disputed 
decision with regard to the granting of permission to the operation of the 
goldmine with the cyanide leaching method that involves the probable risk 
factors addressed in the Environmental Impact Assessment and expert 
reports, which, if materialized, will certainly affect human life, either 
directly or indirectly through environmental deterioration.  
 
 
Against the Executive Circumvention of Judicial Decrees 
 
As the former mayor put it, from this point on the actions of the involved parties 
took a chess-like course, with the villagers and their supporters, on the one hand, and the 
company and the government, on the other, counteracting each other’s moves.  
On May 18, 1997 thousands of villagers, accompanied by hundreds of college 
students from İzmir and Ankara as supporters, and media representatives, gathered in a 
village adjacent to the mine, and held the so-called ‘Cyanide-Free Picnic’ with the motto 
of: ‘Before the water gets contaminated with cyanide!’. The picnic culminated with the 
opening of an inscribed stone block put up in the village square. The inscription, signed 
by 17 villages in close vicinity to the mine, read: 
These lands you’re standing on belong to the villagers of Pınarköy, 
Alacalar, Aşağıkırıklar, Kurfallı, Bozköy, Sarıdere, Eğrigöl, Ovacık, 
Narlıca, Çamköy, Çaltıbahçe, Süleymanlı, Küçükkaya, Yenikent, 
Tekedere, Tepeköy, Yalnızev, and Sağancı. These lands are bountiful. On 
its plains lies cotton like snow, wheat like gold, tobacco like amber; on its 
mountains stand tall pine and oak trees; over its streams extend the cool 
shadows of plane trees. Olive trees at the foot of its mountains are as old 
as history. You can’t get enough of the pomegranates and grapes of these 
lands; don’t leave without tasting them. Stamp the ground and water will 
erupt. This water is therapeutic; it promotes mental and physical 
health….The mud of this area contributed to the beauty of Cleopatra. The 
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parchment paper is from here. It circulated in the hands of the kings, 
treaties were sealed on it, and it carried words of love…The collection of 
this town’s library was read by Alexandrians for centuries….People of 
these lands regard as one the living beings on and under their lands, and 
protect them. For these people, everything on and under the earth is as 
essential as air. They are aware that in the absence of one the other would 
die. You, visitors of these lands, take some time to listen to them carefully, 
thus learn from them and teach others. People of these lands are upset, 
worried, and very angry nowadays. They already knew what gold was but 
they recently found out about cyanide; and once they did so, they 
discarded their long-cherished golden belongings. Their gold is their 
wheat, sunflower, tobacco, cotton, and olives. They don’t want to leave 
these lands and perish, neither do they want to stay and die….If you came 
here as a friend, meet them, listen to them and talk to them. If not, leave 
right away. These people love life and the nature, which is their life. These 
people know that the dead don’t wear gold.  
 
 Several other demonstrations were carried out throughout June of 1997. Villagers 
held a demonstration at the Konak Square in downtown İzmir. They started keeping vigil 
in front of the mine, gathering outside the fence around the mine site, holding flashlights 
in their hands and shouting slogans. A group of villagers intruded the press conference 
concerning the Ovacık Goldmine, held by the Australian Ambassador at a hotel in İzmir 
(Reinart 2003). In support of the villagers’ movement, the Faculty of Mining at the 
Technical University of İstanbul organized a conference, titled “Scientific Aspects of 
Gold Extraction Using Cyanide”. Conference participants concluded that “based on 
current evidence, including the technologies involved and knowledge of the natural and 
cultural environment, the planned extraction of gold in the Bergama region is not 
acceptable” (Bergama Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları 1997: 24). 
Subsequent to the SAC decision there was a marked boost in the judicial leg of 
the villagers’ struggle. According to Article 52 §4 of the Law on Administrative 
Proceedings, the overruling of a decision entailed ipso facto the stay of execution of that 
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decision (Official Gazette, January 20, 1982, No.17580, Law No. 2577). Furthermore, as 
stipulated by the same law: “The Administration is obliged to act in accordance with the 
requirements of the Supreme Administrative Court’s and other administrative courts’ 
decisions of stay of execution without delay. Under no condition can the timeframe for 
enforcement exceed thirty days starting on the day the Administration is notified of the 
decision [the law requires that the involved parties be notified of the decision within 
seven days of its announcement]…. In the case of deliberate non-enforcement of the 
court decisions by the public officials within thirty days the party concerned is entitled to 
file a lawsuit against the administration, and to bring an action for damages against the 
public officials responsible for the non-enforcement of the decision” (Official Gazette, 
January 20, 1982, No.17580, Law No. 2577, Article 28 §1 and 4). Applied to the 
Bergama case, the law required that the Ministry of Environment’s decision to issue an 
operation permit to Eurogold be annulled and the operations at the Ovacık Goldmine be 
halted by June 20, 1997 at latest, based on the SAC’s opposing judgment of May 13, 
1997.  
Upon non-enforcement of the SAC’s ruling within the stipulated time period, the 
İzmir Bar Association sent a letter to the İzmir Provincial Governor’s Office on June 26, 
1997,  urging  that  the  Ovacık  Goldmine  be  closed  down.  In its reply to the letter, the 
governor’s office claimed that the final judgment on the case had not been made yet55, 
                                                 
55 According to Article 49 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, if the 
appealed decision of the lower court is overruled by the Supreme Administrative Court 
(SAC), the case is sent back to the lower court for reconsideration, with Article 52 §4 of 
the law, i.e. ‘the overruling of a decision entails ipso facto the stay of execution of that 
decision’, still holding true. The lower court can insist on its original decision, 
disregarding the SAC’s overruling. If the lower court’s decision of insistence on its 
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and stated that the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources had expressed its support 
for the resumption of the mine’s operations (European Court of Human Rights Judgment, 
10 November 2004, 46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: I-C.31).  
On August 2, 1997 a group of villagers went to Çeşme, a town 50 miles west of 
İzmir, where the Association of the Aegean Industrialists and Businessmen was holding 
its summit meeting. The villagers talked to two state ministers who were attending the 
summit, and asked them to enforce the SAC decision and close the mine. The ministers 
responded that they were waiting for the legal procedure to be finalized and assured the 
villagers that once the SAC decision became final it would be enforced (Gazete Ege 
Daily, August 3, 1997). 
In their biggest demonstration in terms of attracting nationwide attention, the 
villagers went to İstanbul on August 26, 1997, tied themselves to the railings of the 
Bosphorus Bridge, and blocked traffic for two hours. Spanning the Bosphorus Strait 
(İstanbul Strait), and thus connecting the European side of the city to the Asian side, the 
Bosphorus Bridge is one of the most outstanding symbols of İstanbul, the country’s 
biggest metropolis, and cultural and financial center. Hence, the villagers’ demonstration 
on the bridge made headlines both in the newspapers and on TV nationwide.   
E.S., a member of the Environmental Movement Lawyers group in İzmir, and a 
long term legal representative and consultant of the villagers, interpreted the success of 
                                                                                                                                                 
original judgment is appealed by the party involved the case is viewed by the SAC 
General Assembly of Administrative Proceedings. If the SAC General Assembly of 
Administrative Proceedings upholds the SAC’s judgment, the decision of the lower court 
is overruled; otherwise it is affirmed. Judgments of the SAC General Assembly of 
Administrative Proceedings are final and binding for all (Official Gazette, January 20, 
1982, No.17580, Law No. 2577, Article 49 § 3 and 4).  
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the villagers’ direct actions, in general, and their Bosphorus Bridge demonstration, in 
particular, in his following account:  
Everybody is entitled to express their opinion. This is a constitutional 
right. They [Bergama villagers] used this right. They were taught that they 
can do whatever they want in protest: lie on the ground, chain themselves 
to the Bosphorus Bridge, strip themselves off their clothes, paint 
themselves in color, or whatever else they might choose to do as long as 
they dispersed by the third warning of the police through the megaphone, 
as stipulated by the Law of Rallies and Demonstration Marches. They 
were successful in their demonstrations because they learned this rule. 
 
How well the villagers learned the legal requirements of protest was attested in an 
episode during the questioning of the villagers at the İstanbul Police Station’s Counter 
Terrorism Unit where they were taken to in the aftermath of the Bosphorus Bridge 
demonstration. B.Y. from Bergama, a movement activist instrumental in facilitating 
villagers’ direct actions recounted:  
They called in Uncle Bayram, the 82 year-old villager, to question. 
The interrogation started out in a forceful tone. Prosecutors use this 
psychological intimidation tactic toward the villagers, playing on the 
latter’s fear of authority.  
- ‘Bayram!’ the prosecutor commanded.  
- ‘Yes, Mr. Prosecutor.’  
- ‘Are you against the state? What do you want?’ 
- ‘I’m defending my land.’ 
…..The prosecutor was not convinced. He went on in an angrier tone of 
voice: 
- ‘Look, you committed a crime. Do you see these  
police officers, these gendarmes? They brought you in because you 
committed a crime. Do you realize that your actions constitute 
crime?’ 
- ‘Crime has not been established!’ Bayram replied. 
 Now, this is a judicial phrase. Only lawyers use this term. The 
prosecutor was taken aback. He put down his pen, and asked, this time 
respectfully: 
- ‘You’re neither a judge nor a lawyer. How do you  
know that crime was not established?’ 
- ‘We do our homework. We read. It says in the book  
 158
that the police are to stand on an elevated ground where we can see 
them, and through the megaphone they are to warn us three times, 
calling ‘You’re committing a crime, disperse!’ If we don’t disperse 
by the end of the third warning, that’s when the crime is 
established. But in our demonstration the police didn’t have a 
megaphone in their hands!’ 
 This time the prosecutor asked the police officers: 
- ‘Is it true? Did you not have a megaphone?’ 
- ‘We did not.’ 
 So, they let us go. 
 
Both the villagers and those who support them expressed that the struggle of 
Bergama villagers had been a mutual learning experience for all the parties involved. As 
the villagers learned the art of non-violent protest and perfected it in their actions, the 
state and the mining company learned new ways to cope with them. Following the 
Bosphorus Bridge demonstration the police used the megaphone in every protest meeting 
of the villagers. In return, the villagers developed a new tactic. In the words of B.Y.: 
We learned what to do on the streets, how to face the gendarmes, the 
police. And the police started to learn from us….. They would warn us 
through the megaphone. We’d disperse to make sure no crime is 
established. But in a couple of minutes we’d come back to the same place, 
and start over our protest. The police would take us to the prosecutor, and 
complain: ‘Sir, we warn them through the megaphone, and ask them to 
disperse. They disperse, indeed, but come back in a little while.’ The 
prosecutor would tell them: ‘Change the laws. What they do doesn’t 
constitute crime unless the existing laws are changed to prove otherwise.’  
 
On September 9, 1997, 420 villagers, along with the mayor and B.Y., went to 
Balya, a town of Balıkesir, 65 miles northeast of Bergama, to visit the abandoned lead 
and silver mine in the town56. A group of special forces, riot police, and gendarmes 
                                                 
56 When foreign companies were granted mining concessions in the country 
during the dissolution years of the Ottoman Empire, a French company received the right 
to mine silver, lead and zinc in Balya in 1878. The company extracted a total of 400,000 
tons of lead over 62 years it was in operation. In 1940 when the mine was closed Balya 
was left with 4 million tons of toxic waste, consisting of heavy metals, such as cadmium, 
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blocked the road fives miles to Balya. The commander of the gendarmerie announced 
that on the direct order of the Minister of Interior Affairs the villagers would not be 
allowed to enter the town. As the mayor and B.Y. went to negotiate with the authorities 
the villagers were kept in the buses. After hours of negotiations the sub-provincial 
governor of Balya allowed the villagers to get off the buses. The villagers carried out a 
sit-in demonstration and shouted slogans. When the protesters insisted on entering the 
town the commander of the gendarmerie asked them to get in the buses and go back to 
Bergama. Upon their resistance the villagers were beaten, forced into the buses, and sent 
back to Bergama under the escort of police cars (Reinart 2003:100).    
The events on the action front were accompanied by developments on the judicial 
front. Following its ruling of May 1997 the SAC had sent the case back to the lower 
administrative court for reconsideration. The İzmir Administrative Court complied with 
the SAC’s judgment and annulled the Ministry of Environment’s decision on October 15, 
1997 (İzmir First Administrative Court, File No. 1997/636, Decision No. 1997/877, dated 
10/15/1997).  
On October 23, 1997, the Ministry of Environment invited the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlement, the Ministry of Health, and the provincial governor of İzmir to reconsider the 
conditions attached to the disputed operation permits in view of the SAC’s decision 
(European Court of Human Rights Judgment, 10 November 2004, 46117/99 [2004] 
                                                                                                                                                 
arsenic, lead, and zinc (Minibaş 2005:461). The town’s population decreased from about 
36,000 in the 1930s to 2,000 today. 
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ECHR 621: I-C.32). Although the statutory time limit of enforcement had passed the 
mine was still not closed by the end of November 1997.  
In the census held on November 30, 1997, 10,000 people from eight villages 
refused to be counted by the census officials, reasoning: “If we don’t count we don’t want 
to be counted” (Yeni Asır Daily, November 25, 1997). On December 24, 1997, the legal 
representatives of the villagers sent notices to the İzmir provincial governor, and to the 
Ministers of the Environment, the Energy and Natural Resources, and the Forests, calling 
for the enforcement of the SAC’s judgment. 
The account by H.N., a 45 year-old villager and movement activist, illustrated the 
frustration of the villagers with the administration’s failure to secure their rights that are 
guaranteed by law and affirmed by judiciary decisions:  
We won our case at the High Court. There was a big celebration in our 
villages the day when the court announced its decision. We said: ‘This is 
it. We did it. We won!’ But they didn’t close the mine.    
 
C.U., a 40 year-old lawyer from Bergama and one of the lawyers of the villagers 
made the following comment on the deferral of the SAC judgment by the administration:  
Imagine that a citizen is convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to 
24 years of imprisonment. Once the judgment becomes final, i.e. there is 
no other course of appeal in the judicial system, its enforcement is 
obligated by law. But instead of sending the convict to jail the executive 
power decides, in a totally arbitrary manner, not to execute the convict’s 
sentence. It says: ‘High Court, I realize you sentenced this person to 24 
years imprisonment but I will not send him to jail!’ Is this possible under 
the rule of law? But this is exactly what we experienced in this country in 
the Bergama case. The High Court says, the mining operation should stop, 
there’s no public interest in carrying on with it; but the country’s 
administrators, the Council of Ministers, Ministers of Energy and of 
Environment all say: ‘I’m not enforcing it!’ What would you do in 
response? These people were neglecting their duty by not enforcing the 
court’s decision. So, we filed lawsuits against them. 
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On January 6, 1998, the lawyers of the villagers brought an action for damages at 
the Ankara District Court against the Prime Minister, the Minister of Environment, the 
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Public 
Works, and the provincial governor of İzmir, for not enforcing the SAC’s decision.  
In his interpretation of the developments following the SAC ruling, 44 year-old 
S.C. from İzmir, a longtime movement supporter and one of the lawyers of the villagers, 
stated: 
In the aftermath of the ’97 decision the concern for securing the rule of 
law gained primacy in the struggle….The protection of environmental 
rights is essential but if court rules are not enforced in a country there 
would be no guarantee for the exercise of any rights. The institution to 
resort to for the settlement of a dispute between two parties is the court. If 
the court’s rule is not going to be enforced how will people claim their 
rights? Is everyone going to act on their own sense of justice? This would 
lead to disorder and chaos. You can’t even talk about a state under these 
conditions, let alone a state based on the rule of law. You would destroy 
the atmosphere of peace in the society. If no one trusts that the court 
decisions will be enforced nobody will take the courts seriously; nobody 
will resort to courts to resolve their disputes….In this case, securing 
environmental rights becomes part of the bigger problem of the 
enforcement of judiciary decisions. 
 
On February 27, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Governor of İzmir ordered the 
mine to be closed. Four days later, the public prosecutor at the Bergama police court 
brought criminal proceedings against the senior managers of Eurogold, with the charge of 
cyanide use at the Ovacık Goldmine without prior authorization. Contrary to the 
government’s claim that no mining activity had been carried out at the mine, a court-
ordered inspection on the mine site on March 27, 1998 revealed that the company already 
extracted gold, using three tons of cyanide, and that there was eighteen tons of cyanide in 
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stock at the site (European Court of Human Rights Judgment, 10 November 2004, 
46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: I-C.36&37).  
Two subsequent developments in August and September 1998 moved the 
Bergama case to international milieu in terms of publicity and legal measures. Between 
July 31 and August 9 over 2,000 young people from 22 countries and from throughout 
Turkey gathered in Bergama within the framework of the biggest international youth 
festival held in the country. The festival was organized by environmental non-
governmental organizations, labor unions, and college students in support of the Bergama 
villagers’ struggle, and logistically supported by the Bergama Municipality. Staying in a 
camping area allotted to them by the municipality, festival participants held panel 
discussions, displayed performing and plastic arts, staging improvised plays, creating 
sculptures, and painting murals on the buildings in the villages and the town. Professional 
popular and classical music groups, theater companies, and dance ensembles also 
attended the festival to show their support for the Bergama villagers’ resistance against 
goldmining. Affirming their solidarity with the villagers, festival participants frequently 
shouted one of the powerful slogans of the movement: “Everywhere is Bergama, all of us 
are from Bergama!” Underlying this slogan was the mentality expressed by D.T., one of 
the leading movement actors from Bergama:  
Living in the same geography is not the necessary condition for 
participating in this movement. I could be living in Kars [the Eastern most 
province of Turkey] or in İstanbul, and this would still be my problem.  
 
The festival was covered in both the national and the international media (Turkish Daily 
News August 23, 1998, Öncü and Koçan 2001: 36, Reinart 2003:113). 
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On the judicial front, the Bergama case was carried to international milieu on 
September 25, 1998, when nine villagers and the mayor of Bergama applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)57 in Strasbourg, France against the Turkish 
government for violating the applicants’ rights protected under Articles 2, 6, 8, and 13 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, i.e. right 
to life, right to a fair trial, right to respect for private and family life, and right to an 
effective remedy, respectively. 54 year-old G.P. from İzmir, a longtime movement 
supporter and one of the lawyers of the villagers, commented on the application to ECHR 
as follows: 
The Strasbourg Court does not consider eligible for trial every single case 
brought to it. Since the Court has an extensive caseload with thousands of 
applications only those that are deemed significant make it to a hearing 
before the judges. Our case was considered for trial. This created a new 
source of hope for the villagers.  
 
1999 saw significant developments affecting the prospects of goldmining in 
Bergama and the future course of the villagers’ movement. In early 1999 Eurogold 
applied to related ministries to obtain a new permit, claiming that it had taken additional 
                                                 
57 ECHR is an institution of the Council of Europe (COE). COE is an 
international organization established in May 1949 by ten European countries to protect 
and promote human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law. Currently, COE has 
47 member states. In 1950, COE adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention), an international legal instrument 
safeguarding human rights. ECHR was set up in 1959 by the Convention as a mechanism 
to ensure the contracting states’ observance of their obligations under the Convention. 
Complaints against contracting states can be brought to the ECHR either by other 
contracting states or by individual applicants, i.e. individuals, groups of individuals or 
non-governmental organizations, subject to the jurisdiction of a member state. Until 
Protocol No.11 to the Convention, adopted in 1998, made it mandatory the acceptance of 
the right of individual petition was left up to the discretion of the member states. Thus, 
until 1998 individual application to the ECHR was admitted only against those member 
states that accepted it. Turkey, a member of the Council of Europe since August 1949, 
accepted individual application in 1989. 
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measures to minimize the risks associated with goldmining. Upon this request, the Prime 
Minister asked TÜBİTAK, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of 
Turkey58, on March 8, 1999 to reevaluate, in light of the new security measures taken by 
the company, whether or not the risks associated with the investment are acceptable 
(Prime Minister’s Office Circular. 1999. B.02.O.MÜS.0.13.00.00-585).  
In another development, significant in its consequences for the Bergama villagers’ 
movement, Taşkın, the then mayor, lost the local elections of April 1999. In Taşkın’s 
words: 
I served for two terms as the mayor of Bergama, between 1989 and 1999. 
They defeated us in the ’99 elections….Akif Ersezgin comes from a 
respectable family favoring the Republican People’s Party (RPP). As a 
contractor he did USD 100 million worth of construction work for the 
mine….I was the mayor from the RPP and had not decided whether or not 
to run again for the next elections. He came forward and said that he was 
going to nominate his candidacy from the RPP for the elections. How 
could this be? I had already served for ten years and was considering 
leaving my seat to a young successor. But how could I leave my seat to the 
contractor of the mine? I talked to the RPP headquarters. I told them that 
we had been following a certain line as the party. RPP adopted decisions 
in its general party meetings giving primacy to environmental issues. They 
suggested that I nominate my candidacy against his. But I couldn’t 
possibly win because I didn’t prepare accordingly. In my second term of 
service I gave priority to the struggle against goldmining. If I had 
considered nominating for the next elections I would have prepared 
accordingly. Thus, I lost the elections. After that the policy of the 
municipality vis-à-vis the mine changed drastically. The new mayor did 
not care about the struggle at all.   
  
                                                 
58 TÜBİTAK is a governmental agency founded in 1963 with the aim of 
promoting, developing, organizing and coordinating research and development in the 
fields of science and technology in Turkey in line with the national targets of economic 
development and technical progress. TÜBİTAK reports directly to the Prime Minister 
and acts as an advisory agency to the Turkish Government on science and research issues 
(http://www.tubitak.gov.tr). 
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 Concurrently, the strife between leading movement actors, Taşkın and B.Y. 
reached the point of a break, with each accusing the other for weakening the villagers’ 
movement. According to Taşkın, B.Y. supported the construction work that the new 
mayor did for the mine. Taşkın further claimed that B.Y. detracted from the resistance of 
Bergama villagers by mobilizing them to protest against environmental problems faced 
by communities in other towns and cities (Reinart 2003:113-14). B.Y. was also accused 
by D.T., another leading movement actor from Bergama, for placing himself in the center 
of the movement for personal gain. In the words of D.T.:  
[B.Y.] joined the movement for political gain in the first place. He and 
Taşkın were political rivals in the same party. [B.Y.] became active in the 
villagers’ movement when he saw that Taşkın’s influence in the party was 
on the rise in the second half of the 1990s….[B.Y.] wanted to be seen in 
the media. When some movement leaders from the villages came to the 
foreground on several occasions addressing the press he almost chained 
himself to the microphone to dominate the scene. 
   
B.Y., in turn, accused Taşkın of eschewing direct actions. For B.Y., the former 
mayor was seeking media’s attention even though he wasn’t contributing to the actions 
carried out by the villagers (Reinart 2003:113-14). Despite their split, however, Taşkın 
and B.Y. continued to play active roles in the movement, the former promoting the 
villagers’ cause through efforts within the framework of the Bergama Environment, 
Culture, and Arts Association, and the latter assisting the villagers on the action front of 
the movement.   
Meanwhile, in its third shift of capital configuration in April 1999, Eurogold 
changed hands when the Australian partner Normandy Mining Limited acquired the 
shares of INMET, thus becoming the only owner of the mine.   
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Around the same time, “Turkish governmental bodies (including the President) 
and representatives of business began highlighting the necessity for the inclusion of the 
principle of international arbitration for investments into national legislation for further 
liberalization, deregulation and restructuring of the economy, and thereby for foreign 
investment flows” (Çoban 2002:218). Governmental efforts of legislating international 
arbitration faced strong opposition by labor unions, professional associations, and 
environmental organizations before and during the parliamentary proceedings over the 
issue (Çoban 2002). Among the opponents were the Bergama villagers. Amidst protests 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed three constitutional amendments in August 
1999 to prepare the national legislative ground for the prospective adoption of an 
international arbitration law. With the amendments to the Articles 47, 125, and 155 of the 
Constitution, the Assembly accepted international arbitration for the settlement of 
disputes arising from concession conditions and contracts regarding public services; 
allowed for recourse to civil law in drawing up contracts concerning public investments 
and services; limited the scope of administrative law, and as a corollary, bypassed the 
sanction of the Supreme Administrative Court regarding concession contracts (Official 
Gazette, November 9, 1982, No.17863, Law No. 2709, Çoban 2002).  
In October 1999, TÜBİTAK published its assessment report on the risks associated 
with the mine. The report was prepared by a group of eleven scientists in the fields of 
environmental engineering, ecological chemistry, environmental law, hydrogeology, 
geological and geotechnical engineering, geophysics and seismology. Interpreting the 
1997 SAC judgment as a decision questioning the cyanide-leaching method to be 
practiced in the specific case under investigation, rather than a ruling absolutely banning 
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the use of this method, the TÜBİTAK Report stated that, since the onset of the judicial 
procedure on the case, the establishment in question was improved with additional 
environmental safety measures to eliminate the risks identified in the SAC decision. The 
report further held that the production process of the Ovacık Goldmine exemplified the 
currently available state of the art technology; that, as was true for similar goldmines in 
operation in developed countries, cyanide use in Ovacık Goldmine did not pose a threat 
to the environment; that there was not a single incident or environmental problem 
recorded in recent years as having resulted from cyanide use; and that independent of the 
good will of the entrepreneur or the supervision to be carried out, the reliability of the 
establishment was due to the processes employed and the measures taken. Concluding 
that the risks identified in the SAC decision as posing a threat to human life and the 
environment were either completely eliminated or reduced to levels much lower than 
acceptable, the TÜBİTAK Report suggested that the operation of the establishment in 
question, and of similar other establishments under the same circumstances, would 
benefit the country within the framework of sustainable development (TÜBİTAK-
YDABÇAG Değerlendirme Raporu 1999).  
The TÜBİTAK Report was severely criticized by professional associations of 
engineers, environmental non-governmental organizations, and academicians for being 
biased, and misleading due to false information and omissions. 16 professors from the 
Environmental Engineering Department at the September Nine University in İzmir 
asserted that, in its conclusion, the TÜBİTAK Report disregarded the negative effects 
mentioned in its annex; ignored the mining-related accidents in the world; based some of 
its assessments on the assumption of the existence of facilities at the mine site that were 
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not in place; and relied on the information provided by Eurogold (TMMOB 2001:20). In 
addition, a professor at the Public Health Department of the same university denounced 
the report for stating, without consulting a public health expert, that health risks 
associated with mining were eliminated (Cumhuriyet Daily, August 16, 2000).  Another 
point of criticism came from Y.B., a professor of chemical metallurgy at the Technical 
University of İstanbul, with respect to the report’s assertion that ‘the Ovacık Goldmine 
exemplified the currently available state of the art technology’. According to Y.B.:  
The biggest deception in gold mining is that technology is not utilized to 
its fullest extent. There is no establishment in this industry that employs 
state of the art technology….Technologies are available that would not 
harm the environment or keep the damage to a minimum, even with the 
use of cyanide. But these technologies are not utilized. Why? Due to 
economic reasons. They spare the best technology because this would cost 
them more than the current technology they’re using.  
 
Thus, for critics, the TÜBİTAK Report was prepared in support of the company’s views 
and interests. As such, it was a custom-made, political document, rather than a scientific 
assessment report.  
In a separate development on November 25, 1999 the Ankara District Court 
dismissed the villagers’ action for damages that was brought to court in January 1998. 
The lawyers of the villagers appealed the decision of dismissal to the Court of Cassation. 
The accelerated lobbying efforts of Eurogold, starting in the early 1999, did not 
remain limited to contacts with the government to obtain new permits but also extended 
to the villages. In a renewed public relations campaign the company gave boost to its 
attempts of convincing the locals of its goodwill, the effectiveness of the environmental 
safety measures taken, and the potential benefits of the prospective mining undertaking. 
To illustrate, during Ramadan in December 1999 Eurogold gave a feast in Bergama. This 
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was followed by the company’s invitation of the village leaders on a trip to Spain to 
observe a goldmine in operation. All but one village leader turned down this offer. The 
villagers put pressure on the village leader who was sympathetic to the offer not to accept 
the invitation. They reminded him that he was elected by the villagers and threatened to 
overthrow him from leadership if he went on the trip with the company. Thus, the village 
leader was convinced not to go (Reinart 2003:121-22). In another move, the company, 
officially referred to as Normandy since early 2000, distributed calendars in Bergama. 
Printed on the calendars were pictures of Atatürk, the revered founder of the Republic, 
along with his statement on the importance for the country of exploiting natural resources 
(Milliyet Daily, January 10, 2000).   
In its efforts to obtain new operation permits Normandy was also assisted by the 
diplomatic interference of Australian government representatives. In this context, the 
Australian Minister of Industry, Science and Natural Resources, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and Minister of Environment sent letters to their Turkish counterparts on January 
21, February 17, and February 21, 2000, respectively, asking for their assistance in 
granting an operation permit to Normandy (TMMOB 2001:18-19, Reinart 2003:131-
132).   
Meanwhile, on February 16, 2000 the villagers, along with their animals, marched 
in protest from the mine site to Bergama to call attention to the recent mining-related 
environmental disaster in Romania (Milliyet Daily, February 17, 2000). In what was 
called the worst disaster since Chernobyl, the tailings dam of the goldmine in Baia Mare, 
Romania broke to spill cyanide into the Tizsa River, a tributary of the Danube River, 
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killing fish and other wildlife, and contaminating drinking water sources (Argeseanu 
2004). 
In parallel to Normandy’s attempts to obtain a new permit and to the diplomatic 
interference of the Australian government authorities on behalf of the company the 
Turkish government focused on clearing the obstacles at the administrative level. The 
Prime Minister’s Office asked the Ministry of Environment for its view on the operation 
of the Ovacık Goldmine. Based on the conclusions of the controversial TÜBİTAK Report 
the Ministry expressed its favorable opinion on January 31, 2000. On April 5, 2000, the 
Prime Minister’s Office issued a circular, emphasizing that the mining undertaking in 
Bergama was foreign investment, and in case it was blocked, Turkey would have to pay 
compensation to the entrepreneur according to the requirements of International 
Arbitration, which, in turn, would have a discouraging effect on prospective inflows of 
foreign capital (Evrensel Daily, June 14, 2000). The circular then asked the Ministries of 
Interior, of Health, of Public Works, of Energy and Natural Resources, of Forests, and of 
Environment to reconsider their decisions pertaining to the operation of the Ovacık 
Goldmine in Bergama, having regard to the conclusions of the TÜBİTAK Report, which 
stated that the risk factors mentioned in the SAC decision were eliminated; to the 
Ministry of Environment’s favorable opinion; and to the opinion of the President’s 
Administration, which pointed out the economic importance of the investment in question 
(Prime Minister’s Office Circular. 2000. B.02.O.MÜS.0.13.00.00-263).  
G.P., a longtime movement supporter and one of the lawyers of the villagers, 
commented on the administration’s course of action as follows:  
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Through protests and demonstrations of the villagers and the struggle on 
the legal front we had the company cornered. They came to the point 
where they couldn’t move a bit. It was then when the fraudulent moves of 
our public administration started. We call this circumvention. The Prime 
Minister’s Office issued a circular in 2000…We realized that it was a part 
of the scenario: The Prime Minister asks TÜBİTAK for a report; TÜBİTAK 
sends some experts here; they do some observation on the mine site for 
two days, and prepare a report favorable for the operation of the mine; 
based on that report the company asks the government to restart the EIA 
process and grant a permit. But the Prime Minister’s Office realizes that 
the whole EIA process would take time so they skip it and issue a circular 
addressed to the relevant ministries, instead. Based on that circular the 
permits of the company were renewed….There was one thing for us to do 
in this case: bring the circular to court. That’s what we did. 
 
Reasoning that the Prime Minister’s circular had no legal basis, eighteen residents 
of Bergama applied to court for the annulment of the circular.  
 Upon the request of the sub-provincial governor of Bergama, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office in Bergama initiated an investigation on 80 villagers in September 
2000 for establishing illegal commissions and village committees under the pretext of 
environmentalism, and for carrying out protest demonstrations. The file was sent to the 
Office of the Attorney General at the State Security Court59 in İzmir, which returned the 
file back to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Bergama on the grounds of lack of 
evidence, and asked for the testimonies of the villagers under investigation (Cumhuriyet 
Daily, September 6, 2000). E.S., one of the legal representatives of the villagers since the 
beginning of the movement, applied to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Bergama and the 
Office of the Attorney General at the State Security Court in İzmir, to request his 
inclusion in the investigation along with the villagers. Stating that he attended countless 
                                                 
59 State Security Courts (SSC) were established by the 1980 junta, and instituted 
in the 1982 Constitution, as courts with jurisdiction over ‘crimes against the state’. SSC 
were formally abolished in June 2004, as part of the political reforms passed in an 
attempt to meet the European Union’s criteria for Turkey's accession.  
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meetings and panels at home and abroad as a speaker in support of the villagers, went to 
the villages to give his clients legal advise, and attended colloquia on civil disobedience 
to better serve the villagers, E.S. reported himself as guilty of the same crime as the 
villagers, and requested that an investigation be initiated on him, as well. Similarly, 
representatives of the Union of Turkish Engineers’ and Architects’ Chambers visited the 
villages to express their support to the villagers in their struggle against goldmining, and 
announced that they all were members of the same ‘illegal organization’ as the villagers 
were alleged to belong to (Evrensel Daily, September 17, 2000).  
The villagers continued their protests and demonstrations despite allegations of 
establishing illegal organizations. In November 2000, 62 villagers, along with B.Y. who 
organized the event, walked from Bergama to the province of Çanakkale. The symbolic 
value of this action stemmed from the significance of Çanakkale as the front where the 
Battle of Çanakkale was fought and won against the Allies during the First World War. 
The Battle of Çanakkale laid the grounds for the Turkish War of Independence against 
allied occupation in the aftermath of the world war. Covering 20-30 miles a day the 
villagers walked for eight straight days. Along the way the marchers were encouraged 
and logistically supported by farmers who provided them produce from their fields, and 
by restaurant- and storeowners who offered them food and drinks. At the entrance of 
Çanakkale a large crowd greeted the villagers with cheers and flowers. With copies of 
court decisions hanging down on their neck the villagers visited the War Memorial, and 
paid tribute to the fallen soldiers, as well as to Atatürk, the commander of the Battle of 
Çanakkale and the founder of the Republic (Reinart 2003:132-133).  
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In the early 2001 Normandy increased its activities on the mine site and started 
taking job applications. Around three thousand people from surrounding villages walked 
to the mine site one night in March with torches in their hands, and marched around the 
mine in protest (Reinart 2003:138).  
The mine officially started its operations on April 13, 2001 for a one-year period 
of trial production, on the basis of new permits granted to the company in the aftermath 
of the circular issued by the Prime Minister’s Office in April 2000.  
Shortly after the official commencement of the mining operations, on June 1, 
2001, the İzmir Administrative Court gave its judgment on the request by movement 
activists for the judicial review of the 2000 circular. The Court annulled the circular, 
ruling that “the transaction subject to this case [the 2000 circular], changed in practice the 
final judgment of the court  [the 1997 SAC decision]. This situation is clearly against the 
principle of the rule of law” (İzmir First Administrative Court, File No. 2000/896, 
Decision No. 2001/485, dated 06/01/2001). The Prime Minister’s Office appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial review.  
Following the Administrative Court’s decision, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and 
his Democratic Left Party engaged in a campaign of promoting goldmining as the 
solution to the country’s economic problems. In a report released to the media, Ecevit 
stated that goldmining would help Turkey overcome her existing economic crisis60 and 
provide the country with a steady and lasting source of income (Milliyet Daily, June 30, 
2001). The Prime Minister announced that Turkey had 400 billion dollars worth of gold 
                                                 
60 The Turkish economy saw an economic crisis in 2001. The economy shrank by 
nine percent, investments fell, bankruptcies and unemployment exploded, and state 
indebtedness reached the alarming level of 150 percent of GNP (Keyder 2004:75).     
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reserves and could generate 15 billion dollars of annual export revenue if those reserves 
were to be exploited (Milliyet Daily, June 30, 2001). Ecevit also stated that the 1997 SAC 
decision negatively affected the inflow of foreign capital and the prestige of Turkey 
(TMMOB 2001:20). Beside its emphasis on the economic potential of gold extraction, 
the Prime Minister’s report included a claim discrediting the Bergama villagers’ 
movement against goldmining as being provoked by Germany, through German non-
profit organizations supporting the movement, to uphold her own economic interests. 
According to Erol Al and Hasan Özgöbek, members of parliament from the Democratic 
Left Party, the resistance against goldmining in Bergama, carried out under the banner of 
public health and environmental protection, was backed by the German FoodFirst 
Information and Action Network (FIAN). Al and Özgöbek argued that German 
foundations supported the campaigns against goldmining in Turkey because, as the 
world’s second largest manufacturer of golden jewelry, Turkey imported 800 million 
dollars worth of gold from Germany each year (Milliyet Daily, June 30, 2001).  
Meanwhile, as part of the political maneuver to facilitate the inflow of foreign 
capital, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed the International Arbitration Law 
on June 21, 2001, based on the constitutional amendments enacted in 1999. International 
Arbitration Law extended the scope of arbitration beyond disputes arising from public 
service concession contracts and conditions to apply to any dispute regarding foreign 
investments (Çoban 2002:219). Among other conditions for an investment to qualify as 
having a foreign element, the new law stated, “if at least one of the partners of the 
company….has brought in foreign capital in line with the legislation for the 
encouragement of foreign capital” that party would be entitled to international arbitration 
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as the means of dispute settlement (Official Gazette. July 05, 2001. No. 24453, Law No. 
4686, Article 2 §3). Thus, the International Arbitration Law qualified Normandy as a 
party to international arbitration.   
In another development favorable to Normandy, on July 26, 2001, the Supreme 
Administrative Court decided to suspend the execution of the lower court’s (İzmir 
Administrative Court) judgment of June 1, which annulled the Prime Minister’s circular 
of 2000. In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court reasoned that the transaction 
subject to the case (the circular) did not constitute an enforceable decision and was not 
open to appeal before the administrative courts  (European Court of Human Rights 
Judgment, 10 November 2004, 46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: D. 49).  
In August 2001, Necip Hablemitoğlu, a professor of Turkish History at the 
Ankara University, published a book, titled “German Foundations and the Bergama 
Case”. Hablemitoğlu’s book was based on the same claim as that recently advocated by 
the government. In his book, Hablemitoğlu argued that behind the Bergama resistance 
was German foundations working against the interests of Turkey. According to 
Hablemitoğlu, it was in the best interest of Germany if Turkey did not extract gold 
because “ each year Turkey spends over 2 billion dollars of her scarce resources just to 
meet her demand for gold. More than half of Turkey’s gold imports come from 
Germany…Germany’s income from her sale of gold to Turkey reaches 2 billion dollars 
[including illegal transactions by gold smugglers]. This is an indispensable figure, even 
for Germany. The essence of the “Bergama Case” rests upon these monetary facts” 
(Hablemitoğlu 2001:67). Hablemitoğlu’s book was widely distributed for free by 
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Normandy61. The book had a serious negative impact on the movement, leading to public 
skepticism about the underlying motive of Bergama villagers’ protests against the mine. 
In the words of E.S., a long term legal representative of the villagers: 
Hablemitoğlu, a professor at the Ankara University and an influential 
figure at the intelligence agency, first started doing research on the 
foundations associated with German political parties, and writing on their 
activities in Turkey. Then he was introduced to the company, which led 
him to incorporate the Bergama Case in his book on German Foundations. 
Allegedly, three other movement participants and I were German spies. 
According to his claim, Germany had a lot of gold and didn’t want any 
other country to extract their own gold instead of importing from 
Germany. Since we supposedly worked for Germany we prevented 
goldmining in Bergama. His book was full of lies…But it left a mark in 
people’s minds: Are they really German spies? Do they really get paid by 
Germany to protest against goldmining? This struck a blow at the 
movement. It was a state-sponsored move.  
 
 The villagers strongly reacted to the allegations, which were especially hard for 
them to take as proud Aegeans who played a defining role in the outcome of the Turkish 
War of Independence. They had successfully fought against the enemy but now they were 
being accused of acting against Turkish interests alongside the enemy as it was presented 
in Hablemitoğlu’s book. In that respect, Reinart (2003) reported a villager complaining: 
“They treat us as if we’re the enemy. We are not the enemy. We are just defending our 
rights to life, based on our country’s laws. How did it come about that our soldiers got to 
guard the mine against us?” (p.142). This sense of resentment was shared by I.A., a 55 
year-old villager and adamant movement activist:  
Our movement was successful because we put our hearts into it. We put 
effort in it from deep inside. We protested, believing in the cause of our 
struggle. If you were to hire people, and send them out to protest they 
                                                 
61 During the visit of the mine within the framework of this study, a copy of the  
book was given to me by the Public Relations Department of Koza, the company 
currently operating the mine. 
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would fail. We walked to Çanakkale for eight days, the soles of our feet 
bleeding on the way. It didn’t stop us. We continued walking. This is a 
matter of conviction. Would you walk for eight straight days if I paid you? 
It’s not an easy undertaking!  
 
Similarly, T.D., a 52 year-old female villager and leading movement activist stated in an 
interview she gave to a newspaper: 
Unlike some others, the Bergama villagers are not remote-controlled TVs. 
Instead of looking for new excuses Normandy should stop ignoring court 
decisions and leave our lands. We had been struggling for eleven years to 
keep Bergama alive, to keep our lands from dying (Evrensel Daily, July 1, 
2001). 
 
Interpreting the allegation of ‘German provocation’ as a despicable attack on the 
movement, B.Y., a 62 year-old movement activist from Bergama asked: 
Our struggle is confirmed by the high courts of the Republic of Turkey. 
There are final court decisions. Were our honorable judges also paid by 
Germans to take those decisions? (BIA Haber Merkezi, July 2, 2001) 
  
Meanwhile, ongoing operations at the mine and constant explosions produced 
negative effects in the villages. On her visit to the villages in August 2001, Reinart 
(2003) reported the villagers’ complaints as follows:  
An old man in the coffeehouse complained: 
- Three or four times a day they explode dynatimes underground. A fine, 
sticky layer of dust covers the leaves of tobacco and olive. Our tobacco 
shriveled and died. Olives dried out as they just turned from blossom to 
fruit. The explosions diverted the groundwater. Our waters first turned 
turbid, then receded. Our wells dried out.   
….Another villager interjected:  
- Our cows have miscarriages. A dozen of calves were born either still or 
defective.  
- Did you not experience such incidents before? I asked.  
- Professor, replied a thin, tall villager. Our cows are Holstein…These are 
healthy and valuable animals. They miscarry because of the explosions; 
they give birth to defective calves. 
An old man pulled up his shirt and showed me his breast covered with red spots.  
- I’m seventy years old. For the first time in my life am I having such a 
skin rash. 
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...Sabahat Gökçeoğlu said:  
- We no longer have birds flying around. We find dead bodies of birds 
here and there. Birds used to chirp in this region at all times. 
 …Gülder Barlas from Ovacık:   
- We can’t sleep at night…They explode dynamites three times at night. In 
the middle of the night we wake up to an earthquake. We realize it’s not 
an earthquake but they explode dynamites again…Why do they do it at 
night? Why are they allowed to do this? We can’t sleep. We’re scared. 
Where can we go? We’re very upset.  
…[In another coffeehouse] ‘How are you?’ I asked. Silence. Then:  
- How can we be? said a 75 year-old man, we’re left alone with the Angel 
of Death…How could the state leave us all alone like this? (Pp.141-44).    
 
Concurrently, Normandy placed job advertisements in the newspapers. Due to the 
negative effects of the economic crisis and the concomitant upsurge in unemployment 
some villagers applied to work for the mine. H.N., a 45 year-old villager, who continue to 
this day struggling against the mine, interpreted the employment choice of some of the 
former activists as follows:  
They work for the mine because of economic necessity. If economic 
conditions were favorable the mine wouldn’t be operating now. It played 
into the hands of the company that farmers no longer were able to make 
enough money off the land. 
 
The account by K.M., 44 year-old villager and long-time movement activist, was along 
the same lines: 
What can they do? They bowed to economic pressure. I’m not judging 
them. They participated in the struggle against the mine along with me but 
economic conditions forced them to work for the mine. If court decisions 
had been enforced none of these would have happened. 
 
I.A., a 55 year-old villager and adamant movement activist, commented: 
Since five years, agriculture doesn’t provide enough income to make a 
decent living. This had a great impact on people’s decision to work for the 
mine…. There have always been some among us who we didn’t trust. We 
thought of them as likely to switch sides any time. It was not them who 
disappointed us. Some of those who we trusted a great deal left us over 
time for money. Either by way of employment or by selling their land to 
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the company. We lost very dependable people for money.….. It was 
money that spoiled and divided us.      
 
A positive development for the villagers came on September 25, 2001 when the 
Court of Cassation overturned the 1999 dismissal of the Ankara District Court in the 
action for damages against the Prime Minister, the Minister of Environment, the Minister 
of Energy and Natural Resources, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Public Works, 
and the provincial governor of İzmir for not enforcing a final court judgment. The case 
had been brought to the Ankara District Court in 1998. When this court had dismissed the 
case in 1999, the lawyers of the villagers had appealed the decision to the Court of 
Cassation. In its judgment, the Court of Cassation stated: “It is established that the court’s 
judgment [October 15, 1997 İzmir First Administrative Court’s decision of annulling the 
Ministry of Environment’s operation permit] was sent by the Ministry of Environment to 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry 
of Health, the Office of the Provincial Governor of İzmir, and the İzmir Regional 
Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, on October 23, 1997, and 
that these authorities were asked to act in line with the said court judgment. Although the 
involved parties were duly notified of the judgment the defendants, except for the 
Minister of Environment İmren Aykut, failed to act within the statutory time limit in a 
manner as to prevent gold extraction with cyanide leaching method. Thus, it is found, 
they did not enforce the court’s judgment….It is hereby acknowledged that, through their 
unjust action [non-enforcement of the court rule], the defendants, with the exception of 
İmren Aykut, violated the individual rights of the applicants” (Court of Cassation Fourth 
Chamber, File No. 2001/3884, Decision No. 2001/8478, dated September 25, 2001). The 
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Court of Cassation remitted the case to the Ankara District Court, which followed the 
judgment of the former and sentenced the defendants to pay compensation to the 
applicants (Ankara Fifth District Court, Decision No. 2002/353-711, dated 10/16/2002).     
Judicial successes of the villagers continued into 2002. On January 10, 2002, the 
İzmir Third Administrative Court suspended the execution of the permit that had been 
granted to Normandy by the Ministry of Health on December 22, 2000, following the 
publication of the TÜBİTAK Report and the issuance of the circular by the Prime 
Minister’s Office. This judgment was followed by the decision of the İzmir First 
Administrative Court on January 23, 2002 to suspend the execution of the permit issued 
to Normandy by the Directorate General of Forests on October 6, 2000. In their 
judgments, both courts ruled: “the transaction subject to this case changed in practice the 
final judicial decision [the 1997 SAC decision]. This situation is clearly against the 
principle of the rule of law” (İzmir Third Administrative Court, File No. 2001/401, dated 
01/10/2002; İzmir First Administrative Court, File No. 2001/239, dated 01/23/2002). The 
defendants’ request for judicial review of both decisions was rejected at the İzmir 
Regional Administrative Court on the grounds that the permits in question were clearly 
against the law and that in case of enforcement they would cause irreparable damage 
(European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 46117/99 [2004] 
ECHR 621:D.55-56).  
Meanwhile, in the fourth change of capital configuration since 1989, the mine 
changed hands in February 2002 when the US-based Newmont Mining Corporation 
(Newmont) acquired Normandy. Along with Normandy, Newmont acquired the Canadian 
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Franco-Nevada Mining Corporation Ltd., thus becoming the world’s largest gold 
producer. 
For the villagers and other movement actors, all of these capital-related changes 
in the company operating the mine were part of a game played by the corporate mining 
industry all around the world. Thus, P.A. a 64 year-old villager and movement activist 
stated:  
As much as they seem to operate as different companies under different 
names they constitute in fact one and the same big industry. They agree 
among each other. Not only do they exploit the natural resources of less-
developed countries but also mess their environment, and then disappear, 
leaving them with irreparable damage. 
 
In the words of Taşkın, the former mayor:  
The trick of this industry is that the constituent companies repeatedly shed 
their skin so you can’t find the perpetrator. The environment is left 
polluted and damaged but no one is there to take any responsibility. Such 
is the game.  
 
H.N., a 45 year-old villager and long time movement activist, made the same 
comment, backing it with a personal experience:  
I was a member of the Village Governing Committee then. After a name 
change they came to the village to meet us. The managing director of the 
company said that they don’t harm the environment with their operations. 
I told him that we live very close to the mine, and that their regular 
dynamite explosions crack the walls of our houses.  
  -  The problem doesn’t stem from our operations, he said.  
  -  The office of the village leader and the wedding hall are  
  adjacent buildings. The wall combining the two buildings  
has a big crack now. How did it happen? Did I do it? I 
asked.   
  -  We didn’t do it; Eurogold did, he responded. 
 -  Well, who are you?  
 -  We’re Newmont. 
The new company will take over where the previous company leaves off, 
and if a problem arises in the future the previous company will be blamed 
for it. Since nobody will own the problem it will be left unsolved. Even if 
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people die as a result, no one will take responsibility. What I experienced 
was indicative of this game. 
 
Following the latest judgments of the İzmir Administrative Court suspending the 
permits of the company, the villagers were once again hopeful that the mine would be 
closed. However, by March 2002, the mine was still continuing its operations although 
the statutory limit to enforce the said judicial decisions had passed. I.A., a 55 year-old 
villager and adamant movement activist, complained: 
We brought to court the permit issued by the Ministry of Health. We won 
the case in 2002. They gave us a piece of paper, stating that we won. What 
in the world am I supposed to do with this piece of paper? If we won then 
do as the judgment says. We win on paper but we don’t see anything in 
practice.  
 
On March 1, 2002 a group of villagers went to Ankara, the capital, to protest the 
Ministry of Health for not enforcing the judgment of the İzmir Third Administrative 
Court. When they were not let into the building to talk to the Undersecretary of the 
Minister the villagers carried out a sit-in demonstration in front of the building, shouting  
slogans, like “Either close down the goldmine or the courts!” and “We are the people, we 
are right, we are going to win!”. A group of protestors were eventually let in as 
representatives of the villagers. However, the representative group did not get to talk to 
the Undersecretary because, they were told, the Undersecretary was at a meeting. 
Hanging a copy of the court judgment and a padlock at the door of the Undersecretary’s 
Office the villagers declared their determination to see the mine closed (Evrensel Daily, 
March 2, 2002).  
In another demonstration on March 7, 2002, over two hundred villagers from four 
villages surrounding the mine gathered at a village square, and walked to the mine to 
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notify the company of the judgment of the İzmir First Administrative Court, which 
suspended the permit issued by the General Directorate of Forests. The demonstrators 
were halted at the gate of the mine by the gendarmerie for “not having the permit to go 
in”. Pointing at the mine, the villagers responded: “Neither do they!” (Evrensel Daily, 
March 8, 2002).      
As a countermove against the villagers’ actions, Newmont organized a pro-mining 
demonstration in Bergama on March, 26 2002. With their helmets on their heads and 
bread in their hands the miners, their spouses and children walked to the town square, 
carrying placards that read: ‘Don’t Touch Our Job, Our Bread!’, ‘If There Is No Bread 
There Is No Peace!”, “Don’t Close The Mine!”. In his speech addressing the crowd at the 
town square, a management representative of Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası – Maden-
İş (Mineworkers’ Union of Turkey), which the workers of the goldmine in Bergama 
belonged to, stated that the Bergama Ovacık Goldmine employed environmentally 
sensitive technology, provided jobs and bread to 700 people, and contributed to the 
national economy at large. The union representative called for the continuation of the 
mine’s operations to serve the interests of the union workers as well as the interests of the 
nation as a whole (Kuzey Ege Daily, March 26, 2002).  
Interpreting Newmont’s strategy as an attempt to weaken the villagers’ movement 
by pitting mineworkers against movement activists62, I.A. a 55 year-old villager and 
adamant movement activist, stated: 
                                                 
62 The divide between mineworkers and movement activists took a deadly turn in 
August 2002 when members of the same family got into an argument over their differing 
views on the mine, which led a family member working for the mine shoot dead another 
who was active in the resistance against the mine.  
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They have no decency. All they have is money. They go to great length to 
divide people. Divide and conquer, like the American political strategy.  
 
The same day as the mineworkers’ demonstration in Bergama, a group of 
villagers held a protest in İstanbul, blocking traffic on the Bosphorus Bridge and calling 
for the enforcement of court decisions (Reinart 2003:145).  
The Ministry of Health sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Governor of 
İzmir on March 28, 2002, asking the latter to relay the decision of the İzmir Third 
Administrative Court to the authorities at the Ovacık Goldmine by April 3, 2002 at latest.  
On March 29, 2002, Newmont was officially notified of the İzmir Third 
Administrative Court’s decision to suspend the mine’s permit, and expected to cease its 
operations as sanctioned by law. The same day, the Council of Ministers adopted a 
“decision of principle”, asserting that the Ovacık Goldmine in Bergama should continue 
its activities. The decision was not made public (European Court of Human Rights 
Judgment, 10 November 2004, 46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: D.75).  
In another development on the same day, a Research Commission on Mining, 
established by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), visited the goldmine. 
Finding out about the visit of the commission, 1500 villagers from ten villages in the 
close vicinity of the mine gathered in a nearby village and proceeded toward the mine in 
an attempt to talk to the members of the TGNA Commission. When they were stopped by 
the gendarmerie the villagers held a sit-in demonstration, shouting slogans against the 
mine and calling for the enforcement of judicial decisions (Evrensel Daily, March 30, 
2002).      
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Back and Forth Between Hope and Despair 
They wait for months to close the mine. It takes them an hour to reopen it. 
They shut it down only to open it again in an hour.  
H.N., 45 year-old villager and movement activist 
The mine was officially closed on April 2, 2002, on the basis of the decisions of 
the İzmir Third and First Administrative Courts to suspend its permits. The next day, the 
mine was opened on the grounds of the “decision of principle” of the Council of 
Ministers.  
On April 9, 2002, the İzmir Bar took the Council of Ministers’ Decision of 
Principle (CMDP) to court for violating the Constitution and the principle of the rule of 
law. In a separate case, the Bar filed a lawsuit against the members of the Council of 
Ministers for obstructing the enforcement of judicial decisions.  
In the case for the annulment of the CMDP the Supreme Administrative Court 
(SAC) dismissed the Bar’s application on the grounds that “the decision subject to the 
case is not included in the application file and it is not clear what the case is about…” 
(Supreme Administrative Court, File No. 2002/1477, Decision No. 2002/2738, dated 
May 13, 2002).  
Following the SAC’s decision of dismissal the İzmir Bar asked the Office of the 
Prime Minister for a copy of the CMDP. When the Bar was told that the decision in 
question could be obtained from the Office of the Sub-provincial Governor of Bergama 
the Bar wrote to the latter. In its reply letter, the Office of the Sub-provincial Governor of 
Bergama stated that their office did not have the requested decision but it might be 
available at the Office of the Provincial Governor of İzmir or yet higher offices. 
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In the face of all attempts the İzmir Bar failed to get hold of a copy of the CMDP. 
The Bar still took the case to court, however, based on the information at hand. In its 
decision on July 30, 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) once again dismissed 
the case, repeating its reasoning in the previous dismissal judgment. On October 6, 2002, 
the İzmir Bar appealed the SAC’s second dismissal decision.  
C.U., a lawyer from Bergama and one of the legal representatives of the villagers, 
recounted the judicial battle revolving around the CMDP as follows: 
They made up a Council of Ministers’ Decision that had no legal 
basis whatsoever. They called it the Council of Ministers’ Decision of 
Principle. Law comprises of norms. It is clearly stated in the Constitution 
and the statutes how these norms are to be carried out and how they will 
duly take effect. For a Council of Ministers’ Decision to have legal basis it 
has got to be signed by all ministers and the President, and published in 
the Official Gazette. Only when all of these conditions are met can we talk 
about a Council of Ministers’ Decision. Otherwise it’s legally nonexistent.  
We ask the Governor: 
- Will you show us this decision? 
  -  It’s a decision of principle. It’s confidential. I can’t show  
    it to you. 
-  What’s the number and the date of the Official Gazette it     
                                                    was published in? 
    -   I don’t know. 
  We write to Ankara.  
- Will you give us a copy of the decision? 
   Silence.  
We failed to find it but still took the case to court. 
-  Honorable Court! They’re talking about a decision. We   
want it to be cancelled but they won’t give it to us. Will 
you find it for us?  
We had to deal with such trickeries of the administration. 
Eventually we got hold of the decision. Months later the Office of the 
Prime Minister sent us a copy. 
 
It was only when the European Court of Human Rights asked for a copy of the 
document to be examined as part of the Bergama case proceedings that the villagers’ 
 187
lawyers were able to obtain the Council of Ministers’ decision. In their “decision of 
principle” the Council of Ministers stated: 
…[I]t has been established that [the Bergama Ovacık Goldmine] is a 
mining concern…,which provides employment for 362 persons and is 
worth 1,200 million US dollars in added value to our country, including 
280 million US dollars of direct revenue…..[T]he decision to be taken in 
respect of this investment is of some importance, in that it will pave the 
way for six other goldmines….[According to the TÜBİTAK Report of 
October 1999] ‘the suspected risks to human health and the environment 
have been completely removed or reduced to levels considerably lower 
than the acceptable limits’….[C]yanide leaching process….can be applied 
without damage to human health provided that the necessary precautions 
are taken…[T]he cyanide leaching process described in the 1991 
environmental impact report …has been discontinued. Advanced 
technology is now in place….For the above reasons, and bearing in mind 
their contribution to the country’s economy, it is considered advisable that 
the gold and silver mining concerns in the vicinity of Ovacık and Çamköy, 
in the district of Bergama (İzmir), ….should continue their activities 
(European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 
46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: D.75).            
 
Amidst this political-legal imbroglio, Newmont focused its lobbying efforts on the 
Turkish government for the adoption of a new Mining Law that would enable the 
company to continue its mining operations without any judicial obstructions in the future.  
The villagers’ movement took another blow in October 2002 when the Chief 
Prosecutor of the State Security Court, the court dealing with crimes against the state, 
brought formal charges against fifteen people, among them four leading figures of the 
Bergama resistance movement, for forming a secret alliance with German foundations 
against the interests of Turkey, and engaging in espionage activities. The prosecutor took 
the allegations in Hablemitoğlu’s book as evidence for this case. For B.Y., a 62 year-old 
movement actor from Bergama, who was one of the indicted, everything was plain and 
simple:  
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They take the money and disappear, leaving us with death. And those of 
us who oppose this arrangement get conveniently labelled as traitors.  
 
On March 4, 2003, the defendants were acquitted on all charges but the public’s image of 
the villagers’ resistance remained tainted by the allegations.  
On February 12, 2004 the Ministry of Environment and Forests63 extended the 
permit concerning the mine’s chemical processing unit and waste pond for a period of 
three years (European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 46117/99 
[2004] ECHR 621: D.68).  
Meanwhile, an analysis of water samples from the region, carried out in April 
2004, revealed high levels of arsenic. A group of scientists in the Department of 
Chemistry at the Aegean University in İzmir took samples from two drinking water 
sources, and three artesian wells in the affected area. The analysis, carried out in the lab 
of the Faculty of Sciences at the Aegean University, revealed that the two drinking water 
samples contained high levels of arsenic – one 25 times, the other 23 times higher than 
the highest permitted level. For the three artesian well samples, the arsenic levels proved 
to be 13, 12, 9 times higher than permitted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
adopted as the water standard in Turkey. F.R., one of the scientists in the group that 
performed the analysis pointed out that they were only able to check the arsenic levels in 
their samples, and suggested “ it would be best if water samples were checked for levels 
of all heavy metals because if they contain arsenic, they definitely contain other metals, 
too, going through the same process”.  
                                                 
63 In May 2003, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Forests were 
combined to form the Ministry of Environment and Forests.  
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The villagers interviewed for this study expressed that since the mine started its 
operations in 2001 many in the surrounding villages stopped drinking tap water. 45 year-
old H.N., a villager and unyielding movement activist, stated:  
I don’t drink water from the faucet. Even by the taste of it you can tell it’s 
not clean. I buy bottled water. Before I leave the house to go off to the 
field I drink 2-3 glasses of bottled water so I won’t get thirsty soon. Later, 
when I get thirsty I go to the store and buy water. 
 
In the same vein, K.M., a 44 year-old villager and movement activist, conveyed: 
We have a fountain here, right next to the coffeehouse but we don’t drink 
of it. We buy bottled water instead. 
 
 O.G. is a 42 year-old villager who worked for the mine for eight years but was 
laid off two years ago when he got sick with spleen failure. He is among the villagers 
who don’t trust the quality of the water: 
I don’t drink tap water. I don’t believe it is safe. The quality of the water 
changed visibly. You wash your hands and face in the water and it leaves 
a sticky residue. How can you drink such water? …In the mine they don’t 
use tap water. Everybody drinks bottled water. Tap water is not used for 
cooking, either. Only dishes are done under water from the faucet. 
  
 I.A., a 55 year-old villager and movement activist, expressed the grievances of the 
villagers as follows: 
At least 30 percent of the people in our village drink bottled water. But not 
everyone’s budget allows them to buy water. We live in the village. You 
may have to do this in İstanbul but drinking bottled water is a luxury for 
someone living in the village. There are ten artesian wells in this plateau. 
In the past, you could drink from any one of your choice but this is no 
longer the case. We can’t drink water from those wells anymore. I work in 
the field. If you consume two liters of water a day I consume five. But we 
can’t drink water on the field. Water contamination affected us greatly. 
We’re very troubled in this regard. 
 
Calling attention to the contradictory results of different analyses, H.N. stated: 
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The university came and said: ‘There’s arsenic in your waters’. Then came  
the authorities from the Health Directorate of the town and analyzed the 
water. Their reports said that our water is cleaner than bottled water. 
 
 I.A. explained the contradiction as follows: 
   
  Well, there is biological analysis and chemical analysis. Chemical analysis  
can’t be carried out here in Bergama. It can only be done at certain 
universities. What the government does is biological analysis. They only 
check the water for bacteria. They can’t tell whether there is arsenic in the 
water because they can’t do chemical analysis. It costs some 2,5 billion 
[Turkish Lira], they say. We don’t have that kind of money. The 
university carried out that analysis on its own resources. Of course we will 
believe the university. We have to, because those professors who wrote 
the report firmly defended their results. I went to the Office of the Sub-
provincial Governor in Bergama with the professors. The sub-provincial 
governor told them that their analysis is incorrect. The professors stood 
behind their signatures, and challenged the sub-provincial governor to sue 
them. He couldn’t do it. If you claim that these guys incite the people to 
protest against the mine by issuing incorrect reports, then sue them! But he 
didn’t do so. Who would you believe in this case? I was there to witness 
this conversation….[A former high ranking official at the Health 
Directorate of the town] told me: ‘The mine carries out its own analysis. 
We only stamp it. There’s pressure from above. The state approves of the 
mine’. He said they never did any analysis themselves. Then, of course, 
the company shows the stamped document and says: ‘Look, I have the 
approval of the state!’  
 
The problem I.A. pointed out concerning the state’s reliance on and blind 
acceptance of water quality data as the company measures and presents them is 
corroborated when two sets of measures are juxtaposed with regard to cyanide in the 
wastewater discharged to the tailings pond. The following table (Table 2) reveals the 
arresting disparity between the figures reported to the state and those actually measured 
by the company.  
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   July 15, 2002  12.6 0.31 
August 2, 2002     1.94 0.68 
August 4, 2002    1.2 0.44 
August 5, 2002 1 0.36 
August 6, 2002 2 0.12 
August 7, 2002     1.88 0.55 
 





The lobbying efforts of Newmont for unobstructed continuation of its mining 
operations bore fruit with the enactment of the Mining Law on May 26, 2004, followed 
by the passage of the amendment to the Value Added Tax (VAT) Law on July 16, 2004. 
The new Mining Law rescinded the Mining Fund fees applied to mining activities on 
forest lease lands; laid the ground for the expropriation of private property if it is deemed 
critical by the investor to carry out its mining activities; and reduced the royalties to be 
paid to the state. The law not only adopted direct incentives to encourage mining 
investments but also paved the way for mining in previously protected areas, including 
forests, national parks, agricultural lands, pastures, and watersheds, by curbing the 
restrictions imposed on mining activities in these areas by other laws, such as the 
Environmental Law, the National Parks Law, the Law for the Protection of Cultural and 
Natural Assets, the National Forestation and Erosion Control Mobilization Law, and the  
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Forest Law64 (Official Gazette, May 5, 2004, No. 25483, Law No. 5177). The 
amendment to the VAT Law provided further privilege to the mining industry by 
exempting “the deliveries and services to the explorers and producers of gold and silver” 
from VAT (Official Gazette, July 31, 2004, No. 25539, Law No. 5228, Article 14(c)).   
These legislative concessions were not only applauded by Newmont but also by 
other foreign companies with mining interests in Turkey who viewed Bergama as the 
gateway for their prospective operations in the country. The Canadian Eldorado Gold 
Corporation was one of these companies65. Two newsletters posted on the web-site of 
Eldorado, informing its shareholders of the state of the company’s operations, provided 
the most outright confirmation of the influence of multinational corporations on the 
Turkish government to pass legislation in favor of the global mining industry. In his letter 
dated March 30, 2004 (Eldorado News Release. 2004a) Earl W. Price, the Chief 
Financial Officer of the company, wrote:  
Turkish VAT law imposes VAT on goods and services sold in Turkey, the 
most common rate being 18%. Recently the VAT regulations (the 
"regulations") have been modified such that the exemptions allowable on 
the export of gold doré ("doré") have been removed….The removal of the 
rebate of VAT on exports of doré and the removal of the VAT rebate on 
importation of equipment, if applied in their present form, will trigger an 
increase in the construction and operating costs of the Kışladağ Project. 
….We are working with the Turkish government in an effort to further 
amend the VAT regulations….  
                                                 
64 Due to the changes that the new Mining Law instituted in other laws it was 
adopted under the title of The Law Concerning Changes in the Mining Law and Some 
Other Laws. Ironically, the new law took effect on May 5th, celebrated globally as the 
World Environment Day. With the initiative of the environmental lawyers from İzmir the 
Mining Law was taken to the Constitutional Court for review of its constitutionality.  
65 Eldorado Gold Corporation is the owner of Tüprag Metal Mining Industry and 
Commerce Ltd.Co. that operates the controversial Kışladağ Goldmine in the Aegean town 
of Eşme, Uşak where over 1,000 people got sick with typical symptoms of cyanide 
poisoning on June 27, 2006 (see the Prologue for the details of the incident). 
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Three and a half months later, on July 15, 2004, Paul N. Wright, the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Eldorado, addressed the company’s shareholders as follows 
(Eldorado News Release. 2004b): 
Eldorado Gold Corporation…is pleased to announce that the government 
of Turkey has passed into law two major pieces of legislation positively 
impacting the mining industry. Legislation exempting the production of 
gold in Turkey from Value Added Tax ("VAT") and amendments to the 
Mining Law have been passed by the Turkish Parliament….At a time 
when many jurisdictions are increasing the tax burden for gold mining 
companies, we are extremely appreciative of the continued enlightened 
attitude of the Turkish Government. The elimination of VAT and the 
significant amendments to the Mining Law exemplify the continued active 
support of the Government in promoting a positive environment enabling 
the industry to flourish in Turkey. 
  
The decision of the İzmir Third Administrative Court on May 27, 2004 to annul 
the permit issued by the Ministry of Health on December 22, 2000, came as a boost for 
the villagers. The Court ruled that the risks associated with cyanide leaching method in 
goldmining could not be eliminated by supplementary measures since the latter would 
still be based on the same cyanidation process in extracting gold. The court also held that 
the issuing of the disputed permit was incompatible with the principle of the rule of law 
because the former amended in effect a judicial decision that had become final (European 
Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: 
D.69).   
This favorable judgment for the movement was followed by the decision of a 
common commission of the 6th and 8th Divisions of the Supreme Administrative Court on 
June 23, 2004 to suspend the execution of the Council of Ministers’ Decision of Principle 
(Cumhuriyet Daily, July 16, 2004), on the grounds that the said decision was unlawful, 
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“given that the decision to issue a permit, based on the environmental impact report, had 
been overturned by the courts and that no other decision had been adopted pursuant to the 
Environmental Act and the related regulations”, which the Council of Ministers might 
have taken as the basis for its decision of principle authorizing the operation of the 
goldmine in question (European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 
46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621: D.78).   
In an attempt to overcome the deadlock resulting from the latest court decision 
Newmont turned to the Ministry of Environment and Forests for advice on how to 
proceed. In his response, the Ministry noted that the Provisional Article No. 3 of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulation of December 16, 2003 applied to 
the mining operation at the Ovacık Goldmine. The article referred to by the Ministry 
stated that those projects that were approved before the EIA Regulation of February 7, 
1993, and that started their operations before this date were exempt from the 
requirements of the 2003 EIA Regulation (Official Gazette, December 16, 2003, No. 
25318).  However, the Ministry asked Newmont to prepare an Environmental State 
Assessment Report in line with the Provisional Article No. 6 of the EIA Regulation. 
According to the said article of the regulation, those establishments in operation that were 
subject to the requirements of the 1993, 1997, and 2002 EIA Regulations before the 
current regulation (2003) went into effect, but did not complete their obligations, present 
an Environmental State Assessment Report to be evaluated by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests to ensure that the establishments in question meet the 
requirements of existing regulations (Official Gazette, December 16, 2003, No. 25318). 
Environmental State Assessment Report (ESA Report) is incorporated into the 
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environmental legislation in Turkey by the 2003 EIA Regulation. As defined in the 
regulation, albeit extremely vaguely, the ESA Report is separate from and less 
comprehensive than the EIA Report. According to Article 4 of the EIA Regulation, 
“Environmental Impact Assessment refers to the work to be carried out to identify the 
potential positive or negative environmental impacts of the planned projects, to determine 
the measures to be taken to prevent the negative impacts or to reduce them to a minimum, 
to assess alternatives to the technologies and sites chosen, and to devise a plan for the 
observation and supervision of the implementation of the projects in question” (Official 
Gazette, December 16, 2003, No. 25318). Environmental State Assessment Report, on 
the other hand, refers to “the technical report prepared to ensure that the necessary 
environmental measures would be taken by those establishments that commenced their 
operations without complying with the relevant requirements of the EIA Regulation” 
(Official Gazette, December 16, 2003, No. 25318).  
Commenting on the developments concerning the mine in the aftermath of the 
Supreme Administrative Court Decision of June 23, 2004, a Newmont executive told the 
press: “….we were surprised by the court judgment. The Turkish government in support 
of the mine advised us to present a new Environmental Impact Assessment Report [sic] 
and start a new process for permission. We are following the suggested procedure” 
(quoted in Cangı 2005). Newmont submitted the required Environmental State 
Assessment Report to the Ministry on August 16, 2004. As the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests was counseling Newmont how to proceed with its operations in the face of 
the adverse court judgment the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a letter to the Provincial 
Governor of İzmir on August 18, 2004, asking the latter to act compliant with the 
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Supreme Administrative Court’s decision. Accordingly, the Provincial Governor of İzmir 
ordered the Sub-provincial Governor of Bergama to halt the operations of the mine 
(Cumhuriyet Daily, August 20, 2004).  Thus, the mine was officially closed on August 
19, 2004.  
In a political twist on August 27, 2004, however, the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests adopted a decision stating “provided that the conditions specified in the Final 
Environmental State Assessment Report and its addenda are complied with, there is no 
objection to the mine’s operation” (quoted in Cangı 2005).  
As had been the case with the Council of Ministers’ Decision of Principle before, 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ decision was not made public. Despite several 
formal requests submitted to the Ministry the lawyers of the villagers could not get hold 
of the decision in question through the Ministry of Environment and Forests. The lawyers 
eventually obtained a copy of the decision on September 16, 2004 through the Ministry 
of the Energy and Natural Resources’ General Directorate of Mining Affairs (Cangı 
2005). Two separate lawsuits were filed against the decision of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests. The first was brought to the İzmir First Administrative Court 
by three lawyers of the villagers requesting the cancellation of the decision. The second 
case was filed at the Supreme Administrative Court by 1342 villagers, their lawyers, 
several professional associations of engineers, and a labor union, for the annulment of the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests’ decision, as well as of the relevant articles 
(Provisional Articles No. 3 and 6) of the EIA Regulation (Cangı 2005).  
To ensure the continuation of Newmont’s operations in Bergama following the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests’ authorization of the Environmental State 
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Assessment Report, Eric S. Edelman, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at the time, 
intervened directly by writing to the Minister of Public Works and Settlement on 
September 17, 2004, and asking the latter to advise the Office of the İzmir Provincial 
Governor to approve the mine’s zoning plans, which had been revoked before. On 
September 29, 2004, Newmont presented its zoning plans to the Office of the İzmir 
Provincial Governor for approval. In its decision on October 27, 2004 the Provincial 
Administration approved the mine’s zoning plans   
In an encouraging development for the movement, on November 10, 2004 the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in the case 
brought against Turkey by nine villagers and the mayor of Bergama in 1998. The ECHR 
held that “the respondent State did not fulfill its obligation to secure the applicants’ right 
to respect for their private and family life, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention” 
(European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 2004. 46117/99 [2004] 
ECHR 621: 126). The Court also noted that “the national authorities failed to comply in 
practice and within a reasonable time” with the court decisions that had become final, 
thus violating Article 6 §1 of the Convention concerning the right to effective judicial 
protection. Thus, the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 10 November 
2004. 46117/99 [2004] ECHR 621:144) concluded that: 
….the violation of the Convention has undoubtedly caused the applicants 
a considerable degree of damage. The judicial decision canceling the 
award of a permit was not enforced, in violation of the fundamental 
principles of a State governed by the rule of law. The applicants were thus 
obliged to tolerate adverse living conditions and to bring several actions 
against decisions taken by the central authorities in order to ensure that the 
authorities would comply with that decision. Damage of this sort cannot 
be precisely calculated. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the 
Court awards the applicants EUR 3,000 each. 
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In early February 2005, the lawyers of the villagers applied to the Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources within the framework of the 
Right to Information Act to obtain information on the activities of the mining company. 
Among the specific questions asked were: Did the company pay the required state 
royalties? Were the balance sheets of the company audited by the Ministry of Finance? 
Did the company pay taxes? Does the left-over rock from unprocessed ore pose an 
environmental threat? Is any action being taken to collect from the illegally-operating 
company the court-approved compensation to the villagers that will otherwise be paid 
from the state treasury? Is any action being taken to collect the compensation in question 
from the responsible public officials? The Ministries refused to answer the lawyers’ 
questions, arguing that the answers constituted trade secrets, and thus confidential 
information. Noyan Özkan, one of the lawyers of the villagers, complained (BIA Haber 
Merkezi, March 15, 2005):  
One could write a lengthy book on all the secrets, mysteries, and withheld 
information we had to deal with in the course of the judicial struggle in the 
Bergama case for over 15 years. All the information we currently have at 
hand we have reached by recourse to courts. But applying to courts should 
be a matter of last resort.  
 
E.S., another lawyer of the villagers, recounted: 
 
The Right to Information Act established a Supreme Council to assess the 
release of information in cases of dispute between the parties involved. 
The Supreme Council answers to the Office of the Prime Minister. When 
we got the response of ‘Confidential Information’ from the Minister of 
Finance we applied to the Supreme Council. They said: ‘Why should it be 
confidential information? Give them the answers’. But the Minister of 
Finance did not conform to the Supreme Council’s suggestion and did not 




2005 saw another change in the ownership profile of the Ovacık Goldmine. In 
March 2005, the Turkish family company Koza Group acquired the Ovacık Goldmine 
from Newmont, and established Koza Gold Operations Co.(Koza), which currently runs 
the mine66. As frequently pointed out by Hikmet Çetinkaya in his column in the daily 
Cumhuriyet, the executives of Koza have close ties to the high-ranking officials of the 
currently governing Justice and Development Party through their common affiliation with 
the Gülen movement67. In November 2005, Koza bought Bugün, a daily newspaper, to 
complement its public relations activities (the paper is distributed in Bergama for free), 
and bolster its economic and political leverage.  
In the face of persistent emphasis of Koza on its ‘100 percent Turkishness’ as part 
of its public relations campaign, attempting to turn the tide against opposition to 
goldmining, there is a strong conviction among the villagers and other movement actors 
                                                 
66 Among the mines Koza acquired along with the Ovacık Goldmine was the 
goldmine in the Küçükdere village of Havran. The victory in 1993 of the local resistance 
against the operation of the Küçükdere mine had been instrumental in mobilizing the 
Bergama villagers against Eurogold, the then owner of the Ovacık Goldmine. Currently, 
Koza holds licences for over forty mine sites in fifteen provinces in Turkey, and an 
exploration permit for a mine site in Ghana. 
67 Islamic movement led by Fethullah Gülen, a retired, state-appointed preacher. It 
has its roots in the Nurcu Movement, which was established during the dissolution years 
of the Ottoman Empire by Said Nursi (1873-1960) with the aim of reinforcing the Islamic 
faith against the threat of Western culture and spreading modern scientific knowledge 
among the Islamic population (Ayata 1993). The Gülen Movement, considered a neo-
Nurcu Movement, emerged in the 1970s and flourished in the neo-liberal era of 1980s 
and 1990s, utilizing media, market, and education as its mobilization tools. Fethullah 
Gülen and his followers seek to transform society and its institutions in line with a 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis. A significant characteristic of the Gülen Movement is its non-
confrontational and conciliatory strategy (Ayata 1993, Yavuz 2003a, 2003b), advocating 
“to work from within the existing secular institutions of the state in order to counter and 
reduce the power of the state” (Ayata 1993:55-56). To this end, the followers of Gülen 
successfully employed the tactic of infiltration of strategic state institutions, assuming 
positions of power at the Ministry of Education, the police force, and the State Planning 
Organization (Ayata 1993:56).   
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that Koza is an integral part of the global corporate mining industry. In the words of B.Y., 
a 62 year-old movement activist from Bergama:  
The capital is the same capital, the power is the same power, nothing has 
changed. They replaced one tire for another but the car is the same.  
 
Similarly, D.T., a 44 year-old movement activist from Bergama, expressed: 
The new company is known to have ties to Fethullah Gülen and the 
currently governing Justice and Development Party. It is the product of an 
arrangement planned outside of the country. Koza is presented to the 
public as Turkish but it is not the owner of the mine. Behind the scenes 
there are still the familiar powers at play. 
 
In the same vein, G.P., a 54 year-old movement participant as one of the villagers’ 
lawyers from İzmir, commented: 
I don’t think Koza is alone in this. I believe that it still has ties to 
Newmont, Normandy or to the international gold lobby. They do this 
through clandestine agreements among each other. This is a very smart 
move on Koza’s part because, you know, the Justice and Development 
Party government has Fethullahian members at high ranks; so does Koza. 
Thus, the company has the backing of the government. 
  
44 year-old villager and longtime movement activist K.M. concurred: 
Koza is a shadow company; this is what I think. And it’s not just me, this 
is the conviction of everyone. Whoever owned the mine at the very 
beginning still owns it now. Nothing has changed. 
 
I.A., 55 year-old villager and adamant movement activist, got the same point across, 
using a colorful analogy: 
As a saying goes, you can groom an old donkey - change its saddle, its 
bridle, its appearance - and sell it as a brand-new one, but the donkey is 
still the same old donkey. These companies go around the world, 
constantly changing their names, and presenting themselves as different 
companies, but they are one and the same. 
 
R.C. is a 35 year-old business owner in Bergama who worked for the mine for 
five years. Like the villagers, R.C. opposes the mine but unlike that of the villagers, 
 201
R.C.’s opposition rests on nationalist sentiments rather than environmental and health 
concerns. R.C. claims that the mine is not operated efficiently by foreign undertakers, 
which “leaves our country at high economic loss”. Still, upon the question of how the last 
shift of ownership of the mine affected his views, R.C. responded: 
No one can convince me that Koza is a Turkish undertaking. No foreign 
company would be willing to sell that mine for just 44 million dollars and 
leave. I can imagine the U.S. leg of the company. They take care of things 
through ‘tolerance and dialogue’.68  
 
Notwithstanding the movement participants’ perception of Koza as a shadow 
company with ties to global mining interests, and their concomitant view that “nothing 
has changed”, S.C., one of the lawyers of the villagers, pointed out a change that 
accompanied the shift of the mine’s ownership from foreign to domestic capital. 
Although Koza was not considered a genuinely Turkish company by movement actors it 
was viewed as such by the Turkish business community, which, for the first time in the 
long history of the Bergama struggle against goldmining, actively sided with the mining 
company. Added to the governmental backing of the goldmining investments all along, 
this newfound support element increased the political leverage of Koza. As S.C. noted:  
In the previous cases we filed at the administrative courts against the 
Ministries involved or the Governor’s Office, the company, as well as the 
Yurt Madenciliğini Geliştirme Vakfı-YMGV (Foundation for the 
Development of National Mining) sided with the defendants. We knew 
that YMGV was established by the mining companies, whether foreign or 
Turkish, doesn’t matter. That’s why it didn’t surprise us that this 
                                                 
68 This is a reference to Fethullah Gülen whose followers and sympathizers 
identify him as the pioneer of building bridges between different religions through 
‘tolerance and dialogue’. Since 2000, when he was indicted by the Chief Prosecutor of 
the State Security Court for promoting a hidden agenda of destroying the secular 
foundation of the state, Fethullah Gülen lives in the U.S.A. The U.S. Administration 
supports Gülen’s seemingly moderate approach to Islam as a political leverage against 
Islamic fundamentalism. 
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organization sided with the mining companies. But now we observe new 
names emerge on the side of Koza against us. For example, Ankara Ticaret 
Odası-ATO (Ankara Chamber of Commerce) participated in a case along 
with Koza…This is because Koza is a member of ATO. It sided with Koza 
to support its member.    
 
The legal battle in the Bergama case continued with Koza’s initiation of a new 
process for obtaining permits. On March 14, 2005 the İzmir First Administrative Court 
decided to suspend the execution of the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ decision of 
August 27, 2004 concerning the Ministry’s favorable opinion on the mine’s continued 
operation based on the Environmental State Assessment Report. Reviewing the decision 
upon the Ministry’s request, the İzmir Regional Administrative Court overturned İzmir 
First Administrative Court’s judgment on April 14, 2005 (Radikal Daily, April 28, 2005).  
Following İzmir Regional Administrative Court’s favorable judgment Koza 
applied to the Office of the İzmir Provincial Governor for an operation permit. According 
to Article 7(g) of the Provincial Administration Law permits for polluting establishments 
were to be granted by the Provincial Administration whose decision organ was the 
Provincial General Assembly (Official Gazette, March 4, 2005, No. 25745. Law No. 
5302). Bypassing the Provincial General Assembly, the Governor granted Koza a permit. 
Thus, the Ovacık Goldmine was opened and Koza started its mining operations on May 
20, 2005 (Cumhuriyet Daily, May 21, 2005, Radikal Daily, May 22, 2005).   
On June 1, 2005, the villagers held a demonstration in front of the Provincial 
Governor’s Office in İzmir to protest the reopening of the mine. This action was followed 
by a festival in the village next to the mine organized by the villagers to celebrate the 
World Environment Day on June 5th with the participation of movement activists and 
supporters from the surrounding villages, from Bergama, İzmir, and other cities. The 
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event took a violent turn when mine workers blocked the road to the village to prevent 
the participants from attending the festival, and attacked the latter by throwing rocks and 
eggs at them (BIA Haber Merkezi, June 08, 2005 and June 09, 2005). 
Meanwhile, health problems were being observed among the mineworkers. O.G. 
is a 42 year-old villager who worked for the mine between 1997 and 2005. He was laid 
off when he got sick with spleen failure: 
I worked at the security first; for 3-4 months. That was when the mine was 
at the trial production stage. Then it was closed. When it reopened I 
worked at different sections. My last position was in the kitchen. I worked 
there for a year. The distance between the kitchen and the cyanide tanks is 
not even 10 meters [~11 yards]. The fumes emitted from the tanks affected 
me. They affected my bone marrow. My red blood cells count proved 
abnormal, which then affected my spleen. I underwent cortisone treatment 
for two years at the SSK [short for Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu (Social 
Insurance Agency)] in İzmir. Then I underwent surgery. They removed 
my spleen. Now I’m struggling to stay alive. 
 
O.G. has also been struggling to get a doctor’s note establishing the link between 
his illness and exposure to cyanide. In their study of the distribution of cyanide in blood 
and tissues of 26 victims of fatal cyanide poisoning, Sunshine and Finkle (1964) found 
that the spleen had the highest cyanide content. In search of an explanation for the 
disproportionately high cyanide concentration in this organ, Sunshine and Finkle studied 
the in vitro distribution of cyanide in the blood by adding sodium cyanide to cyanide-free 
blood. The researchers found that the added cyanide was completely bound by the red 
cells. This finding led Sunshine and Finkel (1964:559) to conclude: “Since the spleen is 
very rich in red cells, a probable explanation for the high cyanide concentration in this 
organ is thus provided”. However, for the physician at the state-run SSK hospital in İzmir 
who treated O.G., a clear-cut connection between cyanide exposure, cyanide-binding red 
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cells and spleen failure was not easy to make due to the intricate politics revolving 
around cyanide. O.G. recounted:  
The doctor said that this illness is seen in people dealing with chemicals, 
such as workers at battery factories [O.G. never worked for a chemical 
facility before he was employed at the mine]. I tried hard to get a note 
from him stating this but I failed. At first, he told me he’d write it but then 
he changed his mind, probably because of the pressure put on him. He 
referred me to the High Commission in Ankara. I wrote to the High 
Commission. It’s been a year. I’m still waiting for an answer. It’s been 
two years since I had surgery. I live without a spleen now. The High 
Commission is to write a note stating whether or not this illness is caused 
by cyanide. But, as I said, I haven’t received any such note yet. They have 
very long arms, reaching everywhere. 
 
Those workers at the mine who did jobs that were considered less risky, like 
O.G.’s job in the kitchen, were covered by public insurance through the SSK (Social 
Insurance Agency) whereas the actual processing and extraction jobs were covered by 
private health insurance provided by the company. For O.G., this arrangement helped the 
company cover up the health problems of the mine workers: 
They offer private health insurance and send the sick workers to private 
hospitals for treatment. There are so many who work at cyanide tanks and 
in underground pits. They all are covered by private insurance. Well, of 
course, the company can’t send them to SSK hospitals…..One of the 
workers died of cancer. There is one whose lungs are bad…. A colleague 
who worked with me in the kitchen has leukemia now. Her son works at 
the mine. That’s why she keeps silent, she doesn’t talk…Then there is 
another one. He lives in İzmir now. He is sick, too. The doctor told him 
the same thing: You are affected by some chemicals.     
  
2006 saw positive developments for the villagers on the judicial front. In its 
second decision on the Bergama case, the European Court of Human Rights came to the 
same conclusion on March 28, 2006 as in its previous judgment of November 2004, that 
the applicants’ right to respect for private and family life, and right to a fair trial was 
violated. The Court awarded EUR 3,000 to each of the 315 applicants as compensation 
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for non-pecuniary damage (European Court of Human Rights Judgment. 28 March 2006. 
46771/99 [2006] ECHR 175). Another favorable judgment came from the Supreme 
Admnistrative Court (SAC) on April 19, 2006, which annulled the Council of Ministers’ 
Decision of Principle of March 2002. As hope-arousing as these judgments were, 
however, the villagers were reserved in celebrating, weary of seeing previous favorable 
judicial decisions ignored by the mining company and circumvented by the 
administration. İrfan Keskin is a villager and longtime movement activist who earns his 
living as a cab driver in Bergama. Keskin is also a columnist in the local newspaper of 
Ege Haber. Two days after the latest SAC judgment, Keskin (Ege Haber Daily, April 21, 
2006) expressed his resentment in his column:  
They always find an excuse not to conform to court decisions….They did 
it again. They announced that the Supreme Administrative Court’s April 
19, 2006 decision, annulling, albeit belatedly, the Council of Ministers’ 
Decision of Principle, did not concern them because it referred to a period 
before them. Thus, they will proceed on their way. Yesterday …in 
Bergama they distributed for free thousands of copies of the newspaper 
that advocated their view. They go on, pretending as if nothing happened, 
no court judgment was given. However many decisions courts, judges and 
the law may take they go on. One can’t help but wonder: Why do we even 
have the justice and the legal system? Court decisions are not enforced. 
Aren’t those members of the judiciary who take these decisions a part of 
the whole state mechanism of the Turkish Republic? If yes, why are they 
regarded by some as non-existent?  
 
The day Keskin’s column was published, İzmir 4th Administrative Court decided 
to annul Koza’s zoning plans, which gave rise to new hopes among the villagers. The 
decision was significant in that it was the first court ruling that directly applied to the new 
company, thus voiding the claim of Koza executives that the existing court decisions did 
not bind their company because they all referred to a period before Koza bought the mine. 
In its decision, the court held that “the granting of a development and construction permit 
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to an activity like goldmining, which might have multi-dimensional effects extending 
over a large area, calls for a macro-scale plan that considers the region’s agricultural and 
historical significance. Construction permits given in the absence of such a macro-plan 
on the basis of the single lot the facility sits on, are against the law” (BIA Haber Merkezi, 
May 12, 2006). Koza appealed the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court.  
In an attempt to make heard their demands for the enforcement of the latest 
administrative court decision and to see the mine closed on the basis of that decision, the 
villagers organized a festival in the village next to the mine, on May 4, 2006. To prevent 
any confrontation between mineworkers and festival participants, as at the Environment 
Day Festival of the previous year, the gendarmerie took tight security measures around 
the mine and the festival venue. Hundreds of movement activists, their supporters from 
İzmir and other provinces, and media representatives attended the festival. 
In another festival held in August 2006 in the neighboring town of Dikili, 17 
miles north of Bergama, a group of Koza workers, led by the Public Relations Director of 
the company, carried out a violent attack against the opponents of the mine. Within the 
framework of the annual “Peace, Democracy and Labor Festival”, organized by the Dikili 
Municipality, a panel discussion was held on August 19, under the title of “Cyanide, 
Gold and Environment”. A group of 20 Koza workers, carrying Turkish flags on poles, 
intruded on the panel to prevent the discussion from taking place and attacked the 
panelists (BIA Haber Merkezi, August 21, 2006). 
Meanwhile, Koza took steps in expanding its mining activities beyond Ovacık 
Goldmine in Bergama. One of the minesites Koza had acquired in 2005 along with the 
Ovacık Goldmine was in the village of Küçükdere in Havran, a town in the province of 
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Balıkesir, about 65 miles northeast of Bergama.  When the company’s operation permit 
for the Küçükdere mine was repealed due to the proximity of the minesite to olive groves, 
Koza set out to transport the ore excavated from the Küçükdere site to Bergama to be 
processed in the already running facilities of the Ovacık Goldmine69. In line with the 
request of the lawyers of Bergama villagers, the Bursa 3rd Administrative Court 
suspended the execution of this transaction on December 14, 2006 (Cumhuriyet Daily, 
February 12, 2007). In a counter move, Koza applied to the Office of the Balıkesir 
Provincial Governor to get the opinion of the latter concerning the company’s mining 
activities in Küçükdere. The Küçükdere mine was opened on February 16, 2007, based 
on the favorable opinion of the Balıkesir Governorship stating that no Environmental 
Impact Assessment Report was necessary for the mining operation in question because 
the minesite was smaller than 25 hectares and no chemical facility would be built on the 
site.  
On June 5, 2007, the European Court of Human Rights announced its third 
favorable decision for the villagers, coming to the same conclusion as in its previous two 
judgments pertaining to the Bergama case, and awarding EUR 3,000 to the applicant, a 
movement activist from Balıkesir, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage (European 
Court of Human Rights Judgment. 5 June 2007. 17381/02 [2007] ECHR 381).  
In their latest activity, between June 9-10, 2007 movement activists convened a 
panel in the village of Narlıca in Bergama, attended by several professors, locals, and 
                                                 
69 Similarly, ores excavated from the company’s Mastra minesite in Gümüşhane, 
a province in the Northeastern Black Sea Region, were transported to the Ovacık 
Goldmine for the cyanide-leaching extraction process. 
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movement supporters to discuss mine site rehabilitation measures that need to be taken in 
the Ovacık Goldmine to minimize the environmental and health damages.  
Against the backdrop of increasing cancer cases, especially instances of breast 
cancer among village women, decreasing productivity of the land, water contamination, 
and the ongoing, state-supported corporate mining operations, Bergama villagers 
continue their struggle on judicial front today, still standing their ground in the hope of 























ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The concluding chapter of the current study is organized under four sections. The 
first section provides a synopsis of the distinct phases of the Bergama villagers’ 
movement, followed by a theoretically-informed review of the case with a focus on three 
data codes selected for analysis: collective identity, movement transformation, and 
movement outcome. Guided by this analysis and by the review of the U.S. Environmental 
Justice Movement (EJM) literature, the second section elaborates on the commonalities 
of the EJM and the Bergama villagers’ movement. The findings in this section lend 
support to my argument that it is misleading to conceive of ecological grassroots 
movements in the global South and North as instances of collective action utterly distinct 
from each other in form and content, based merely on the differences in economic 
development levels and cultural geography. In the third section, the applicability of the 
New Social Movements (NSM) theories to the Bergama case is assessed. In light of the 
failure of the NSM theorists on several grounds to account for the case studied, as well as 
for the EJM, I argue that a new approach to theorizing social movements, which would 
take as its point of departure the commonalities in the grassroots movements worldwide, 
would guide not only social movement scholars in understanding ecological grassroots 
movements in the North and South but also movement activists in their struggle for social 
change. I will conclude the chapter by wrapping up my argument that an exclusive focus 
on the distinctions between the ecological grassroots movements in the global South, on 
the one hand, and in the North, on the other, is counter-productive in challenging the 
systemic root causes of ecological problems plaguing the people of the world today.   
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Analytical Summary of the Bergama Case  
The view that regards the Bergama villagers’ movement as having followed a 
natural course of development, as expressed by the former mayor of Bergama, ignores 
the dynamic process by which the villagers actively participated in defining and 
redefining their situation based on the changes in their field of action, and on the 
emerging opportunities and constraints. Taking issue with this essentialist view I analyze 
the Bergama villagers’ movement in four distinct phases of development. This approach, 
I argue, is useful on at least two grounds. First, it identifies the processes of formation 
and transformation of the movement; and second, it reveals a pattern of adjustment in the 
means and ends of the struggle over time, which in turn squarely grounds the movement 
in the larger political economic context both in the national and the international milieu. 
At this juncture, however, a caveat is in order. By examining the movement in 
distinct phases I do not claim a discontinuity between the identified phases. Neither do I 
intend to reify the collective identity of the movement actors treating it as a specific, 
absolute entity existing in particular moments in time. My approach should rather be 
considered as an analytical tool to understand the socially constructed nature of the 
movement under investigation.  
With the neo-liberal shift in the economy in 1980s one of the priorities for 
Turkish policymakers came to be the provision of incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment. Simultaneously, the political-economic developments at the world-systemic 
level expanded the global market for gold and presented the global corporate mining 
industry with opportunities for new, profitable investments worldwide. The investment in 
the villages of Bergama by a multinational goldmining company in 1989 came as a direct 
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result of these developments. The villagers’ reaction to goldmining in the region 
gradually shifted from welcoming the investment, to suspicion, concern, and later 
opposition, as they became aware of the risks associated with mining. 
In broad strokes, the first phase of the Bergama movement between 1989-1992 
was characterized by a learning process on the part of Bergama villagers. Under the 
asupices of the mayor of Bergama and with the support from the professional 
associations of engineers, the Public Health Department of the Aegean University in 
İzmir, the Environmental Movement Lawyers, and Greenpeace, information was gathered 
displaying the multidimensional risks associated with goldmining. Through the local 
committees established by elected village leaders the collected information was 
disseminated to the villagers. The mayor and the local Environment, Culture and Arts 
Association were instrumental in bringing together the villagers and the academia for the 
very first time. Early mobilization efforts in this phase took the form of press releases, 
movie showings, information meetings, conferences and panels in the village 
coffeehouses, attended by professors from İzmir, İstanbul and Ankara to address the 
villagers. As these efforts were proceeding the Environmental Impact Assessment Report 
for the goldmine was published in 1991. This was followed by the operation permits 
granted to the company by the Ministry of Forests the same year and the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources in 1992. Simultaneously, the mining company engaged in 
a public campaign to win over the villagers with the promise of employment for the 
village youth and wealth for the whole region. As concerned as the villagers were about 
the environmental and health risks of the goldmine, their concern in this phase was 
limited in effect to mere suspicion rather than any form of collective action.       
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The second phase from 1992 to 1996 marked the consolidation of the 
mobilization efforts, the budding of the movement, and the initiation of the legal and 
political struggle against goldmining. Along with growing information and the 
concomitant awareness with respect to the magnitude of the risks involved, opposition to 
the mine gained ground among increasing numbers of villagers. The establishment in 
1993 of the Hand in Hand Initiative, incorporating close to fifty non-governmental 
organizations, including several professional associations of engineers, physicians’ 
associations, environmental organizations, human rights groups, as well as individual 
lawyers and academicians, provided the Bergama villagers with a permanent support 
structure in their struggle against goldmining. On the political front, movement actors 
embarked on an international publicity campaign to affect a shift in public opinion 
against the multinational mining company and its finance sources in their respective 
home countries. The existing network of relations of urban intellectuals with 
environmental activists and interest groups in Europe comprised the most prominent 
source relied on in this political process. A defining event in terms of its positive impact 
on the mobilization of the villagers of Bergama in this phase was the culmination in 
victory of the strong local resistance against the proposed gold mine in the Küçükdere 
village of Havran, a town 65 miles northeast of Bergama, when the Ministry of 
Environment refused in 1993 to grant permission to the goldmining project in the region 
due to the proximity of the mine site to olive groves. Encouraged by the Küçükdere 
victory, the Bergama villagers turned to the Environmental Movement Lawyers group in 
İzmir for legal consultation and representation, which opened a new front in the struggle 
against goldmining in Bergama. In 1994, when the Ministry of Environment issued a 
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permit for goldmining in Bergama, the villagers’ lawyers filed lawsuits at the 
administrative court on behalf of 650 villagers and residents of Bergama for the 
annulment of the Ministry’s permit. Upon the dismissal of the villagers’ request by the 
administrative court in 1996 the lawyers appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Administrative Court.   
The third phase of the movement between late 1996 and mid 1997 signified a 
considerable shift in the struggle with the villagers’ recourse to direct action tactics. 
Nationwide publicity efforts through actions of civil disobedience, demonstrations, 
marches, blockades, sit-ins, petitions, solidarity picnics and festivals were added to the 
movement repertoire in this phase alongside the struggle on the legal and political fronts. 
The third phase culminated in victory when the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) 
overturned the lower administrative court’s 1996 decision in a groundbreaking judgment 
on May 13, 1997, ruling that the Ministry of Environment’s operation permit did not 
serve public interest, and was in violation of the Articles 17 and 56 of the Constitution, 
which secured the right to life and the right to live in a healthy environment.    
The fourth and currently ongoing phase that started in the aftermath of the 1997 
SAC judgment was marked by the efforts of the villagers and their urban intellectual 
supporters to have the government authorities enforce the high court’s, and later other 
courts’, judgments. As the former mayor put it, following the SAC decision the actions of 
the involved parties took a chess-like course, with the villagers and their supporters, on 
the one hand, and the company and the state, on the other, counteracting each other’s 
moves. Along with a marked boost in the judicial leg of the struggle the villagers 
continued their protests and demonstrations to see the mine closed. The state deferred the 
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enforcement of the SAC ruling. With the de facto backing of the state, the company 
increased its pace of constructing the mine. In light of these developments, the villagers 
accelerated their protest actions and their struggle on the judicial front. The maneuvers of 
the state in this phase to circumvent the SAC decision and numerous other judgments by 
national and international courts ruling in favor of the villagers prompted the 
incorporation of the notions of justice, democratic participation and citizenship rights into 
the claims of movement actors, thus adding a new dimension to the struggle of the 
Bergama villagers. As the direct action front of the movement weakened over time the 
judicial front gained primacy in the struggle. Underlying the decline in direct actions was 
the frustration of the villagers with the state’s outright support of the mining company 
and persistent non-enforcement of court judgments, as well as the hardship due to 
economic crises and the structural decline of the agricultural sector in the national 
economy, which deprived the villagers of the time and finances necessary to carry out 
direct actions70. The frustration and the concomitant resentment of the villagers toward 
the administration are manifest in M.K.’s statement. M.K. is a 51 year-old village woman 
who had been active in the movement. Under economic hardship her 25 year-old son had 
to leave the village to find a job somewhere else so he would not have to work for the 
mine. She expressed:  
We are all against the mine. Today I would still travel around, go 
everywhere in protest. But they just won’t close the mine! 
 
                                                 
70 Shefner’s (2006) research reveals that a similar reason underlay the move away 
from mass mobilization and confrontational tactics in a democratization movement in 
Jalisco, Mexico. Shefner (2006: 258, 260) reports a movement activist stating that 
economic hardship forced people to work for survival, which, in turn, decreased the time 
available for political organizing. 
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Collective Identity 
Collective identity constitutes one of the key concepts in the analyses of new 
social movements scholars (Castells 2004, Cohen 1985, Melucci 1989, Pizzorno 1978, 
Touraine [1978] 1981). According to Melucci (1995), neither structural preconditions nor 
values and beliefs alone produce collective action. Rather, individuals collectively 
construct their action through a framing process that involves constant interaction, 
communication, negotiation, and cognitive definition of the means, ends and the field of 
action. This interactive and shared definition is what Melucci (1995) conceives of as 
collective identity. In the process of constructing collective identity actors develop a 
sense of a “we”, which enables them to feel as part of a common unity with shared 
interests and goals (Castells 2004, Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995, Gamson 1992, Johnston 
et.al. 1994, Melucci 1995, Polkinghorn 2000, Snow 2001, Taylor and Whittier 1992, 
Woehrle and Coy 2000). This sense of “we” is not static, however. To ensure its 
continuity collective actors need to renegotiate and redefine it depending on the changes 
in their field of action, and the emerging opportunities and constraints. Thus, the process 
of collective identity is also “the ability to produce new definitions by integrating the past 
and the emerging elements of the present into the unity and continuity of a collective 
actor” (Melucci 1995: 49).    
Corresponding to this social constructionist and processual approach, Taylor and 
Whittier (1992) identify boundaries, consciousness, and negotiation as the analytical 
tools to understand the contruction of collective identity in social movements. Boundaries 
specify “the social territories of group relations by highlighting the differences between 
activists and the web of others in the contested social world…Boundary markers 
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are…central to the formation of collective identity because they promote a heightened 
awareness of a group’s commonalities and frame interaction between members of the in-
group and the out-group” (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 111). Once the boundaries are 
marked and the “we-they” distinction is formulated collective actors frame the group’s 
interests in opposition to the dominant order through a conscious, reflective process. This 
process of what McAdam (1982) refers to as ‘cognitive liberation’ facilitates the 
collective actors’ transformation from passive victims of injustices to active challengers 
of the status quo. Negotiations enable collective actors to politicize their daily lives and 
articulate ways to bring about the desired change (Hunt et.al. 1994, Taylor and Whittier 
1992).    
 Bergama villagers’ movement followed a course of development consistent with 
this constructionist analysis. Movement actors achieved the unity and continuity of their 
collective action by a process of collective identity formation, which involved the 
cognitive definition and redefinition of the situation, as well as the assessment, 
reassessment and adjustment of the means and ends of action in light of internal and 
external shifts in the movement’s field of action.  
I.A., a villager and long-time movement activist, said: 
At first, people were divided. When the company first came here some 
people started working for the mine. But in 5 or 6 years we became a 
single entity, as solid as a rock, everyone being on our side. 
 
 This period of five to six years correspond to what I identified as the first two 
phases of the Bergama villagers’ movement. During this time the villagers’ reaction to 
goldmining in the region gradually shifted from welcoming the investment, to suspicion, 
concern, and later opposition, as they became aware of the risks associated with mining. 
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This awareness was the outcome of a learning process, which the former mayor summed 
up as follows: 
Professors talked to the villagers directly. The villagers listened very 
carefully and learned. Then we helped each other, discussing among 
ourselves what we learned, and repeating it over and over again.  
 
 Along similar lines, B.Y., a movement activist from Bergama, stated: 
   
We met respectable, democratic, highly-educated people from around the 
world….We started to communicate with them. They told us the stories of 
gold. What is gold? How is it extracted and processed? What is the per 
capita income in the countries where gold is extracted? How rich or poor 
did they get?  How do their lands look like now? And under which 
circumstances do people live in those countries after the gold mining? 
They told us all about these. …..We were startled by what we heard.   
 
 Knowledge thus obtained empowered the villagers and enabled them to 
cognitively define the situation, and frame their interests and goals through an interactive 
process. P.A., a villager and movement activist, noted that protecting their land was the 
main drive for the villagers to mobilize:  
We found out that cyanide is a very dangerous poison, and that our 
environment was at risk. We were concerned that our olive trees might be 
harmed, and that we wouldn’t be able to sell the crops we grew or the milk 
our cows produced. So we organized and started a movement. 
 
This cognitive definition and frame served as a foundation on which the villagers 
built a strong sense of “we”.  In the words of the former mayor: 
….this is a socially complex region. It incorporates different ethnic and 
religious groups. One village is Alevi, another Sunni, one is made up of 
Bulgarian immigrants, another of Romanian immigrants, yet another of 
nomads. That is to say, they don’t get together on any given day. Each 
group has its own village, and lives according to its own traditional ways 
of life….. They are also socio-economically diverse. Some of the villagers 
are more well-to-do than others…. How in the world were these people to 
get together? They did. They needed a motivation to do so: knowledge, a 
point of departure… An incredible grassroots movement emerged here as 
a result.  
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 In the process of the construction of “we” the villagers also formed a conception 
of “they” as the antagonist group to wage a struggle against. During the first two phases 
of the movement “they” predominantly referred to the corporate mining industry, in 
general, and the mining company, in particular. The following accounts by several 
movement actors exemplify the characteristics attributed to “they”:  
The trick of this industry is that the constituent companies repeatedly shed 
their skin so you can’t find the perpetrator. The environment is left 
polluted and damaged but no one is there to take any responsibility. Such 
is the game.      -  Former mayor of Bergama. 
 
The new company will take over where the previous company leaves off, 
and if a problem arises in the future the previous company will be blamed 
for it. Since nobody will own the problem it will be left unsolved. Even if 
people die as a result, no one will take responsibility.   
- H.N., a villager and movement activist. 
 
As much as they seem to operate as different companies under different 
names they constitute in fact one and the same big industry. They agree 
among each other. Not only do they exploit the natural resources of less-
developed countries but also mess their environment, and then disappear, 
leaving them with irreparable damage.  
- P.A., a villager and movement activist. 
 
They engage in corporate marriages, custom-made for whichever country 
they go to. They can be named Eurogold, TÜPRAG, or something else. 
These marriages end when the mine closes. They use the same method 
everywhere in the world. 
- D.T., businessowner and movement activist from Bergama. 
 
The corporate mining industry does not consider public interest. Capital is 
interested in one thing alone, to fill their pockets. This is the nature of 
capital….. They need to maximize their profits. To do so they need to 
minimize their expenditures. In their investment in technology, in the 
wages they pay to their workers, or in the environmental precautions they 
take they are driven by these principles. If you add these all up you can’t 
expect them to consider public interest. That would be unrealistic.   
- F.R., a professor and movement supporter from İzmir. 
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They have no decency. All they have is money. They go to great length to 
divide people. 
 - I.A., a villager and movement activist.  
 
The processes of learning, collectively defining the situation, framing common 
interests and goals, and demarcating and articulating the “we-they” boundaries effected 
the cognitive liberation of the villagers. This transformation of consciousness was 
discernible in the villagers’ big leap to activism from their initial stance of “May it 
[goldmining in the region] proceed if any good will come out of it, may it not if any harm 
will come out of it”. As suggested in this statement, reported by the former mayor, the 
villagers had passively expressed their willingness to accept whatever the outcome might 
come to be. They transformed from acquiescent bystanders, ready to leave the turn of 
events that would affect their lives up to the grace of an abstract force, to active 
participants of Turkey’s longest-lasting grassroots movement, collectively taking action 
for their right to live in a healthy environment.   
The dynamic nature of the movement that was evident in the redefinition and 
reassessment of the means and ends to respond to emerging opportunities and challenges 
in the movement actors’ field of action also rendered the learning process of the villagers 
continuous and expanding in scope. For example, with the shift to direct action tactics in 
the third phase the villagers learned civil disobedience and the judicial aspects of protest. 
C.U., a lawyer from Bergama and one of the legal representatives of the villagers, noted: 
Going out to the streets in protest is risky. You might run into other people 
there; your opponents, radicals, etc.... So, it was a necessity for the 
villagers to be informed on the legal aspects of protest…. At that point we 
did our part and taught them what they needed to know to protest within 
the framework of the rules of law.  
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 Another manifestation of the dynamic, socially-constructed nature of the 
movement was the actors’ incorporation of the state in their conception of “they” 
alongside the company and the corporate mining industry in the third and fourth phases 
of the movement.  This shift in the demarcation of “they” occurred against the backdrop 
of the state’s insistent ignorance of the demands and protests of the villagers71 by issuing 
permits to the company; its outright support of the mining company by deferring and 
circumventing through legislative and administrative means the 1997 SAC judgment and 
other similar court decisions that acknowledged the risks of goldmining in the region. 
Movement actors articulated their conception and resentment of the state as a party on the 
side of the mining company, as follows: 
If the Minister publicly announces: ‘We’re going to extract gold to the last 
nugget!’, the company does not need to do much. It seems the decision has 
long been made, and the scaffold set.  
– H.N. a villager and movement activist. 
 
[T]hey [the mining company] have one big advantage: the backing of the 
governments. Especially since 1998, there were governments giving them 
the message: ‘O.K. Extract the gold, we’re behind you!’ or ‘We’ll look the 
other way!’ The most evident manifestation of governmental support is the 
continuing operation of the mine despite all the court rules in favor of the 
villagers.    – N.L., a professor and movement supporter from İstanbul. 
 
The company is omnipotent. It has the advantage of having the 
government on its side. The government functions as if it is the secretariat 
of the company, with the ministers issuing orders to do what’s necessary 




                                                 
71 This ignorance ranged from not taking the movement seriously to the extreme 
of denial, as exemplified by the reaction of the sub-provincial governor of Bergama when 
I justly referred to the villagers’ movement as a social movement during my interview 
with him for this study: “What social movement? Would you call the walking of two or 
three women and children on the streets a social movement?”  
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 Movement Transformation 
 In social movement analyses transformation is predominantly studied as a 
movement outcome at the individual or the community level, such as changes in the 
activists’ attitudes, political behavior, occupational and marital statuses (Cable et.al. 
1988, Fendrich and Lovoy 1988, McAdam 1989), or shifts in the level of community 
integration after mobilization (Edelstein 1988, Fowlkes and Miller 1987). With the 
exception of a few studies (Bullard 1994, 1996, Bullard and Wright 1992, Cable and 
Degutis 1991, Cable and Shriver 1995, Krauss 1989, Shefner 2006) transformation is not 
analyzed at the movement level as a dynamic process through which movement activists 
collectively experience a transformation of consciousness, redefine their grievances 
(Shefner 1999), contest the legitimacy of the entire political-economic system, and 
demand direct democracy.  
 Bergama villagers’ movement underwent a transformation from a local ecological 
movement to an environmental justice movement with national implications 
incorporating into the movement discourse the claims for the rule of law, justice, 
democratic participation and citizenship rights. This transformation, I argue, is best 
explained by a process-based, social-constructionist approach. As discussed in the 
previous sub-section on collective identity, the construction of collective identity is a 
continuous process that requires movement actors to constantly reflect on and redefine 
the situation, assess and adjust to the emerging opportunities and challenges in their field 
of action. The movement transformation in the Bergama case occurred through such a 
process of redefinition and reassessment against the background of shifts in the 
movement’s internal and external field of action.  
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The state championed the mining investment in Bergama from its inception in 
1989. As the villagers learned about and were convinced of the environmental and health 
risks involved they gradually mobilized against goldmining in the region. In the first two 
phases of the movement between 1989 and 1996, however, the villagers and their urban 
intellectual supporters did not directly contest the state as an antagonist. Rather, the main 
target of their struggle was the mining company. This was manifest in the movement 
activists’ strategies and tactics in the first two phases. To publicize their case movement 
activists organized press conferences and panels at local and regional levels to reveal the 
notorious environmental safety and social responsibility records of the mining company, 
in particular, and the global corporate mining industry, in general. Later they undertook 
an international publicity campaign to affect a shift in the public opinion against the 
multinational mining company and its finance sources in their home countries.    
The shift in the struggle in the third phase, when the villagers adopted direct 
action tactics, brought about the first direct confrontation between the villagers and the 
state with the intervention of the gendarmerie and the police in the protest 
demonstrations. For the villagers, this intervention made more evident than before the 
state’s outright protection of the interests of the mining company against theirs. The 
process of transformation of collective consciousness thus started led to the movement 
actors’ redefinition of the situation and reassessment of the “we-they” demarcation. As 
the stance of the state in support of the mining company grew stronger in the fourth phase 
with the addition of administrative and legislative means to the social control measures to 
ensure the operation of the mine despite court decisions favoring the villagers, the 
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movement transformed into a democratization struggle. S.C., one of the lawyers of the 
villagers from İzmir interpreted this transformation as follows: 
In the aftermath of the ’97 decision the concern for securing the rule of 
law gained primacy in the struggle….The protection of environmental 
rights is essential but if court rules are not enforced in a country there 
would be no guarantee for the exercise of any rights. The institution to 
resort to for the settlement of a dispute between two parties is the court. If 
the court’s rule is not going to be enforced how will people claim their 
rights? Is everyone going to act on their own sense of justice? This would 
lead to disorder and chaos. You can’t even talk about a state under these 
conditions, let alone a state based on the rule of law. You would destroy 
the atmosphere of peace in the society. If no one trusts that the court 
decisions will be enforced nobody will take the courts seriously; nobody 
will resort to courts to resolve their disputes….In this case, securing 
environmental rights becomes part of the bigger problem of the 
enforcement of judiciary decisions. 
 
Along the same lines, E.S., another lawyer from İzmir representing the villagers, 
commented: 
Of course, this is an environmental and public health problem but in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Supreme Administrative Court Decision the 
movement turned into a struggle for the enforcement of the court’s 
judgment. The main questions became: “Is this a state governed by the 




For Gamson (1975), movement success is a set of outcomes that are measured in 
terms of the consequences of mobilization for the movement organization, on the one 
hand, and the movement’s beneficiaries, on the other. Consequences for the former 
concern the “fate of the challenging group as an organization”; for the latter, they involve 
“the distribution of new advantages to the group’s beneficiary” (Gamson 1975:28). 
Although Gamson’s conceptualization has more explanatory power than those analyses 
that operationalize and measure movement outcome monolithically in terms of whether 
 224
or not the stated goals are achieved (Hollander 1992, Mitchell 1981), it has a major 
shortcoming that makes it problematic to apply to the social movements from below like 
the Bergama villagers’ movement and the environmental justice movement in the US. 
Gamson (1975:30) treats outcomes as the ultimate endpoints of a challenge. For equity 
movements, however, outcomes, such as social and personal transformations, can’t be 
frozen at particular moments in time. Rather, they are ongoing processes in a collective 
struggle for breaking the existing power relations and challenging the logic of the system.  
Elaborating on the meaning of success for social movements from below, Nilsen 
and Cox (2005) aptly state:  
Winning… is about human development in many dimensions: in changing 
social relations on a micro-scale, in creating new ways of working, living 
in places, of gender relations, in constructing broader global connections – 
and in constructing movements which can carry this change forward 
against determined, even “last-ditch” opposition armed with tanks (P.4). 
 
Judging Bergama villagers’ resistance by this multi-dimensional and processual 
understanding of success, I argue that the movement has been successful on several 
grounds. On the local level, the empowerment of the villagers has been the most 
substantial achievement of the movement. The long-lasting struggle facilitated social 
change when residents with little or no prior experience of political activism became 
fervent social justice activists constructing a collective identity to define and redefine 
their grievances, and challenge the impositions of corporate capital and the state. On the 
national level, the villagers have been successful in getting across their message to the 
larger society that it is their constitutional right to live in a healthy environment and their 
democratic right to participate in the decisions affecting their lives and livelihoods. They 
did so by engaging in acts of civil disobedience, effectively fighting for their rights 
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within the framework of the national legal system, and making use of judicial means 
accessible to them beyond the national realm. As such, Bergama villagers’ resistance 
movement provided an example for other communities facing similar challenges 
nationwide.  
“Bergama Movement taught a whole lot to everyone”. This statement by S.C. one 
of the lawyers of the villagers, is shared by many other movement participants 
interviewed for this study. According to B.Y., a movement activist from Bergama: 
A sense of self-confidence developed in the villagers. They got to know 
the police, the gendarmerie, they learned the law. They also learned some 
level of science, enough to understand what cyanide, antimony, and 
mercury are, and the way in which they contaminate the groundwater. But 
most importantly, they became aware of their rights as citizens. They 
learned to become citizens. 
  
In a similar vein, K.M., a villager and movement activist, stated:  
We were elementary school graduates back then when we started, we 
became college graduates now.  
 
In the words of H.N., another villager and movement activist:  
We do not fear soldiers or police officers anymore. Before this movement, 
we were so intimidated by them that we would blush even as we saw them 
on the street…..Now we know how to defend our rights whichever 
authority figure may approach us. 
 
 B.Y. pointed out another significant achievement of the movement as follows: 
   
Behind the success of our lawyers lay the 15 year-long resistance 
movement carried out by thousands of people…Movement participants 









Commonalities Between the Bergama Villagers’ Movement and  
the U.S. Environmental Justice Movement 
 
 One of the criticisms directed at the Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) is its 
disregard of environmental injustices outside the U.S. (Martinez-Alier 2003, Rhodes 
2003). Martinez-Alier (2003) substantiates this criticism as follows: 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 of 1994 on Environmental 
Justice was a triumph for this movement. It directed all federal agencies 
(though not corporations or private citizens) to act in such a way that 
disproportionate burdens of pollution do not fall on low-income and 
minority populations in all territories and possessions of the U.S. Thus, 
both poverty and race were taken into account, but nothing was said about 
impacts outside the U.S. Happy is the country where ‘low-income’ people 
are regarded as a minority…! (P.213, emphasis added). 
 
As justified as Martinez-Alier is in criticizing this neglect, in his line of reasoning 
he misses a point that is significant for all social movements from below worldwide. By 
conceiving ‘minority’ in a purely quantitative sense, Martinez-Alier disregards the 
concept’s situatedness in power relations, and the fact that for communities in the global 
South and North alike those very power relations constitute the major source of 
grievances. Taking minority group membership in this latter sense of the concept informs 
a convergence between grassroots movements for environmental justice in the global 
South and North, regardless of their respective differences in economic development 
levels and cultural landscape.  
EJM scholars increasingly emphasize this point. Bullard (quoted in Martinez-







Grass-roots groups, after decades of struggle, have grown to become the 
core of the multi-issue, multi-racial, and multi-regional environmental 
justice movement. Diverse community-based groups have begun to 
organize and link their struggles to issues of civil and human rights, land 
rights and sovereignty, cultural survival, racial and social justice and 
sustainable development…Whether in urban ghettos and barrios, rural 
“poverty pockets”, Native American reservations or communities in the 
developing world, grassroots groups are demanding an end to unjust and 
non-sustainable environmental and development policies (P.214).     
 
 Similarly, Robinson (quoted in Martinez-Alier 2003) stated: 
   
As mining, logging, oil drilling and waste disposal projects push into 
further corners of the planet, people all over the world are seeing their 
basic rights compromised, losing their livelihoods, cultures and even their 
lives. Environmental devastation globally and what we call 
‘environmental racism’ in the US, are violations of human rights and they 
occur for similar reasons (P.220). 
  
The globality of the compounded nature of injustices on political, economic, 
social, and environmental grounds is realized not only by movement scholars but also by 
activists. In her analysis of an ecological grassroots struggle in the Yellow Creek Valley 
of southeastern Kentucky in central Appalachia, Cable (1993) reported:   
[A]t Yellow Creek, the Appalachian stereotype held by outsiders 
[submissive and apathetic] is forcefully countered by a new Appalachian 
identity, an identity characterized by a self-conscious awareness of the 
injustices perpetrated by elites and of Appalachia’s similarities to the 
oppressed parts of the world. This is apparent in an activist’s reference to 
the political position of the region: “Appalachia has more in common with 
some of those countries in Africa than we do with the rest of the United 
States.” (P.81).  
 
 The similarities of disenfranchised communities in the U.S. with those in the 
Southern hemisphere are not only discernible in the structural nature of the environmental 
injustices they face but also in the ways in which they respond to these injustices. The 
Bergama villagers’ movement is a relevant case to prove this point.  
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Like the low-income and minority communities comprising the EJM in the U.S., 
movement activists in the Bergama case (re)define environment to incorporate in it 
people, as well as their homes and workplaces. This broad definition allows them to 
address within the context of their struggle those issues that are central to their everyday 
survival. The former mayor of Bergama comments: 
90 percent of the environmental movements around the world are 
intellectual movements, based on sophisticated knowledge. Few of the 
activists in these movements, if any, become environmentalists because 
their own lives are directly threatened. The environmental movement in 
Bergama is no such movement. It is a pure grassroots movement. Why did 
they set out to protect their environment? Because they were directly faced 
with the potential destruction of their environment, and along with it, their 
ways of living, their very lives. Their main motivation was neither to see 
their surroundings green for recreational purposes nor to let the birds fly 
freely. In the case of the movement of Bergama villagers, the 
environmental movement found its true meaning.    
  
Another similarity between the EJM and the Bergama villagers’ movement is the 
emphasis on self-representation. In the words of B.Y., a movement activist from 
Bergama:  
Many political parties and unions that wanted to be included in our 
movement were disappointed. What made this movement interesting was 
that we didn’t let ourselves be incorporated in any organization. If we had 
done so, we would have been identified with that particular organization, 
which would have compromised our position as a grassroots movement. 
Our movement was taken seriously because it comprised of the villagers 
themselves, not by other parties that defended the villagers’ interests on 
their behalf. 
 
As a corollary of this common characteristic of self-representation, both 
movements placed themselves outside institutional politics, relied on advocacy networks 
and direct action tactics, such as protests, demonstrations, public meetings, fact-finding 
and hearings to educate local residents, petitions, referenda, and litigation. Moreover, in 
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both cases, the community organizations established by movement activists were loosely 
structured and non-hierarchical.   
The significant role of urban intellectuals in both movements constitutes another 
similarity. Urban intellectuals have been instrumental in pointing out the compounded 
nature of environmental injustices, and thus facilitating the process of cognitive liberation 
in the respective communities through which the latter realized that they were victims not 
only of corporate environmental crimes but also of a corporate state structure that denies 
democratic claims (Cable and Shriver 1995:430). This transformation of consciousness 
prompted community members to become not only environmental activists fighting 
against the toxic facilities in their neighborhoods and villages but also social justice 
advocates and activists, attacking the government’s preference of capital accumulation 
and economic growth over public interest, and struggling for democratic and civil rights.       
The similarity in the way activists in both movements experienced and articulated 
resentment at their respective governments is arresting, as manifested in the following 
two excerpts. The first is a statement by the co-founder of the Yellow Creek Concerned 
Citizens, a grassroots organization established by the citizens of Middlesboro, Kentucky 
in the U.S. to redress their grievance of water pollution in the community caused by a 
tanning company. The second statement is by a villager and movement activist in the 
Bergama resistance.  
Bitter resentment keeps us going, I won’t quit now till I get full 
satisfaction. All we’ve ever tried to do is have the laws enforced. Why 
should I have to fight to get what’s already in the law? I’ll tell you why: 
it’s more exploitation of Appalachia.  
- Co-founder of the Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens,   
quoted in Cable (1993:81, emphasis added).   
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Not even a single day did these people hit the streets to ask for a raise in 
the price of their produce. They just ask for their right to live. They want to 
live in a healthy country. This is a simple demand that is already secured 
in the Constitution. Of course they will ask for it. Did we, as farmers, 
confront the state, saying ‘You pay this much to purchase our cotton but 
sell the fuel for that much more!’ No, we didn’t. But shall I also not object 
when you come here to take my life? Of course, I will… They want us to 
be like sheep to do as they say, and accept everything they do. 
- I.A., a Bergama villager and movement activist.   
 
 
Critical Appraisal of New Social Movements (NSM) Theories  
With Reference to the Bergama Case 
 
In terms of their applicability to the Bergama villagers’ movement, the NSM 
theories have weaknesses similar to those I identified in my assessment of their 
explanatory power for the Environmental Justice Movement in the U.S. (pp.45-47 of the 
current study).  
For NSM theorists, a defining characteristic of contemporary social movements is 
their socio-cultural nature, which significantly differs from the old, class-based conflicts 
over economic distribution (Della Porta et.al. 2006, Habermas 1970, 1975, [1981] 1989, 
Melucci 1980, 1989, 1996, Offe 1985, Touraine [1978]1981). The underlying assumption 
is that contemporary society is a post-material society where the arena of social 
contestation is dominated by clashes over values and identities, not over relations of 
material production. Contesting this assertion, Martinez-Alier (2003) rightly argues: 
We are certainly not in a ‘post-material’ age. Externalities (i.e. cost-
shifting) must be seen as part and parcel of the economy, which is 
necessarily open to the entry of resources and to the exit of residues. The 
appropriation of resources and the production of waste result in ecological 
distribution conflicts, which give rise to a worldwide environmental 
justice movement (P.220).  
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Bergama villagers mobilized against the ecological threats posed to their lives and 
livelihoods by an economic investment, which was supported by the state in the name of 
economic growth. Thus, NSM theories fail to account for the conflict in the Bergama 
case, which is very much of socio-economic nature. Furthermore, contrary to the NSM 
conception of contemporary social movements, the Bergama villagers’ resistance is a 
class-based movement. This is manifest in the importance of socio-economic class in the 
self-identification of movement activists, as attested in the statement of K.M., a villager 
and movement activist:  
To those who refer to our struggle as the Bergama Movement I say, this is 
not Bergama Movement, this is a villagers’ movement, ‘The Movement of 
Bergama Villagers’. I’ve always defended this position. 
 
 K.M.’s statement is in stark contrast with Offe’s (1985) claim: 
   
[C]oncerning the actors of the new social movements, the most striking 
aspect is that they do not rely for their self-identification on either the 
established political codes (left/right, liberal/conservative, etc.) nor on the 
partly corresponding socioeconomic codes (such as working class/middle 
class, poor/wealthy, rural/urban population, etc.) (P.831, emphasis 
original).  
   
The significance of socio-economic class in the self-identification of movement 
activists is also manifest in the villagers’ resentment toward the middle-class residents of 
the town of Bergama. According to P.A., a villager and movement activist:  
The people of Bergama never actively participated in the movement, 
neither did they oppose the mining company. On the contrary, they were 
happy due to the prospects of wealth for Bergama.      
 
Similarly, C.U., a lawyer from Bergama and one of the legal representatives of 




In the town of Bergama, there was no collective public stance against the 
mine…..Except for some individuals from Bergama, who voluntarily 
fought against the mine, the people of Bergama as a collectivity did not 
contribute a bit to the villagers’ movement. They rather viewed the mine 
as a source of income for themselves…. [T]his is due to the lethargy of the 
people of Bergama; a combination of their calculation of petty interests, 
their opportunism, and their lack of social impetus…. Bergama is one of 
the biggest towns of the Izmir Province, with a population of 50,000-
60,000. If it had taken a collective stance against the gold mine; if 10,000 
people had gathered in the central square of the town and said ‘No!’, it 
wouldn’t have been easy for the company to proceed with its operations. 
 
Another aspect of the Bergama case that the NSM theories fail (perhaps most 
terribly) to explain, is the underlying reason for the villagers’ mobilization. For Habermas 
([1981]1989), what motivates the actors of the new social movements to mobilize is:  
[D]evelopments that noticeably affect the organic foundations of the 
lifeworld and make us drastically aware of standards of livability, of 
inflexible limits to the deprivation of sensual-aesthetic background 
needs…The issue is…of defending and restoring endangered ways of life 
(P.392, 394).   
  
As is true for the EJM in the U.S. and other environmental justice struggles 
around the world, what is at stake in the Bergama case is not the standards of livability 
but livability itself, not sensual-aesthetic background needs but the very survival needs, 
and the issue is not of defending and restoring endangered ways of life but endangered 




Gamson (1992) criticizes the NSM theories for their exclusion of contemporary 
movements in societies other than Western Europe and North America. This theoretical 




…privileges one particular, albeit interesting, subset of social movements 
that happen to be predominantly white, middle class and located in 
Western Europe and North America. These movements are well worth 
studying. But when they become a reified category of analysis – the new 
social movements – many of the most important social movements of the 
past two decades are rendered invisible (P.58, emphasis original). 
 
Taking Gamson’s criticism one step further, I argue that the NSM theories do not 
account for the contemporary social movements in North America, as exemplified in the 
failure of this theoretical framework to explain the Environmental Justice Movement. I 
further argue that rendered invisible by this approach are not only other important social 
movements around the globe but also the similarities in the grievances, means and goals 
of the grassroots struggles in the global North and South.  
Despite being systematically stripped of their ‘cratos’, the ‘demos’ in the North, 
South, East and West firmly hold their ground in their fight against structural injustices, 
striving for their longed-for ideal of direct democracy. This global convergence of 
grassroots struggles goes unnoticed by the New Social Movements (NSM) theorists. 
A new approach to theorizing social movements that takes as its point of 
departure these similarities is necessary. Such an approach will guide not only social 
movement scholars in understanding ecological grassroots movements in the global 
North and South but also movement activists in their struggle for social change. In 
contrast, an exclusive focus on the distinctions between the ecological grassroots 
movements in the global South, on the one hand, and in the North, on the other, will be 
counter-productive in challenging the systemic root causes of ecological problems 
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